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SEPTEMBER

COMMENTARY

This Century of Betrayal

The Promise and the Pale

Empire and Zionism: A Bankrupt Partnership

Atonement—A Poem

Checkmate for Rabble-Rousers

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The Presence is in Exile, Too—A Story

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The Month in History

International Bill of Rights: Second Phase

France: Nothing is Concluded

From the American Scene—

Sarah to Sylvia to Shirley

The Study of Man—

“Whither Civilization?”

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
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PUBLISHED BY THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

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Fritz Sternberg

As his contribution to the series, "The Crisis of the Individual," the internationally known economist and political scientist probes down to what he considers the single basic global maladjustment at the heart of the ills of our era.

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Franz Rosenzweig

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A portrait of one of the most remarkable Jewish religious personalities of modern times, by a scholar who knew him and his work.

The Red Calf

Mendele Mocher Sforim

A chapter, translated into English for the first time, from the informal memoirs of the first classic Yiddish writer. Mendele's work has a more than historical interest for our times.

COMMENTARY

INCORPORATING CONTEMPORARY JEWISH RECORD

THIS CENTURY OF BETRAYAL

Can America Lead a New Struggle for Independence?

HANS KOHN

WE HAVE all grown up with the belief that society must rest upon the dignity and inviolability of the individual human being. But in our time men have been used as cattle and killed like cattle, while the man of conscience and purpose suffers increasingly from a sense of helplessness. Where did Western civilization go wrong? Is the crisis of our time due to the abuse of technology, the failure of religion, the debasement of culture, the bureaucratization of politics—or what?

THE 20th century has betrayed the 18th century's ideas of human freedom and the 19th century's progress toward their achievement.

What 18th-century aristocrats talked of in a cosmopolitan, truly European atmosphere—the emancipation of the individual from traditions and superstitions, the new humanitarianism, the daring freedom of the human mind, the changed relationship between ruler and governed—was as nearly realized by 19th-century middle-class society as may ever be done. It was a century full of enterprise and happiness. Europe broadened into the world; new frontiers were conquered; the standard of living rose rapidly; age-old scourges of mankind—pests and famines—were brought for the first time under control; intercourse between countries all over the globe became freer than ever

This is the eighth article in the series, "The Crisis of the Individual." It is the aim of this series to offer varying analyses of the nature of our dilemma and, if possible, to suggest ways of solving it.

Future contributors to the series will include Leo S. Baeck, Julien Benda, James Burnham, Martin Buber, Lewis Corey, Irwin Edman, Louis Finkelstein, André Gide, Sidney Hook, Karl Polanyi, S. K. Popper, and Fritz Sternberg.

before: men, goods, and ideas traveled with few hinderances; peace seemed assured; and long-lasting wars among civilized nations were thought absurd.

The one world which the 18th century in its intellectual curiosity visualized seemed assured in the 19th century through the magic of universal commerce and free trade. The benevolent merchant offering goods and happiness replaced the warrior hero carrying glory and death. The Victorian poet laureate voiced the general expectation of middle-class society in 1853 in the familiar lines beginning:

*Men, my brothers, men the workers, ever
reaping something new;
That which they have done but earnest of
the things that they shall do.*

and ending in the prophecy:

*Till the war-drum throb'd no longer, and
the battle flags were furled
In the Parliament of man, the Federation
of the world.*

For the first time mankind became an open society: the age-old seclusion of China and Japan was broken; Russia and Turkey—the only two European countries where travelers at the end of the century still needed passports—entered more and more into the community of nations; the knowledge of European science began to penetrate the jungles of Africa and the deserts of Asia.

More important, however, was the spread of the new humane attitude based upon the growing recognition of the value and dignity of each individual life: the end of slavery and serfdom, the unprecedented feeling of social responsibility, the reform of penal laws. Under the influence of English

ideas of liberty and law, attempts were everywhere made, even in Russia, Turkey, and China, to limit autocracy, to secure individual rights, to establish the majesty of law. At the beginning of the 20th century, the globe seemed well on the way toward coalescing into one world. At Bournemouth on June 12, 1946, Mr. Ernest Bevin could nostalgically sum up mankind's hopes by recalling the reality of a few decades ago: "I want to be able to go down to Victoria Station, get a ticket, and go where the hell I like without a passport or anything else."

THE apparent turning point in the 20th century's betrayal was the war of 1914, which was followed by Lenin's Russian Revolution. Some immediately recognized the war in its full implication as a crisis of unprecedented magnitude. Sir Edward Grey was not thinking of political or economic issues when he spoke at the beginning of the war of the lights going out all over Europe. At the end of the war, among jubulations of victory and expectations of return to "normalcy," Paul Valéry stated that an extraordinary shudder had passed through the marrow of Europe. "We modern civilizations have learned to recognize that we are mortal like the others. We feel that a civilization is fragile as a life."

With unusual perspicacity, then little heeded, he predicted that the transition from war to peace would be infinitely more dangerous and more obscure than the passage from peace to war; that all nations would be convulsed by it; that in a short while we might behold the miracle of a strictly animal society, a perfect and final ant-hill; and that Europe might lose her leadership and become what she was in reality, a little cape of the Asiatic continent. Four years later, in a lecture at Zürich, Valéry once more spoke of the crisis in the wake of the war. He described it in words which could be applied as well to the situation in 1946, after the second war. Today his words, spoken in the fall of 1922, sound familiar:

HANS KOHN follows the march of ideas and events with the eyes of an historian; his writings on the origins and development of nationalism have won him international reputation. He is professor of modern history at Smith College. His activities as foreign correspondent took him from Prague, where he was born in 1891, to France, Palestine, and finally to the United States. During World War I, Dr. Kohn was a prisoner of war in Turkestan and Siberia, and for the following two years served as secretary of the Comité des Delegations Juives in Paris. After receiving a doctor's degree from the University of Prague in 1923, he went as a correspondent for the *Frankfurter Zeitung* to Palestine, where he remained, writing and teaching, until 1933. After his arrival in the United States, Dr. Kohn lectured for a year at the New School of Social Research in New York City. In addition to numerous volumes on politics published in Europe, his books to appear in this country are *Nationalism in the Soviet Union* (1933), *Orient and Occident* (1934), *Western Civilization in the Near East* (1936), *Force or Reason* (1937), *Revolutions and Dictatorship* (1939), *Not By Arms Alone* (1940), *World Must Federate! Isolation vs. Cooperation* (1940), *World Order in Historical Perspective* (1942), *Idea of Nationalism; A Study in its Origins and Background* (1945), and *Prophets and Peoples; Studies in 19th Century Nationalism* (1946).

The storm has died away, and still we are restless, uneasy, as if the storm were about to break. Almost all the affairs of men remain in a terrible uncertainty. We think of what has disappeared, we are almost destroyed by what has been destroyed; we do not know what will be born, and we fear the future, not without reason. We hope vaguely, we dread precisely; our fears are infinitely more precise than our hopes; we confess that the charm of life is behind us, abundance is behind us, but doubt and disorder are in us and with us. There is no thinking man, however shrewd or learned he may be, who can hope to dominate this anxiety, to escape from this impression of darkness, to measure the probable duration of this period when the vital relations of humanity are disturbed profoundly.

One can say that all the fundamentals of our world have been affected by the war, or more exactly, by the circumstances of the war; something deeper has been worn away than the renewable parts of the machine. You know how greatly the general economic situation has been disturbed, and the polity of states, and the very life of the individual; you are familiar with the universal discomfort, hesitation, apprehension. But among all these injured things is the mind. The mind has indeed been cruelly wounded; its complaint is heard in the hearts of intellectual men; it passes a mournful judgment on itself. It doubts itself profoundly.

In these words Valéry exposed the fundamental crisis of the 20th century. The crisis was so grave because of the state in which it found the mind. The intellectual trends of the 19th century had presaged the reality of the 20th, just as those of the 18th had prophesied the reality of the 19th. Baudelaire and Richard Wagner, Nietzsche and Dostoevski, denounced their age, its individualism and humanitarianism, the middle-class foundation and its pursuit of happiness. By the middle of the 20th century many of their wish-projections had become an actuality with a vengeance. But the trends had been gathering momentum for the last one hundred years. It was on June 17, 1852 that Amiel wrote in his *Journal Intime*:

Every despotism has a specially keen and hostile instinct for whatever keeps up human dignity and independence. It is curious to see scientific teaching used everywhere as a means

to stifle all freedom of investigation in moral questions under a deadweight of facts. Materialism is the auxiliary doctrine of every tyranny, whether of the one or of the masses. To crush what is spiritual, moral, human in man, by specializing him, to form mere wheels of the great social machine instead of complete individuals, to make society and not conscience the center of life, to enslave the soul to things, to depersonalize man—this is the dominant drift of the age.

IN THE 18th century the individual asserted himself in opposition to the tyranny of the one; in the 20th century the individual faces the incomparably harder task of asserting himself in opposition to the tyranny of the many.

The two mass movements of the 19th century, nationalism and socialism, originated in the liberal atmosphere inherited from the 18th century. They were imbued with a generous benevolence towards everything human, with a desire for a universal embrace, for tearing down all walls of segregation, with a determination to lay the foundations for a truly open society. In the patriots of 1848, even in Marx, some of these hopes of the age vibrated. But a new spirit of militancy gradually shifted the emphasis from the individual to the organization, from open outstretched arms to clenched fists; nationalism centered around barracks, socialism around factories, each one a symbol and model of team work and discipline. Yet the mutual hostility of these two mass movements before the war of 1914 safeguarded an area of liberty and individuality. It was the fusion of nationalism and socialism in Russia and Germany that created the modern totalitarian society with its type of man: worker and soldier at the same time, the total antithesis of 19th-century man.

Berdyaev has spoken of the "new Middle Ages." In Russia and in Germany—and wherever totalitarianism penetrated—men became fired by a fanatical faith, by an absolute unquestioning certainty which rejected the critical attitude of modern man. Compromise—the foundation of democracy—was now a betrayal of the faith; the certainty of salvation numbed any moral sense

regarding the means of the attainment of the end. Primitive beliefs in the power of the blood, in the sacred character of the leader, in the solidarity and primacy of the group, were revived; the individual, his rights and happiness, even his life and dignity, appeared of little value in the midst of the surging elemental forces. Totalitarianism in Russia and Germany—and to a lesser extent in other countries—broke the dykes of civilization which the 19th century had believed lasting.

The great freedoms of the mind conquered by Italian, Dutch, French, and English thinkers from the Renaissance to the Enlightenment, first firmly established in 17th-century England, and taken for granted in the 19th-century Western world, were scoffed at and abandoned outside their original home. In the last century these freedoms had set out to encompass the globe and to create the one world: now they were again practically confined to the British lands and the northwestern fringe of Europe. Although technological means were improving and more and more people were beginning to talk of "one world," the one world based upon the growing community of concepts and attitudes disintegrated rapidly in the frightful ruins of world wars and the lawless brutality of totalitarianism. New formidable barriers of hatred and misunderstanding have been erected; free intercourse of men, goods, and ideas has ceased; nations have again shut themselves up in a way that the 19th century would have considered fantastic.

SOCIOLOGICALLY, the 19th century with its ideas of individual rights—which are only attainable in a normal climate of tolerance, compromise, and fair play—found its foundation in a middle-class society with England as its model. Slowly, by the end of the century, such a middle class and its intelligentsia began to grow up even in Russia and in Asia. As a result of the two wars and the totalitarian revolutions, this middle class has been largely destroyed. Its last stronghold, so far unshaken, is the

United States, which in the 20th century inherits in many ways the 19th-century position of the British empire. But throughout Europe, the war's physical devastations, and inflation, taxation, and confiscation, have taken their toll of the economic foundations of the middle class. The situation is much worse, however: outside Britain, Switzerland, and Sweden, the lawlessness of totalitarian rule and of the struggle against it, the lack of information and fear of the secret police, the shattered nerves and the dilapidated homes, have destroyed more than the economic foundations of middle-class life.

For it is possible for a society to think creatively even when its economic power is waning. All over the continent of Europe, the landowning gentry and aristocracy were economically a declining class on the eve of the French Revolution and yet daring in mind; 18th-century Germany and Renaissance Italy were in a state of political disintegration and growing economic weakness; their international position and influence were negligible, and yet letters and thought flourished there more than at any other time. But today nobody can predict whether the European mind, after the horrors of war and totalitarianism, has preserved enough vitality and integrity to reassert itself amid economic decline.

That again enhances the importance of the United States. It was born as a nation in the 18th century out of the heritage of liberty of England, and the universal and rational ideas of the enlightenment. It thus has formed a continuation of Western civilization under more propitious circumstances. In spite of its political and economic insignificance at that time, it played a great role in the crises at the end of the 18th century. It is not impossible that—perhaps it may again be said *in spite of* its present political and economic power—the United States may play a similar role in the forthcoming crises of the European mind in the 20th century.

For the present crisis, the consequence of the cruel wounds of the European mind,

cannot be overcome except by a regained vitality which shows itself above all in the independence of individual thinking. Since Socrates, and again since the 17th century, it has been the dangerous privilege of the European mind to assume the troublesome burden of thinking, to be driven by a restless inquietude to ever new questioning. It has resisted the self-righteous arrogance of dogmatic simplification. It has tried to view its own situation as objectively and critically as possible. Though the intellectual was as a person and a citizen involved in the melee and took his share of the fighting, the mind made a vigorous effort to rise above the confusion and to guard a sense of proportion. Though it was painfully conscious of its inherent shortcomings, it was anxious not to make them an excuse for abdication. It did not seek emotional release and refuge in easy slogans, attributing all the evils of a complex situation to some single factor, some devil of history or society—the international bankers or capitalism, imperialism or bolshevism, cartels or the Jews, freemasons or Catholics. It refused to regard collectivities as endowed with higher faculties and to raise them to a semi-divine rank. It did not trust the "virtuous people" over the "wicked government," nor did it believe that membership in a class, group, race, or party, determined the validity or quality of thought. It realized that all these generalizations tend to absorb the individual, to deform thinking, and to shift the responsibility from the individual to a scapegoat, and thus to aggravate the crisis.

TODAY the individual has been dwarfed by the adoration of force and success and the glorification of bigness. The rapid deterioration in the course of this century has become clear in the fall from Wilson's association of equal nations, small and large alike, backed by the moral conscience and free discussion of mankind, to the Big Three and the rule of power. In the last ten years a Big Three has appeared twice on the world scene: in 1940 when Ger-

many, Italy, and Japan set out to establish a new world order and to divide the earth into their spheres of influence—two Western powers, of which one overshadowed the other, and an Eastern power: an uneasy arrangement to couple Nordic Germany and non-Aryan Japan; and now in 1946 when America, Britain, and Russia have set out with a similar purpose—two Western powers (of which one overshadows the other) and an Eastern power: an uneasy arrangement to couple democratic America and totalitarian Russia. This cult of quantity, of the colossal, considers power as permanent and moral factors as irrelevant. Yet six years ago the *Luftgeschwader* and the *Panzer-Kolonnen* of Germany seemed irresistible in the air and on the ground; Britain practically unarmed and much inferior in manpower, standing alone and abandoned, broke the overweening power of the Axis, both on the Channel and on the Nile.

With this cult of force and bigness goes the violence of language and volume of noise which shouts down the individual and breaks his independence. Never have verbal attacks been so unrestrained, both in the abuse of the adversary and in the misuse of words and facts. Lenin's revolution set the pattern; other totalitarian regimes imitated it successfully; even non-totalitarian nationalist movements in Central Europe and in Asia have showed themselves masters of the new artless art which, with the degradation of the language, involves the degradation of the mind. Even the more mature free societies have succumbed to this danger in the milder form of ready acceptance of clichés. Thus in the United States most people assume that a "republic" in itself is better than a "monarchy." That may have been true in 1791, when there were almost no republics, and perhaps even in 1848. But it is a rather wild assumption today when so many Latin American republics have for a very long time shown neither civic virtue nor respect for liberties—and, remember, the totalitarianism of Russia and Germany grew out of republics and preserved

republican institutions. The cliché induces the mind to oppose a hopeful though non-existent ideal situation of the future to the reality of the present, forgetting that the future may invalidate all the bright promises and leave instead more ruin and disintegration.

We would do well to be forewarned about slogans like "national independence" or "revolution," so often regarded as a good in themselves. The dissolution of the Hapsburg monarchy did not raise the standard of tolerance or decency in the Danubian valley; the independence of many nations has been used for the oppression of minorities and the deterioration of human liberties; a revolution may create a void without providing anything better to fill it.

In the present crisis, loose thinking is more dangerous than ever; wishful dreaming without rational control may hasten catastrophe. The American and British leaders showed no respect for the dignity of words and facts in speaking of totalitarian Russia as a democratic country, and discussing with her "freedom of elections" or "liberty of the press." Whatever momentary advantages this betrayal of the mind may have brought in the confusion of the war have cost dearly. For it helped that softening of thinking, that devaluation of all values, which is at the bottom of the crisis.

THE cult of force and of violence has produced the worship of the hero. In the totalitarian countries, military language has cloaked what were formerly the most civilian of occupations: harvesting of the crops in the fields, and teaching of the art of reading, writing poetry, and scientific research, become movements of a great army on march, comprising everything, engaging every individual activity, so much so that in this age of false heroism nothing is left to the independent daring of the individual. In the Soviet Union, mothers of ten children become "national heroines." The fanatical fighting spirit of armies and whole populations is regarded as praise-

worthy and presented as a justification of the regime, as if Nazi Germany or primitive hordes had lacked such a spirit. The machine has no room for true courage, for what the Germans call—perhaps because they showed it so rarely—*Zivilkourage*, unregimented individual courage. Heroism and the hero are extolled at a time when nothing is more needed than the very civilian virtues which are the foundation of civility and of civilization alike. The present-day hero, inspired by the violent language of full-blast battle cries disguised as social theories or historical messages, has only contempt for two of the four cardinal virtues known to antiquity and to the Christian Middle Ages, *temperantia* and *prudentia*, moderation and measure, *mesotes* and *sophrosyne*. Nor can he lay claim to the two which remain, for fortitude and justice can only be shown by the thinking individual and never by the regimented fighter.

The 20th century has boasted of its consideration for the welfare of the people, yet it has sacrificed the welfare, life, and happiness of man to idols and molochs with as little a perturbed conscience as primitive ages did. The unjust fate of an individual—an individual unimportant in himself and with no other dignity or demand for respect than the decisive one, of being human—could until recently stir whole communities into action. The revolted conscience of intellectuals was alive to individual wrongs, especially to wrongs inflicted by the tyranny of authority or of superstition. In the 18th century, Voltaire could exact restitution from Louis XV for the execution of Jean Calas in spite of the fury of the masses who sided with the monarch. The storm that swept France as the result of the Dreyfus trial, the overthrow of the Maura cabinet in Spain in 1909 as the result of the execution of the anarchist Ferrer, the wave of protests in the United States against the condemnation of Sacco and Vanzetti, are recent outstanding examples that make sad reading at a time when millions are thrown by secret

police into prisons, are executed, purged, liquidated, or just disappear without leaving a trace, as if they were not human beings, as if they had never lived—without arousing indignation and action even in the free countries.

The individual mind, having abdicated before the "necessity of history," accepts the most dastardly degradation of man with a callousness unimaginable in the 19th century.

THE most dangerous symptom for the future of civilization is the admiration which even liberal intellectuals hold for liberty's most determined enemies, for their seeming efficiency and their success. The astonishing ability of the mind to deceive itself and escape its responsibilities is revealed in the brilliant array of excuses and subterfuges. To compete with totalitarian claims, immense demands are put upon free society, which no society can meet. Its survival, and our right to its survival, are made dependent upon the solution of many problems that by their nature are insoluble except in a Utopia, or allow only a slow and gradual amelioration by patient and sustained effort. The boasts of totalitarian regimes are accepted uncritically at face value. So it is with the most popular slogan: "unemployment." As if the totalitarian regimes had solved that problem otherwise than by gigantic preparations for war or defense, "guns instead of butter,"

and with a standard of living that the "unemployed" in a capitalistic society would reject. But of a time when the intelligence abdicates its independence, nothing is more characteristic than the appearance of so many saviors with ready remedies for all the ills of their class, nation, or group, some of them even claiming that, at a rather undetermined cost, they may save all of mankind or whatever may be left of it after the salvaging process.

That the many accept the panaceas in their thirst for ready-made faiths and inspiring certainties is understandable; that the world is again full of magicians and quacks—this time in scientific garb—is perhaps unavoidable; all this enhances the responsibility of the individual to maintain his critical independence and to resume the 18th-century fight for clarity and human values.

It will be an infinitely harder fight. The mind today is more conscious of its limitations, more aware of the elemental strength of the dark forces in man. It will not indulge in Utopian hopes nor in romantic nostalgia. It cannot undo the present, and has to build within the given human reality and historical situation with creative patience. It will not try to coin new slogans. It is its task to preserve amid the ruins the threatened heritage of civilization, the respect for truth, the rule of law, the sanctity of human life, and the regard for the freedom of the individual and of the mind.

THE PROMISE AND THE PALE

A Gentile View of Jewish Irony

WILLIAM BARRETT

IT IS time the Gentile took careful notice of Sholom Aleichem. And why not? Where is it written in the Talmud that a Gentile should not write about Sholom Aleichem? And, on the other hand, does not the Bible say: "The stranger may see new things in the house?" Or, as someone in Kasrilevka remarked when the first news arrived that a certain Jewish Captain Dreyfus had been accused in France of selling his country's secrets: "What won't a Jew do these days to earn a living?" And not only a Jew.

Of course, this involves limitations: Reading *The Old Country*, the volume of Sholom Aleichem's stories newly published by Crown, I cannot check the translation point by point, though it seems to me it must be a very good one, for I can continually guess behind the English the intonation and turn of phrase (on which so much in Sholom Aleichem depends) of the original.

Nor am I able to speak authoritatively about the selection of stories, beyond saying that the whole volume maintains a consistently satisfying level throughout. Besides my own inference, however, I have the word of friends that the editors and translators, Julius and Frances Butwin, have done a remarkably good job: certainly they have turned out a book that can delight and absorb the English reader who does not know any Yiddish at all. But perhaps this has to be qualified some-

what: I cannot conceive, for example, of a highly literate Gentile who has lived all his life in rural Kansas picking up this book and seeing its qualities for what they are. To read Sholom Aleichem one must have at least some direct and intimate acquaintance with Jewish people, Jewish traits, and the Jewish mind. And perhaps only a Jew who has lived within the Russian or Polish Pale will extract the maximum of pathos and irony from these stories.

This last perhaps best defines the sense in which Sholom Aleichem is to be taken as an example of folk literature. Examples of folk literature in another sense would be the tales of the brothers Grimm or of Hans Christian Andersen: products of the folk itself, of its ancestral and unconscious mythopoeic wisdom. On the other hand, we have the folk or peasantry treated by such writers as Verga and Silone in Italy, and from time to time by various masters of French fiction. The place of Sholom Aleichem as a folk writer is somewhere between these two groups: he is certainly, in any case, an example of folk writing in a more authentic sense than Verga or Silone. For with Sholom Aleichem there is a direct relation between the writer and his audience. We do not meet here a self-conscious writer, obsessed with problems of his art or the tradition into which his works are to be inserted. For the most part the writer seems to be transcribing directly the incidents and lives that were common knowledge and conversation in the communities within the Pale. *He is directly expressing a people to itself*—such is the essential folk quality of Sholom Aleichem.

This is the reason why, in speaking of Sholom Aleichem, one tends to pass directly from the writer to his material: the life of

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the Jew that he represents; why, for example, Mr. Maurice Samuel's excellent book is entitled *The World of Sholom Aleichem* rather than anything else which would have to do with the personality or self-development of the writer. Now the most attractive and famous characteristic of Yiddish life within the Pale is its irony; and it is in his mastery of irony that Sholom Aleichem achieves his distinctive quality and greatness as a humorist. In other respects the life he represents is extremely narrow and even impoverished for the creative novelist. Within the Pale there are no great ranges of class or status, which have traditionally provided the most exciting opportunities for Western novelists. But this narrowness carries the great virtue of its defect: the Jews face each other more nakedly, so to speak, and they develop their irony face to face with each other. Hence too the particular rudeness of the Jew (which the anti-Semite has seized upon without ever understanding), expressed in Sholom Aleichem by the amazing and comic curses and imprecations the characters address to each other from time to time; but by being so vocal, this violence is also sublimated, and does not appear in the drunken physical forms of the Russian peasantry surrounding the Jewish communities. Moreover, this Old-Country rudeness is not to be confused with the forms it takes in the New World, where it is already permeated (as is the case with all other immigrant peoples in New York) by the violence of American life. Such rudeness is only the other side of honesty: the Gentile, as Delmore Schwartz says, lives by wearing a mask, the Jew by taking one off—a profound observation to which I shall return in a minute.

THE depth and wisdom of Jewish irony and Jewish humor arise from their fundamentally religious source. A comparison with the peasant humor in Silone is instructive at this point: the humor of the Italian peasant is often sharp and shrewd, but it has a quality of dumb earthy pathos, and it is significant that Silone often makes the peasants be their wittiest when

they are acting stupid before the city officials and bureaucrats. Jewish irony is immensely more self-conscious because the Jew is aware that the greatest joke of all is that he, a Jew, in his particular conditions of life, should even attempt a joke. He, as a Jew, has the Promise, yet he lives meanwhile in the Pale. The contrast between that Promise and his actual life is so extraordinary that he must look at his *total existence* with irony: Ach! what a joke that a Jew should even try to make a joke! The tension between these two is necessary for this irony: if he lost his belief in the Promise, irony would no longer be possible, but only desperation, and in the end, extinction.

Thus it seems to me a mistake (though I speak, of course, from limited knowledge) to consider the theological irony expressed by Sholom Aleichem's people as a sign of incipient disbelief; if incipient, this is still certainly miles away from actual disbelief. Usually, in fact, the irony conveys a quite sound theology. There is, for example, the incident (unfortunately not included in this collection) of the Jew on Yom Kippur in the synagogue who wearily exclaims: "I'm tired of confessing my sins, why doesn't God confess some of his?" The irony exists here only so long as no disbelief or blasphemy is understood. And the point expressed is also a very serious one for any believer. It must not be forgotten (and if we were inclined to forget it, Tevye the Milkman, who is one of Sholom Aleichem's best theologians, would probably remind us) that on the Day of Judgment God also justifies himself; and he has many things to explain to us, many things . . . *bien sur, il en aura beaucoup*.

The very particularism of Jewish religion reinforces and develops Jewish irony in another respect too. Religion must regulate every action of life, in order that life may be sanctioned as separate from the alien body in the midst of which the Jew is condemned to wander. But every action, as soon as it is touched upon by the Law, becomes the subject of discussion and casuistry: it comes into relation with the word. All aspects of life thus become vocal, and it is from this

ubiquity of language and talk that Sholom Aleichem draws his main strength. In one of the stories the narrator is able to elicit from the Russian peasant who is driving him only a grunted "uh-uh" in answer to all his questions, and he comments:

I imagined what it would have been like if this were a Jew driving the sleigh. He would have told me not only where the inn was, but who ran it, what his name was, how many children he had, how much rent he paid, what he got out of it, how long he had been there, who had been there before him—in short, everything. We are a strange people, we Jews.

The possession of language, Aristotle says, is what sets man off from the beast; and to the degree that everything in life has been systematically talked over, life itself becomes more self-conscious, and therefore more human. Obviously too, the writer in a community where everything is talked about and known—the man's name, his children, rent, etc.—has an immense advantage: he does not have to scratch his head very hard for material.

The conditions of the Pale, and the particularism of his religion, conspire to separate the Jew from the soil and the larger social whole in which he lives. However this may impoverish the total range of his imaginative life, it has nevertheless immense advantages as a preparation for the modern world: the Jew is not easily addicted to the myths of soil and blood. This Russian driver above, we must remember, undoubtedly spoke of the Tsar as "Little Father," believing himself sincerely a child before such authority; and this mysticism of the existing order and authority is also shared by the peasantries of the West. One story in this collection, "Hodel," deals with a young Jew who is sent away—obviously to Siberia—for political activity. Sholom Aleichem does not follow him into the Russian world beyond the Pale, but we, who are aware of that outside world, cannot help being moved in a manner probably uncalculated by the author, remembering that the *élite* among Russian political intellectuals were in a great percent-

age Jews. The Pale had not been a very bad preparation for them. And one more example to drive home the point: there is the remark made by Henry Adams about the Dreyfus Affair, that even if Dreyfus were not guilty, he should accept the verdict of the military court for the honor of the French army and the French nation. Alas, the Jew was stubborn and did not respond like a peasant sheep to this myth of the Nation; he, the particularist in religion, was committed to a more universal commandment: truth.

THE difference between Jew and Gentile does not engage Sholom Aleichem, since he moves solely within the Jewish world, but it is expressed—though incidentally and perhaps there too even a little unconsciously—by a greater Jewish writer than Sholom Aleichem, Marcel Proust, in those pages of his novel where he is treating of the repercussions of the Dreyfus case in the circle of the *Guermites*. The *Guermites* are the beautiful race in whom Proust feels the mysterious presence of the blood: their past perpetually suggests to him the beauties of medieval churches and stained glass; but they are also still the boar-hunting feudal chivalry with all its cruelties and *paganism*. And despite the extent of his assimilation, his acceptance by the aristocracy and the Jockey Club, we are led to sense the profound degree to which Swann (who, one suspects, becomes here the vehicle of Proust's own experiences as a Jew in the Parisian *haut monde*) is separated from the *Guermites*—from their beauties and cruelties both—as a superior spiritual being.

The point, in short, that I am laboring to make—and it is one so profoundly ironical that one might almost say that History itself has played a stroke of Jewish irony—is simply that the very particularism and alienation of the Jew have rendered him the universal norm for intellectual life in the modern world. The man who would live an intellectual or spiritual life is driven by modern society into a corner: here in his particular Pale, he may not have the Promise or the

Law, but he is nevertheless bound by the law of his own obligations, and he too had better develop an inclusive irony towards the powers that be or go under. If I may be permitted one more example, I should like to point out that in James Joyce's *Ulysses* the spiritual father of Stephen Dedalus (who is Joyce himself) is the Jew, Leopold Bloom. Joyce's imagination is always anchored to a massive and bedrock literalness—in this respect he is the most traditional, even medieval or Dantesque, of modern writers—and I do not see any reason for not taking him at his literal word here. And I think it must be apparent to the reader by this time that the present writer feels himself more attached to these stories of Sholom Aleichem than to any folk tales of native American or Irish source—which should normally, one supposes, be where he locates his tradition, if he had one.

OBVIOUSLY, I have been led here beyond the immediate subject of Sholom Aleichem himself, but the digression appears to me inevitable. If the Jew had not entered the life of the West—as an extraordinary contributor to human culture and as the object of unparalleled mass-persecution—we should read Sholom Aleichem only as a highly amusing, but also narrow, folk writer. But in fact we do read him for more, for what he reveals about a destiny that was to be played out outside the Pale. If Sigmund Freud strikes us as a Jewish figure, in a profound way, it is not simply because he himself has acknowledged on several occasions what he owed to being a Jew, or because he fully exhibits his liking for Jewish jokes in his book on wit. He tells somewhere the story of a private conversation in which the great French psychologist, Charcot, remarks of a neurotic woman patient: "*En ces cas, c'est toujours la chose genitale, toujours, toujours, toujours.*" If he knew this, comments Freud, why did he not ever say it in public? But the Gentile, to quote again, lives by wearing a mask, the Jew by taking it off. The Gentile must be genteel—the gentility of the Gentile.

To be thoroughly genteel involves an inordinate amount of polite falsehood; presently one becomes assimilated to the ritual of falsehood and one is playing a role—practising "bad faith," as Jean-Paul Sartre would say. Freud, the Jew, takes off the mask—and in public; and the genteel tradition has not yet forgiven him for it. (They never wear masks in the Pale. Who but a *nogid* could afford one?) And if we take the following casual passage from Freud:

Perhaps, then, you . . . will fall back upon the argument that it is surely very improbable that we ought to concede so large a part in the human constitution to what is evil. But do your own experiences justify you in this statement? I will say nothing of how you may appear in your own eyes, but have you met with so much good will in your superiors and rivals, so much chivalry in your enemies and so little envy amongst your acquaintances, that you feel it incumbent on you to protest against the part played by egotistic baseness in human nature?

we have only to translate it suitably with the appropriate winks, shrugs, intonations, and quotations of scripture in order to have a piece of truthful cynicism that could come from the mouth of one of Sholom Aleichem's characters.

No doubt, as Maurice Samuel has pointed out, the world of Sholom Aleichem was teetering, even when he wrote, on the brink of dissolution: the Jews of the Pale, habituated as they were to suffering and persecution, could hardly have imagined the dark bloody whirlwind of Hitler, the Nazis, and the extermination camps of World War II. But if this world has largely vanished, through slaughter or immigration, there is still on this side of the Atlantic an extraordinary persistence of some of the old patterns: for where he is not engaged in trying to exterminate the Jew, the Gentile is still attempting to push him back, in the university world and elsewhere, into some *numerus clausus*, which is only a more genteel form of the Pale. And immediately the old stories arise again.

For example, let me tell you, Mr. Sholom Aleichem, the story of the ten Jews on the *Harvard Law Review*. . . .

EMPIRE AND ZIONISM: A BANKRUPT PARTNERSHIP

A Realistic Approach to Arab-Jewish Cooperation

VICTOR EPPSTEIN

THE sentimentality or Byronic romanticism of Zionism has received far more emphasis than the politico-economic currents that have constituted its real strengths or weaknesses. Underlying realistic factors have been generally obscured by the poetic declarations of Zionist leaders. Theodor Herzl, founder of the World Zionist Organization, thought of himself in terms of Messianic leadership. For Ahad Ha'am, whose basic philosophy is more or less accepted by most American Zionists, the greatest value and primary function of a Jewish Palestine could perhaps be found in its cultural and spiritual stimulation of Diaspora Judaism.

The various schools of Labor Zionism have conceived the movement as a social experiment in utopianism. Dr. Chaim Weizmann's personality, like Herzl's before him, has also served to obscure the historical value of Zionism. Thousands doubtless believe the oft repeated legend that Great Britain issued

the Balfour Declaration as a reward for Dr. Weizmann's chemical aid to the Allies in World War I.

Zionism Seeks Imperialist Support

THE greatest confusion as to the real political nature of Zionism arises from the relationship between Zionism and Western imperialism. Zionism has, in fact, often seemed to be the child of imperialism. Herzl sought to gain Kaiser Wilhelm's sponsorship in the form of a German protectorate by tying his movement to Germany's expansionist schemes. Fortunately, the Kaiser "missed the boat" and did not take Herzl's project very seriously.

The open use of Zionism as an instrument of British imperialism during the past two decades accounts for the fanatical opposition of the Arabs. How often have not Zionists expressed sincere bewilderment in the face of this opposition! They have cited the many material and cultural advantages Jewish colonization has brought to the Arabs of Palestine and surrounding areas. At the same time, these very Zionists have been puzzled at England's failure to allow the rapid growth of Jewish settlement, which, they have naively asserted, would so greatly strengthen the British Empire.

If the Arab nationalists are correct in their assumption that Zionism helps Britain hold her grip on the Empire, why indeed have British statesmen not seized every opportunity to foster large-scale Jewish immigration, to encourage the Jewish organizations for self-defense, to facilitate rather than to prohibit the purchase of land by Palestine Jews—in short, to implement the Palestine Mandate?

Zionists have generally lazily concluded that this was but another case of British

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"muddling," reinforced by bureaucratic anti-Semitism to be sure, yet in the main the same sort of ineptitude that produced the American Revolution, the Sinn Fein, and Mahatma Gandhi.

The complex pattern of British policy becomes intelligible only when we realize that the England which underwent industrial revolution two hundred years ago is now attempting to prevent this economic evolution in the East. Industrialization in the home country demanded the achievement of democratic institutions; where there is no disposition to permit the former, as in Palestine, there is not likely to be much concern over absence of the latter. An idealist may, to be sure, rise in Parliament to complain that Palestine is governed as under a "police state," but his sentimental protest is politely ignored.

Significantly, Zionists have been careful to point out that the armed resistance of Palestinian "terrorists," like the unanimous moral opposition of the official Jewish community, is not at this juncture directed against British rule in Palestine, as the Irish Sinn Fein rebellion once was, but is focused intensely and exclusively upon one single issue, i.e., British refusal to allow the surviving Jews of Europe to enter the country. No matter how violent their protests, the Jews have taken every occasion to make clear their loyalty to the Empire and its aims.

Let us be clear on this point before we proceed, because the attempt is being made to confuse the issue, deliberately on the part of the British government, unintentionally, though no less effectively, on the part of some Zionist spokesmen in England and America.

During the entire period of Arab violence in 1936-39, with the Jewish national army (outlawed by the administration) in existence as now, there were no organized "terrorist acts," either of reprisal or aggression.

It was only when the government ordered the cessation of further immigration and closed the gates of Palestine in the faces of European refugees that the shooting started. Examine the list of "illegal acts committed

by Jewish nationalist extremists," and it will be seen that not in a single instance were ultimate political considerations involved. Until recently each act was directly concerned with entrance into the country of a specific group of immigrants, classed by the government as illegal. The Jews know that the sole legal claim of the British to be in Palestine is their mandate to "facilitate Jewish immigration," and accordingly they feel no moral obligation to acquiesce in Britain's "illegal" and "terroristic" attempt to shut off immigration.

Empire Economy Vs. Zionist Industry

BUT why does England, with its long tradition of humane civilization, with its own record of fair treatment of the Jewish people and its openly expressed sympathy with Zionist aims, act in a way that denies hope to the remnant of European Jewry, outrages Zionists, and dismays fair-minded people everywhere? There is only one consideration which weighs more heavily with the British government than abstract morality, than humanitarianism, than even fidelity to its own pledge—the perpetuation of the Empire.

There is nothing surprising in the notorious discrepancy between the campaign program of the British Labour party and the foreign policy subsequently adopted by the responsible Labour government. British trade unionism, despite its theoretical socialism, has never evolved a practical program for the transformation of British industry from an imperialistic to a national structure. Mr. Churchill must have spoken with tongue in cheek when he warned the Labour government that their anti-imperialist measures would result in unemployment and economic shrinkage in England until the population, by starvation and emigration, had been reduced by 50 per cent. He could not have doubted that the permanent bureaucracy had already instructed the government in the elementary facts of life and that not even a Labour prime minister would willingly preside over the dissolution of the Empire. The British industrial econ-

omy has never known any but an imperial structure, and until an acceptable alternative has been devised, with a reasonable prospect for full employment of the home population—which has multiplied vastly since industrialization—the preservation of the Empire will continue to be the basis of Britain's foreign policy.

The British Empire can be maintained only if two conditions are guaranteed. The first and obvious need is for the protection of the imperial "life line." Zionists, aware of this, have pointed out that Arabian nationalism threatens the life line, that a Jewish Palestine, loyal to Britain, should be established as the best safeguard against anti-British tendencies in the East, and have emphasized the fact that even the most extreme Jewish nationalist would be perfectly satisfied with dominion status under the British flag.

But the second condition, which Zionists ignore, is the root of the trouble. The Empire cannot be maintained unless Britain staves off the industrialization of the East. Once the whole world has experienced the industrial revolution, there is little reason to suppose that forty-five million people inhabiting a remote North Atlantic island about the size of Utah would be able to fulfill an economic role of any special world significance.

The British government knows that the Jews who settle in Palestine will play an even greater role in the industrialization of the Middle East than did the Jews in Europe during the 18th and 19th centuries.

A rationalized agrarian economy could support a few hundred thousand Jews in Palestine without threatening Great Britain's long-term interests. This was the "Jewish national homeland" that the government had in mind. Do a good turn for the Jews, and incidentally acquire a new foothold in the eastern Mediterranean. The Balfour Declaration was issued in good faith. Everything was foreseen, except that a recrudescence of anti-Semitism, worldwide in scope, would accomplish that which the eloquent romanticism of Herzl and the idealism of his Zionist followers failed to achieve,

a will to mass immigration into thirsty, backward Levantine Palestine on the part of progressive European Jews.

From the very beginning of its mandate over Palestine, Britain discouraged every effort toward rationalization of the country's industrial system. Skilled handicrafts were tolerated, but industrialism was discouraged and obstructed by every conceivable obstacle; export duties were imposed, but no protective tariffs; prohibitive import taxes were decreed on fuel and raw materials. Yet befuddled Zionists are still trying to win the English over to mass immigration with blueprints of harnessed waterpower, scientific foundations for industrial research, electricity, mass production. It is said that a laboratory for the industrial development of atomic energy has been suggested. A project for the production of atomic bombs would be less ominous!

No, the Zionists are not plotting the overthrow of the British Empire—far from it. They are in all sincerity concerned only with the creation of an economy that will enable the resurrected Jewish nation to support itself. Let it be understood, as well, that the British recognize and sympathize with the desire of the Jews, not only to rescue their kinfolk, but also to end the historic homelessness of the Hebrew nation.

The logic of the situation, however, is inescapable. No matter what their intentions, these European Jewish immigrants must inevitably become the fomenters of the industrial revolution in the East. Two hundred years ago British industry underwent this transformation, and the revolution which started in England soon crossed the Channel. From Palestine shall go forth not "the Law, and the Word of God from Jerusalem," but modern technology and science, until the entire Middle East is transformed.

Why Do Arabs Fight Zionism?

IF IT is for these reasons that Britain turns a deaf ear to the Zionist argument that a Jewish Palestine will strengthen the Empire, to what can we ascribe the hostility of

the Arabs to Jewish immigration? Why are they unmoved by the Zionist argument that a Jewish Palestine means prosperity and health and cultural renaissance for the Arab peoples? Zionist apologists agree that the Arabs are almost unanimous in their opposition to free immigration of Jews into Palestine and have offered many explanations for this—but they have failed to recognize the right one.

Bewildered Jewish commentators suggest that anti-Zionist sentiment is deliberately fostered by the British in accordance with a policy of *divide et impera*; that self-seeking Arab politicians would rather rule the roost in a starving, backward land than face the permanent check to their ambition which a Jewish majority might entail; that religious fanaticism has been used by "rich effendis" who fear the introduction of labor unionism among their fellahin; that centuries of ignorance and social degradation have made the Arabs too stupid to recognize their own advantage; that emergent Arab nationalism has generated a sentimental opposition which, in the long run, will give way to enlightened self-interest. These are but a few of the reasons offered. Most of them have some basis in fact, but all miss the nub of the matter.

One of the editors of the *Nation* comments on Britain's effort "to build up Arab nationalism as a bulwark for British security." "That policy," says Keith Hutchison, "might be defensible in terms of *Realpolitik* had not the British in executing it made the fatal error of leaning on the ruling classes, whose chief interest lies in maintaining the social status quo. The big landowners, who suck up so much of the wealth of the Middle East, fear the leavening effect of Jewish efficiency and democracy on the Arab masses, and they have stimulated anti-Zionism as a counterirritant. . . ." Here Mr. Hutchison, like so many Jewish Zionists, looks at the truth and proclaims an erroneous near-truth.

For the British policy referred to is defensible in terms of *Realpolitik* only if Britain practices what Mr. Hutchison terms a "fatal error." London is not so much building up

the tide of Arab nationalism as trying to channelize its course to the best advantage of the Empire. If the continuation of the Empire requires the prevention of industrial revolution in the Middle East, as we have contended, what could be more logical than Britain's desire to maintain an Arab ruling class that is also, for its own reasons, irreconcilably opposed to a new economic order?

Two Arab Nationalisms

WE MUST recognize under the heading "Arab nationalism," as currently employed, two main historic currents moving in opposite directions, basically irreconcilable and ultimately to be resolved only through civil war and revolution. The dominant ruling class, as Mr. Hutchison states, desires chiefly to maintain the social status quo. It has been England's consistent foreign policy to intervene in countries of potential competition on the side of economically reactionary feudalism, from assisting the Bourbons against the French bourgeoisie to backing Ibn Saud and the Arab League.

To call Ibn Saud a "nationalist" is to deprive the term of any useful meaning. The Sultan's ambitions fall entirely within the pattern of traditional Islamic history. His solitary ideological interest is a fanatical devotion to orthodox Wahabi Mohammedanism. His ambition is to unite all Mussulmans under his rule and to stamp out their many heretical sects without concession to blood or nationality.

To call the notables who organized the Arab League "nationalists" is to be only a little less confusing. They are the feudal "barons" of the Middle East who give considerable lip service to nationalism because it would be political suicide not to do so. They are not mere puppets or stooges of the British; but it is to the advantage of the British to keep them in power because they can preserve their status only by repressing tendencies toward industrialization and democracy. The notables are not kept in power by British support alone; they have power because they are supported by tradition and because they own almost everything.

It is obvious that all the Arab states, through such spokesmen, must oppose Jewish immigration into Palestine for the same basic reason that England does.

There is another class, as yet too small and too poor to wrest the power of government from the old guard, but sufficiently important already to constitute an active political force which affects in many ways the course of administrative policy. This class consists of the emergent bourgeoisie. It is anti-imperialist, hence truly nationalist. It is ambitious, hence libertarian. It is educated, hence optimistic, because it feels that the future belongs to it.

The Strength of the Progressive Nationalists

TO BE sure, a clearly defined liberal nationalist movement, comparable to that headed in Egypt at the turn of the century by Mustafa Kamil (1874-1908), cannot be discerned in the politically immature forces now agitating the Arabs of Palestine. Partisanship in the Arabian Peninsula is inclined to be dynastic. There is little evidence of a progressive program for social and political amelioration in the activities of the urban intelligentsia and of the *shebab*, the educated sons of the more prosperous farmers. Palestine's Arab leadership continues to be opportunistic and inclined to political adventurism. A new leadership must emerge to represent the inchoate industrial class and the masses whose standard of living will depend on the growth of industry.

The prospect for such leadership is to be found in the growth of Arab-owned industry, which was on the increase in Palestine even before the war. Although the total investment remains small, the percentage of increase from year to year is considerable. Most significant is the establishment during the war years of non-traditional Arab enterprises, such as textile and shoe manufactures. Zionist pressure against imperial restrictions on industry cannot but be welcomed as a real ally in this sphere. At any rate, it is unnecessary, as it would be unwise, to view our problem from an isolationist perspective

limited by the boundaries of Palestine. The political status of Palestine is obviously of great significance to the entire Middle East, and its destiny is likely to be influenced as much by the class interests at work within such relatively progressive states as Egypt and Turkey as by those active *at present* in the Arabian Peninsula.

Among the few valuable assets the effendis do not have are the souls and desires of the pitifully underprivileged fellahin, those many millions who own almost nothing but their own souls and desires. We may regard the fellahin as the eventual constituents of the sincere anti-imperialist nationalists whose optimism with respect to the future must rest on the tremendous political power inherent in the numbers of those whom they represent. These nationalists are gradually learning that political independence can give their people nothing really worth fighting for if not the opportunity to develop a healthy, productive economy capable of supporting its workers at a satisfactorily high standard of material and cultural well-being.

Ought not they to be moved by the Zionist claim that Jewish immigration will continue to bring advantages to the fellahin?

For the Arab nationalist, however, Zionism has been suspect, nay damned, from the start because it came to Palestine under British auspices. In any case, he would be forced to oppose the movement as soon as he discovered how eager responsible Zionist leaders are, according to their own declarations, to have the Jewish colony accepted as an imperial bulwark against Arabian hostility.

How can honest, intelligent Zionists blow hot for the Arabs and cold for the British without being at all aware of the self-contradiction? It would seem that the answer lies in their actual indifference to both British and Arab problems. They have been passionately concerned with the solution of the Jewish problem through Zionism; "peripheral" questions have been dismissed without serious investigation and in merely apologetic vein.

Today Zionism finds itself in a dilemma.

Whatever weight the British government may have attached to Zionist professions of loyalty seems now cancelled out by the conviction that a modern, inevitably industrial Jewish commonwealth in Palestine would be bad for the Empire. Whatever advantage to the Arab peoples the Arab nationalist may have recognized in Zionism has even more certainly been obscured by his understandable belief that the Jewish national homeland is a camouflaged outpost of imperialism.

The Dynamic of Zionism

Is ZIONISM therefore doomed? No, for Jewish nationalism rests on the bedrock of ineluctable necessity, the necessity of millions of human beings to live, to know that they and their children will have a tomorrow in which to hope. Theirs is that history-making dynamic which Jabotinsky called "that tangible momentum of irresistible distress and need by which we are propelled and borne." They cannot, as he pointed out, concede anything because they have literally no concessions to make.

If there proves to be no other way, we may expect soon to see the Jews of Europe begin to fight their way out and into "their own country"—unless, seized by some final hysteria of hopelessness, they turn to mass suicide, a possibility against which some European observers have recently warned. It cannot be imagined, however, that a world that has just witnessed the murder of two-thirds of European Jewry will stand by and watch the suicide of the remaining third. British imperialism, in this writer's opinion, will have to make the concession. It is significant that British statesmen have never dared to rest their case for Empire on the bald fact of British economic necessity. For all her insularity, England will never approach the Third Reich's indifference to established moral values. She understands too well the psychological forces through which alone economic "necessity" can determine the course of history. When the issue can no longer be postponed in Palestine, the government will submit to the inevitable and, while legalizing immigration, seek to gain

her long-term objectives by other policies—which, in our opinion, will still prove incapable of saving her imperial economy. To prevent the industrialization of the East is, in the light of history, as impossible an ambition as the preservation of the feudal system of England was at an earlier stage of history. Attlee cannot win where King Canute failed.

A further source of strength in the Zionist movement arises from the fact that for the first time since Herzl convoked the First Zionist Congress in 1897, it has openly and consciously had to break with European imperialism. To establish the fact of this rupture, one need not rely upon the bold declarations of Zionist leaders, such as the ultimatum spoken by Ben Gurion in London last winter, or upon the possibly evanescent testimony furnished by the propaganda coming from the Hagana and the Irgun. The British government has made it unmistakably clear that its purpose is to prevent the immigration without which the fulfillment of Zionism would become impossible and Zionism devoid of all but "ideological" interest. The Jews, for their part, are demonstrating that an administration which pursues such a policy can stay in Palestine only "by force of bombs and bayonets" employed, not against Arabs on behalf of Jews, but against Jews in the protection of His Majesty's agents.

It must not be supposed that this rupture is of temporary or superficial nature. American Zionists, whose Zionism is largely altruistic, a "cause" on behalf of displaced persons and stateless Jews, no doubt still hope that England will "come around" and that a basis for resuming the old pattern of cooperation will be established. Since, however, British interest in Palestine, in so far as it exceeds mere military expediency, must continue to oppose large-scale immigration, it is rather such temporizing "cooperation" that will be momentary and superficial. Today and henceforth, Anglo-Jewish relations in Palestine can only be such as are possible between a hostile empire and a subject territory, fraught with that underlying mistrust

which springs not so much from native incompatibility as from irreconcilable economic interests. Public and private speech in Palestine, today for the first time, sounds much like the speech of Irishmen during the Black and Tan struggle.

The Palestine Arab now witnesses a strange sight. His own effendis, for all their lip-service to nationalism, are at peace with the British. On the other hand, the Jews whom he has been taught to regard as British tools have thoroughly terrorized the imperial administration and are waging a more effective resistance than any other subject people of comparable size.

Jew and Arab Vs. Imperialism

HEREIN lies the ground for rapprochement between Zionism and Arab nationalism. The basic conflict is now being revealed in its true historical character, a conflict not between Jew and Arab but between the British empire and industrial revolution in the Middle East. The Jew enters Palestine not as the agent of an imperialism that dooms the East to a feudal backwardness, but as an "illegal" immigrant bearing the torch of progress. Zionism is revealed as, in fact if not in theory, the spearhead of industrial revolution pointed at the heart of a British imperialism that attempts, for the same reason that it outlaws Jewish immigration, to deny the blessings of modern industry and science to the Arab world. The failure of Zionism in this generation would condemn many generations of Arabs to feudal poverty and would perhaps mark the most reactionary turning point in the politico-economic history of the 20th century.

A change in attitude already is becoming visible on the Arab side as the true historical role of Zionism now establishes itself openly. In a very complicated political scene, too much is not to be expected overnight. One does not denounce today and laud tomorrow if one expects to hold the political following one has built up. But despite the all-too-obvious manipulations and proclamations of the Arab effendis, relations between Jew and Arab neighbor have never been less strained

in Palestine. Concrete evidences of a long-term community of interest are to be expected in the near future, rather than verbal declarations of sympathy which Arabs might not be able to utter without fear of "nationalist" reprisal. The basic political and economic forces in Palestine are such as would permit an eventual pro-Jewish change on the part of Arab political organizations once the Arab bourgeois elements become stronger and more self-conscious; but it must be recognized that there exists at present no Arab party to which overtures could be made. Accordingly, Zionists are not likely to advance their cause by attempting political negotiation of any kind with the Arabs; for the latter's reactionary leaders would without doubt rebuff such moves, while the younger Arab intellectuals, even if otherwise disposed, would as yet fear to compromise their own positions.

Cooperation in fields less conspicuous than politics is possible and may later even prove the necessity for mutual political activity and association. The less "ideological" verbiage, and the more financial and industrial cooperation, the better. Arab capital should be welcomed in Jewish industry, and Jewish credit should be made readily available to Arab enterprise. Mixed partnerships should be encouraged. The present sharp separation between Arab and Jewish industry can and must be broken down. Excellent possibilities may arise from the recent tendency of Egyptian Jews to invest in Palestinian industries. In Egypt the middle-class role of the Jews has been recognized and esteemed by Arab associates and nationalist leaders from Mustafa Kamil to those of our own time. As a democratically-inspired Arab nationalism moves closer to acceptance of Zionism, a clearer political light will reveal the true character of the anti-Zionist Arab League and its reactionary role.

As to the ultimate future, there seem to be good prospects for the Jewish commonwealth of Palestine and for the prosperity of the entire Middle East. The transition will be difficult and perhaps not without bloodshed, but the feudal elements in the

Levant will no more be able to withstand the rationalized industrial economy of the future, led by Zionist innovation, than the British nobility were able to prevent the industrial revolution in England.

The shadow of this future will surely fall upon England with the collapse of her empire-based economy. It will distress her people sorely, unless British statesmen begin to rack their brains for another and more far-seeing solution of the British economic problem. It cannot be supposed that the God of history intends hundreds of millions of human beings to endure perpetual misery and periodic famine so that forty-five millions of their fellow men can enjoy a higher but

none-too-satisfactory standard of living. The tragedy of British insularity is revealed in the mentality of statesmen who think only in terms of a Palestine Problem, an Indian Problem, or a Far Eastern Problem, but never in terms of a British Problem. It is perhaps one of the bitterest ironies of history that the English, who seek now to prevent the entrance of two or three million Jews into their ancient country, may yet have to negotiate for the exodus from their own of twenty or thirty million Englishmen. Should that time come, the British will no doubt strive to solve their problem as courageously as the Jews of Europe and the East are today striving to solve theirs.

ATONEMENT

AVIGDOR HAMMEIRI

From the synagogues calamity is howling
While from the sky favors the blest sun.
How excellent this day to pour one's heart in autumn.

This day is Atonement, day of universal shame.
Let us bear it, strongly, one brief hour
For our miserable lives, and our living horror.

And for every wretch whose anguish will not cease to pain
Let us forgive our folk his calamity.
Let us forgive one another, comradely.

This day is Atonement, look we and be silent.
This is the day when every aching plaint
Blossoms into fire, kindles into flame.

And our distant God, terrible with awe—
This day let us regard him with the same forgiveness.
This day let us forgive him, too, for creating us.

AVIGDOR HAMMEIRI is one of the first modern Hebrew writers of the impressionist school. Born in Hungary in 1886, he now resides in Palestine. This poem is from *The Singing Flame*, a volume of poetry published in 1943 in Tel Aviv. The translation is by Jacob Sloan.

CHECKMATE FOR RABBLE-ROUSERS

What to Do When the Demagogue Comes

SOLOMON ANDHIL FINEBERG

WHAT should be done when a rabble-rouser appears on the local scene? There are those who urge an all-out program of the widest publicity and organized mass-protest aimed at "arousing the community." But there are others who remain skeptical of the wisdom of the "aggressive" public approach in dealing with the professional hate-monger, no matter how useful that method may be in other situations.

The genuine rabble-rouser is not to be confused with men of wealth or political power who may, on occasion, indulge in attacks upon racial or religious groups. The rabble-rouser is altogether dependent upon hate-mongering for public attention and support. It is his whole stock-in-trade. Publicity is not merely incense in his nostrils—it is his very life-blood. Certain vermin thrive in darkness: here is a species that spawns and flourishes only in the spotlight. If we are interested in an effective antidote for rabble-rousers, some other technique seems to be indicated than feeding them large doses of the food that makes them great.

A few years ago, Gerald L. K. Smith's audiences were dwindling to a point that

made the continuance of his public career problematical. In Detroit, where he had once addressed audiences of three thousand, he was drawing only a few hundred. Newspapers ignored him. He seemed on the way to obscurity. At this point "militants" began to organize mass-picketing against him. Demonstrators appeared outside his meeting-halls; the local press began to report incidents connected with his public appearances. National press wires carried the stories. Result: Smith's sagging audiences in Detroit and elsewhere began to grow again. After some months of public clamor, Smith has become the best-advertised anti-Semitic rabble-rouser in America, and is now back in the "big-time."

Some months ago Smith visited Baltimore. He received no mention in the press, addressed a small audience of three hundred people and failed to make expenses. He hasn't been back.

But in other localities Smith has been able lately to provoke clamorous opposition. And to these places he has returned again and again in order to revel in the publicity that attends his appearance. He was denounced in Los Angeles in July 1945 by a crowd of 12,000; he was denounced by the St. Louis press as an undesirable visitor to that city; the result was that Smith was back in both places within a few months.

IN ST. LOUIS, on April 1, 1946, thirty-five veterans marched into a hall where Smith was scheduled to speak, denounced him, and appealed to an audience numbering several hundred to leave. Not one person complied. In fact, Smith was greeted with increased enthusiasm.

Commenting on this incident, the St. Louis *Times Star* on April 3 wrote:

SOLOMON ANDHIL FINEBERG is the author of *Overcoming Anti-Semitism*, a standard work in its field. He is Director of the Community Service department of the American Jewish Committee. He is a member of the Public Affairs Committee of the Central Conference of America Rabbis and was the National Chaplain of the Jewish War Veterans. Dr. Fineberg has contributed articles to many religious and educational periodicals, and has lectured to audiences in more than 200 cities in the United States. His books include *Project in American Jewish History* (1926) and *Biblical Myth and Legend* (1932).

One may well wonder if any good can come from the kind of tactics employed against Mr. Smith at Kiel Auditorium here this week. . . . Mr. Smith, characteristically, made the most of the situation to present himself as a man who is so feared that he must contend with such intrusions, and so courageous and devoted to his cause, that he refuses to be silenced or intimidated. The seeming inspiration which he gets from such show of opposition suggests that he might be less effective if more generally ignored.

After the considerable publicity occasioned by the veterans' fiasco in St. Louis, Smith announced that he would call a national convention of his satellites there on May 28. Still greater clamor followed. Attempts were made to prevent him from engaging the Municipal Auditorium. Defenders of freedom of speech debated with those who believed that Smith's utterances constituted an unjustifiable abuse of that right. Smith's convention itself drew less than two hundred. But those who demonstrated against him scuffled with the police. Again there were arrests, with still greater publicity. Did Smith avoid St. Louis as a result of this open hostility? Rarely does he visit the same city more than once or twice a year, yet he announced a return engagement in St. Louis for June 28—his third visit within four months.

One-third of St. Louis' police force had to be mustered at the Municipal Auditorium on the night of this third meeting. Again there was a counter-demonstration outside. Twenty-two demonstrators were arrested. It is hard to see how the obscure one-twentieth of 1 per cent of the city's population that made up his audience constituted much of a menace. But the American Veterans Committee, the Communists, and a few other groups, made such a hullabaloo that the name of Gerald L. K. Smith has become unforgettable in St. Louis.

Smith's most recent visits to Cleveland and to Pittsburgh provide further proof of the boomerang effect of public demonstrations at his meeting-halls. Smith's audiences were on the decline in both cities, especially in Pittsburgh, where the press had com-

pletely ignored his presence. On August 3 of this year only two hundred persons came to hear him there, as nondescript a crowd of elderly cranks as could have been assembled. The meeting was utterly lacking in news interest and drama, except for the fact that fifteen persons were picketing outside the hall. That gave Smith something to talk about. At the end, he thanked the police and asked the audience to give them a hand. The next day's newspapers, with pictures of the pickets, gave Smith his first public recognition in Pittsburgh.

In Cleveland, five hundred were inside the hall where he spoke, but Smith claimed that at least a thousand more had not dared to cross the picket-line. He made a similar excuse for the small size of his Pittsburgh gathering—although some people seem to have entered just because of the pickets. Of his five hundred Cleveland auditors, 90 per cent were over fifty years of age.

It is hard to overestimate the value of public clamor to a rabble-rouser such as Gerald L. K. Smith. In the role the demagogue plays—so well described in James Rorty's study, "American Fuehrer in Dress Rehearsal," in last November's COMMENTARY—he is always the great little man fighting against all-but-overwhelming opposition. Anything that dramatizes him in the eyes of his followers intensifies their loyalty.

Public clamor not only does this; it also makes him a name in the news, a recognized political factor. Smith—who in 1944 received 1700 of 48,025,684 votes cast in the presidential election—is now widely quoted whenever he endorses a candidate. Counter-demonstrations give Smith a claim to police protection, and he is even able to pose as a defender of the right of free speech. And it is over this issue that some of the people who loathe him most have to side with him, believing that the right of people to speak and to hear is one of the basic safeguards of American democracy.

THAT Smith and his ilk want "militant" opposition is certain. Another depression may come to flood the land with fear and

want. In that evil time—so the rabble-rouser expects—the masses may turn against all established leadership and say: “we have been betrayed by those who control the destiny of our nation.” They may look to someone who has already won notice as a violent opponent of the established order, someone whom they themselves may have once rejected, but whom they will now hail as a prophet wrongly abused and reviled. A man known to only a few thousand cannot possibly become that man on horseback. One whose notoriety has been fanned by friend and foe—such a man can, in a day of national adversity, ride to sudden power.

Those who uphold “militancy” as the best way of dealing with Smith argue from the case of Germany and Hitler. It is claimed that by “ruling the streets,” the Nazis acquired an *esprit de corps*, and that they won over impressionable elements in the masses by their initiative, dash, and readiness for violence, which the democratic forces lacked. It is argued that the democratic groups’ fatal error was to fail to be aggressive: they should have made themselves angrily visible; they should have broken up Nazi meetings.

How does the situation in Germany during the 1920’s compare with that which now exists in the United States? There are *important* differences. Almost from their beginnings, the Nazis were in the public eye and wielded an organized power—there was not the same possibility of keeping them in obscurity.

As may be recalled, the constitution of the Weimar Republic provided for proportional representation, which assured even minor political parties one or more seats in the Reichstag. Thus it was possible for such insignificant groups as the incipient Nazis to acquire influence in the Reichstag early. Moreover, there was the organized power of the Nazi political machine behind every one of its rabble-rousers, protecting and reinforcing him. In America, rabble-rousers may frequently cooperate, but as yet they have no united party behind them; in the main they are more or less one-man shows with only small followings among the lunatic fringe.

As a matter of fact, “militant” opposition was offered to the Nazis in Germany. Communists and Socialists did fight the Nazis in the streets. Although the picketing of meetings was forbidden by the police, heckling at Nazi gatherings was rather frequent and often ended in blows. Unquestionably, the Nazis did *not* yield to such violence; rather they even encouraged it, for they felt they could take care of it. Their storm troopers revelled in physical encounters and enjoyed openly booting intruders out of their meeting-halls.

What was lacking in Germany was a well-conceived, unified, and effectively conducted program against the Nazis. The apathy, overconfidence, and inactivity of certain influential persons was no substitute for a policy or program. Attempts were made, indeed, to educate the public against the menace of the Nazis, but they were mistakenly conceived, consisting mainly of defensive refutations of Nazi propaganda and anti-Semitic diatribes—an altogether negative and self-defeating technique. Moreover, Germans did not have available then the dreadful proof of what horrors Nazism would eventually bring to Germany and the world. Today we have an arsenal of the most effective arguments from the Nazis’ own record. No, the situation is quite different here and now.

In any case, if violence were to prove the only resort and means of self-defense against internal fascism and anti-Semitism—if it actually became necessary to beat up anti-Semitic rowdies, if only to dissuade more timid anti-Semites—then violence should come because, and when, the situation required it. Violence in self-defense would be justified only if the streets were actually threatened by fascists, and provided police protection failed. To employ violence under present circumstances can only alienate right-thinking people, and dramatize “martyrs” for the unthinking.

ARE the audiences of the rabble-rousers actually decreased by the furor raised around them? Competent observers find that the opposite is true. Can it be said that the

public gets a chance to express its indignation? Which public? The several hundreds or thousands who come to jeer? They are already convinced and emotionally involved. What about the 99 per cent or more of the population who do not come out to demonstrate? Do they learn anything about the issues at stake? Do such procedures increase their desire to banish racial and religious prejudice from their hearts? What do they learn from all the fuss except that it involves someone of great importance and influence whose views some other people do not like? Americans are accustomed, in politics, to hearing invective hurled against even the noblest characters: it is "just politics"—not taken seriously. And at the same time they resent interference with freedom of speech. They don't like sending for the police. And Americans have an inveterate sympathy for the "underdog."

The explanation for the latest manifestations of "militancy" against rabble-rousers is not altogether pleasant. Many who demonstrate against Smith and the others are innocent, unwitting people following natural impulses, veterans impatient with less than direct action, Jews with Auschwitz in mind. But there are also Communists and other groups; and they are following a line, creating disturbance for the sake of their own ends, and seeking to build up publicity and power for themselves.

To quote a *Kansas City Star* editorial of July 3:

Without Smith or others like him the people who organize the hecklers have no fiend to fight and nobody to heckle. Without the hecklers and Joe Stalin, Smith would be just another cultist passing the hat to a few impressionable dupes in tent meetings. . . . But with the aid of the hecklers, his meetings have come off as quite a rambunctious show that should be fairly satisfactory to both sides. And we doubt if the majority of the Smith shouters or the majority of the hecklers summoned to the scene had much idea of what it was all about. But Smith certainly does know what he's about and the Communists know what they are about. They both want clamor, confusion and chaos. For the sake of our country,

it's time everybody found out what it was about.

Naming the names of leaders, the *Cleveland Press* on March 1, 1946, after an anti-Smith demonstration, said:

The whole situation is a perfect set-up for the Communist minority in the Cleveland Industrial Union. . . . These boys want a row. They want disturbance. They want confusion. They don't give a damn that the issue is a bad one, that they are taking members of the labor movement into a situation where they should never be. They don't care that they are jeopardizing a principle on which labor should always stand solid . . . the right of freedom of speech.

After a Smith meeting in Minneapolis had been broken up on August 21, the *Minneapolis Star* said, "A mob is a mob whether the target of its abuse is Gerald L. K. Smith or an Alabama Negro." After this incident, Mayor Humphrey of Minneapolis said, "I personally advised against any picketing because I think the silent treatment is more effective in combatting Smith's ideology."

It is mainly from the Communist standpoint that demonstrative treatment of rabble-rousers has virtue. The Communists want it to appear (for the purposes, among other things, of Soviet international policy) in every newspaper of the world that hate-crushing fascist-minded men are great and powerful figures in the United States, holding the center of the stage. Their strategy is to provide plenty of limelight for the rabble-rousers—and to share that limelight. They want to involve the entire American public in a quarrel that could be relegated to insignificance by the silent method.

Is it possible to fight the rabble-rousers without putting them in the limelight? The answer is "Yes"—provided community leaders are willing to do much more than shout: if they are interested in more than working off their own emotions, if they have the patience, intelligence, and organizing skill to develop a long-range program.

It is easy enough to set up a clamor. The rabble-rouser will even cooperate. He will be delighted if steps are taken to prevent his use of public auditoriums. Privately owned meeting-halls, however, are entirely at the disposal of their owners. Informed of what a rabble-rouser is likely to say and what subterfuges his agents employ to obtain the use of such rooms, respectable proprietors as a rule reject requests for rentals, and there can be no appeal to the courts from their refusal to rent. School boards and city councils are not inclined to invite court proceedings. Refusal of public premises in San Francisco led to court action, and Smith won a decision that brought him handsome publicity. In Detroit he was recently refused space by the school authorities, but there they had excellent cause and the move was in this instance a sound one. On a previous occasion Smith had agreed to abide by the established rule that no collection could be taken in a municipally owned hall. He evaded his own promise by distributing self-addressed and stamped envelopes and urging his audience to mail him their contributions by dropping the envelopes in the mailbox across the street. Smith is not likely to provoke any court action in Detroit, for it would mean having his maneuver aired. But elsewhere he is only too ready to go to court with the claim that freedom of speech is being denied him. By and large, no attempt should be made to interfere with a rabble-rouser's search for premises when the likelihood is that he will find a place to speak in anyhow. Such interference will only precipitate a public debate with the rabble-rouser himself in the center of it.

Silent treatment is the best treatment—backed by a many-sided, long-range program, not against the lone demagogue, but against the basic evil of race hate. But the silent treatment requires self-restraint. Agencies that practice the method keep themselves informed of the activities of anti-Semites and circulate the information to journalists, radio commentators, and others who mold opinion. And to circulate the truth about rabble-rousers through private channels re-

quires far more work and planning than proclaiming it in the press. Short-cuts are so tempting. What could be easier than to write—as happened recently—a sensational story exposing an anti-Semitic veterans' organization for a large-circulation magazine? The organizer of that veterans' group, in two years of constant effort, had recruited *only fifty members*. Thus it was obvious that the silent treatment hitherto applied to this particular nuisance had been successful enough. But now the leader of that group is a national figure, and will be able to exploit that magazine article as advertising.

The silent treatment also has the task of explaining to people why legislation prohibiting the incitement of racial and religious hatred does not exist and would not be effective. (The short-cut of legislation is tempting, too.) Here are some of the facts. At present, Massachusetts is the only state that has a group-libel law, applying incidentally only to the written, and not the spoken, word. In the three and a half years since the law was adopted, not so much as one case has been successfully prosecuted, despite numerous violations of the law. American tradition discourages, and American public opinion does not seem receptive to, further limitations on freedom of speech. Newspapers are especially quick to express displeasure at the suggestion that new curbs be placed on printed matter. Moreover, the mere existence of a law cannot prevent *talk*. It can only prescribe a penalty for a speech that in the opinion of a jury has infringed the law.

A RABBLE-ROUSER may well welcome an opportunity to be accused and tried for defamation of a group; his trial would involve argument as to the truth of his statements and give him the chance to air his views from the platform of a courtroom. What more desirable sounding board could he have to appeal to latent prejudices in jury members, and in millions outside? If convicted, the rabble-rouser would, as happened in Germany, be able to substantiate his role as a martyr. In any event, no legislation at

present exists forbidding oral defamation of racial and religious groups; to cope with this evil *right now* demands other means.

The silent treatment does not exclude invoking existing local laws for maintaining the peace, laws against incitement to riot, and other measures designed, not for the protection of groups, but to *preserve public security*.

It is advisable that someone always be on hand to record what a rabble-rouser says; and also present should be someone well acquainted with the law and legal interpretations. Whether a rabble-rouser should be arrested depends upon what he says and what excesses he indulges in. Intelligent judgment must be made as to whether the legal punishment sought would hamper the rabble-rouser more than the notoriety of his arrest would help him. When Smith was convicted in Chicago on February 7, the staff correspondent of the *Christian Science Monitor* reported:

It is certain that Smith and his associates consider the prosecutions of more benefit than otherwise. Smith's conviction on the contempt charge was occasion for considerable handshaking and congratulations among his followers in the court. The publicity attending the whole case has been regarded with smiling appreciation by Smith.

On the other hand, in New York on October 6, 1945, three anti-Semitic rabble-rousers at a street-meeting distributed a piece of literature so vile and repulsive that it practically asked for legal action. One received a year's sentence and two received terms of six months. It is likely that this is in a measure responsible for the fact that no such meetings have thus far been held in the New York area during 1946.

THE intelligent approach, above all, requires understanding the rabble-rouser's place in the whole of American life. At present, rabble-rousing is disreputable in America. Like adultery, intolerance is considered far more heinous when publicly proclaimed than when privately practiced.

Those who have employed the silent therapy have helped to keep rabble-rousing in its present public status—as a lunatic-fringe activity. As long as it remains that, it is not the serious threat that the “militants” stampede themselves and others into believing. After all, the average audience of a rabble-rouser is composed of nondescript, middle-aged or elderly frustrated men and women, people whose abilities and energies cannot sustain serious political action.

And what is it that Smith and the other rabble-rousers do which menaces the nation's welfare? Obviously they are germ-carriers. They spread certain ideas that divide and disrupt. Is it only they, however, who spread these notions? The same venomous ideas are also exchanged in subways, country clubs, and wherever prejudiced tongues wag. Will denunciations of rabble-rousers dissipate that, too?

The antidote for rabble-rousing is much the same as for all racial and religious prejudice. The other side of the silent treatment aimed at Smith and his ilk is *unremitting work to immunize the public against prejudice in general*. Gerald L. K. Smith is not the issue, although he would like to be. The *particular* rabble-rouser does not count in himself. The public mind must be immunized against all of them. Hate-mongers must be combatted like vermin—not by holding each up to public scrutiny, but by making the whole country uninhabitable for them.

The way to fight the rabble-rousers is by fostering attitudes that reject and negate the purposes, techniques, and concepts of racial and religious hostility wherever and whenever.

Under special circumstances there is, let me make clear, a place for publicity as a weapon against bigotry. There are undercover anti-Semites and hate-mongers who try to preserve a respectable public front; they mask their movements and support bigoted organizations stealthily, presenting their poison to only part of their clientele. Exposure has proved an excellent weapon against such covert elements. But against

those who brazenly advertise their prejudices, nothing works better, let me repeat, than silent treatment resting on a self-disciplined and thought-through larger policy and program, which attacks deep-seated problems and avoids indulging itself in brief emotional sprees.

ON THE approach of the rabble-rouser, large advertisements affirming civic unity and genuinely democratic attitudes should appear in the local press of the city concerned. Leadership groups should be called together and told to use radio, press, and platform for pro-democratic announcements. In none of the written or spoken publicity should direct reference be made to the rabble-rouser or to his coming performance.

Those who clamor for demonstrations against him must be convinced, if possible, that intolerance can no more be fought inside or just outside a rabble-rouser's meeting than illiteracy can be fought by picketing the doors of illiterates. Some will remain unconvinced and will go their partisan and disunifying way, but under no circumstances should reputable organizations go along with them. Americans must not let themselves

be dragged into battle over spurious issues.

Even the emergency part of this program requires preparation long in advance of emergencies—and afterwards. The intelligent treatment requires that genuine attention be paid to civic and social ills that create a fertile field for rabble-rousers. It means attention to schools, housing, transportation, recreation, employment, hospitalization. It means building community resources and combining the efforts of men and women of all faiths and races to work for the common benefit. The silent treatment against rabble-rousers is most effective in a city where the leaders of labor, business, education, religion, youth, women's groups, and of all other forms of organized society, are in contact with each other through councils that preach and practice democracy. Attention must be focused not on hate-campaigns against hate-mongers, but on positive and constructive measures that make for amity and good-will between the various racial and religious groups of the community. In the face of a public leadership whose attention is turned to the improvement of human welfare, the rabble-rouser will remain what he should be—a bothersome but not dangerous nonentity.

GERMANY IS NO MORE

Life Among the Ruins

ALFRED DOEBLIN

BADEN-BADEN

"GERMANY" has become a word without meaning. It is a case of finished history. For, with its defeat, "Germany" has ceased to exist. The territory once called Germany, once occupied by the Nazis and now administered by the allied victors, has become a No Man's Land, a sort of ownerless property. Newspapers, stamps, and public buildings bear only the adjective "German"—for instance, "German mail"—but never the noun "Germany." The only exception, as far as I know, is the Berlin newspaper of the United Socialist-Communist party, which calls itself *Vorwärts*, *Berliner Volksblatt*, *das Abendblatt der Hauptstadt Deutschlands* (the Evening Paper of Germany's Capital); this masthead, however, alludes to a program rather than to a fact.

THIS is a first report on life in Germany by ALFRED DOEBLIN, who wrote *Alexanderplatz*, *Berlin*, considered one of the great (and prophetic) novels of pre-Hitler Germany. Dr. Doebelin was born in Stettin in 1888, and studied in Berlin, where his family moved in 1898. He took up medicine at the Universities of Berlin and Freiburg and received his M.D. in 1905. From that time on, Dr. Doebelin has pursued two careers: that of news correspondent, essayist, poet, playwright, and novelist on the one hand; and that of doctor and specialist in nervous disorders on the other. This combination has influenced his writings. During World War I, he served with the medical corps in the German army for three years and participated in the Battle of Verdun. Recognition of Dr. Doebelin's literary work culminated in his election to the Prussian Academy of Arts in 1926. He left Germany with the rising tide of Nazi anti-Semitism and migrated to Holland, France, Palestine, and finally the United States. He is now returned to Germany, as part of the Allied re-education mission in the French zone of occupation.

But it is another matter if one asks whether the disappearance of Germany has penetrated the consciousness of the masses. Probably not. It is one of those great changes that go unnoticed because one's mind is occupied with more immediate problems.

True, in the many discussions going on in a country where people have always been eager for debate, intellectual and politically conscious individuals do acknowledge the fact—without, however, actually accepting it. The fact is recognized for the moment; but it is provisional; what will happen next remains to be seen. During long decades, in school, at public celebrations, etc., the "Reich" grew into too solid a concept to be changed overnight or to undergo any profound transformation in the people's mind. "Germany," it seems, will now only become a more ideal, more spiritual concept. (A similar metamorphosis took place for the Poles between the partition of Poland and her reconstitution in 1918. But "Germany" is not such a unit as "Poland"; strong centrifugal political forces are already at work in this country, and with even wider effect than after 1918.)

At present, what used to be called "Germany" is torn into four different zones, administered by four different powers who have established military governments exercising complete control. Although the four powers are allies, "zone" is no mere word; anybody living here can feel that. Each zone has its own economic system; while we have plenty of paper but no printing presses in one zone, we may find idle presses but no paper in another. By analogy (but only by analogy), it is like starvation in Europe and abundance in America. "They could not come together, the water was much too

deep"—these words from a German folksong fit the case very well.

Barriers and border controls separate each zone. Anyone wishing to go from one zone to another—for instance from Tübingen (Württemberg-French) to Stuttgart (Württemberg-American)—has to fill out complicated and detailed applications with the most punctilious correctness. Each zone thoroughly examines, inside and out, every potential arrival. This is partly because of bureaucratic routine and partly for the sake of self-defense. We are in a defeated country that has to be watched.

ALL this tends to turn the clock back. Let us disregard, for the moment, the subject of food (although nothing else is talked about in all zones—the child cries for milk thinking that its cries will bring milk). There is the problem of newspapers. Mainz and Frankfort-on-the-Main lie in the same district—but try to get a Frankfort newspaper in Mainz! Pamphlets and books appear in the American and English zones (rarely, but they do). You hardly ever hear about them; a traveler from those parts mentions them, and you write for them. If you are lucky, the item you want may not yet be out of print (all printed matter sells out almost instantaneously—like every other commodity), and you may, after a long while, receive a copy by slow mail. And whatever its nature, this piece of literature—which was not issued in Turkey, but seventy-five miles away—arouses the liveliest interest; everybody wants to read it. Germany lives behind a Chinese wall. This may be highly necessary, but it is inconvenient.

Anyone who travels in the territory once called Germany will have a story to tell about it. He will learn a great deal. Everything goes quietly and slowly. And behind it all there seems to lie a deeper meaning, dictated by justice: after their recent journeys deep into Russia, Africa, and France, the Germans' appetite for travel might be considered sated; perhaps now they might stay at home for a while.

Most of them are glad to do that anyhow,

since housing is so scarce and accommodations for travelers so uncertain. Arriving anywhere, the traveler is faced by a multitude of problems that make considerable claim on his talent as a detective, on his imagination, and on his endurance. Only one who is shrewd and modest should set out on a journey. A few unpredictable trains go to the place you want to get to. Most of them turn out a little different from what you expect, and it is a matter of submitting yourself to the will of the railroad. This, too, is a kind of re-education.

The trains that do go are overcrowded. They stop at every village—and this country is filled with innumerable villages, villages not to be found on the map—so that after a day's journey your knowledge of geography is increased enormously. Indeed, after only a little travel during half a year's sojourn in this country, you can set yourself up as a professor of geography. You have to change trains; you have to change trains continually—that is to show you that there are many railroad lines in this country (they boast about it) but only a few trains. It is propaganda; you see through it at once, and you protest; but the railroad continues to instruct you.

Be warned against automobiles. The automobile—so universally employed in America—is extremely rare in Germany. Hardly any cars are privately owned, and those few are usually out of commission. The big word on the highways is "break-down." Which is hardly surprising: existing materials have worn out, spare parts are lacking, good mechanics even more. I have traveled by automobile a few times, and when the breakdowns came, I felt satisfied and relieved—the tension of anticipation had gone. Everything—the division into zones, the increased difficulties of traveling, the few broken-down cars, the bad gasoline, the lack of gasoline—tends to keep people at home and spare them additional nervous excitement. And to dissuade you finally from traveling, there is the possibility of actually starving on the way. Which brings me to the subject of "food."

I HAVE expressed myself incorrectly. I said that one could actually starve on a trip. The average German would correct me and say that you do not have to travel in order to starve; you can do that well enough at home. But this is slightly exaggerated. A great many Germans make a daily routine of hunting for food. Whoever wants to eat not only has to work, he also has to wait, stand in line, run around, and go on hikes. You have to be intelligent and clever, and not shirk hardships; only then will you have a chance of getting somewhere.

The other day I was sitting opposite a young German, the head of a family, and when we started to discuss the food situation (which means immediately) he said that it was really surprising, even miraculous, that, with their present diet, people did not collapse in the streets *en masse*. We pondered this miracle and came to the conclusion that a miracle happening to so many thousands every day could not really be miraculous. There must be other reasons. And when I suggested cheerfully that people simply ate more than their rationed quotas, a furtive grin appeared on the man's face. He admitted that most people—including himself, no doubt—were able to get hold of something extra. But it was a fact that if you had to depend on the ration alone, you would starve. I asked him to forget about the ration and tell me just how everybody, including himself, went about it. Of course, he didn't want to reveal his personal secrets, but he did say that you had to know the places where something was to be had, and then you had to "organize" it.

"To organize" is a slogan dating from the Nazi regime. You "organize" potatoes: first you have to know where to find them, then you find out the price—that is, the article wanted in exchange—then you have to get hold of the article. All this means many complicated transactions requiring little plans of campaign. And often the business is risky, too, for certain foods are under confiscation and cannot be sold privately. Besides there are searches on the highways—you are forced to show what you have so

painfully "organized"; and when traveling by train you have to open your baggage on leaving stations—a hard life for those who don't want to go hungry. No, you don't starve, but you are hungry. People in the social register beg for bread. Married people with children have a particularly difficult time, for, as is natural, they give their meager booty to their offspring. You see many skinny and pale faces among older people, but the youngsters look fairly healthy.

HUNGER is a terrible power in this country. It makes people gloomy and rebellious. It is hard to deal with anybody and arouse his political interest when he hates the whole world and those in particular who deny him his daily bread. Arguments are useless here. I have actually read a religious tract giving hints on how to combat hunger by thought and will-power! It's easy to laugh at that sarcastically, but, as the saying goes: "When things are bad the devil eats flies"—so why shouldn't good advice help when you don't know of anything better?

There are indeed two aspects to hunger: a physiological and psychological one. You can influence the psychological side to a certain degree. Indeed, we have come so far in Europe that the hungry are being given pamphlets to read. Whether they will buy them is another question.

Hunger exists. It is, to use a figure of speech, grist for the mills of nationalism and underground Nazism. The Nazis tell the Germans: "There you have democracy, they take everything away from you, they requisition apartments, they let us starve." Notice the trick: as if democracy had anything to do with all this! As if the Allies had come merely to let the Germans live democratically and to give them credits and food! The Germans rejoiced openly in Hitler's victory over France. They profited for four years from the looting and plundering of the occupied countries. Nobody mentions the cruel hunger they brought to France, Greece, and Poland. They protest about their small rations and in the name

of justice ask for more. The educated and the uneducated are as one in their protests. If, at least, the protests were attenuated by the admission: "We know we have done worse to others"—but there is nothing of the sort. See, they say, you are democratic. You don't want to be like Hitler. So give us more to eat and help us (and then get out as quickly as possible!). That is what justice means to the Germans of 1946. One could despair.

The countryside looks neat and well taken care of. But the cities are devastated. Pictures of these places have been shown in movies, but they look different when you are actually there. The other day I walked through Mainz. Eighty-five per cent of that city lies in ruins. Pavements and sidewalks are cleared of debris. To the left and right you notice what used to be houses but are now boxes of brick without covers and with holes instead of windows. The boxes are differently cut; sometimes all four walls are still standing, sometimes the front wall has been knocked in, collapsing into the interior. Sometimes the front and rear walls are standing but the side walls are missing. Quite often nothing at all is left, and the place where a building stood is marked by a mountain of twisted steel girders, pieces of doors and windows, and sections of pipe. Occasionally you discover half a radiator or a dented pail in the midst of the rubble. But it is known that other things lie hidden there, too: corpses. There they lie.

A strange silence hangs over these streets. Death surprised many people in their apartments; many more, in the inadequate shelter of cellars, were buried under tumbling houses. Many others were burned to death. We walk above a cemetery. Our steps echo loudly.

In some places the asphalt is torn up. Almost everywhere red bricks that are still intact have been carefully sorted and piled up near walls, ready to be used again. As before, the people are industrious and methodical. They always submitted to a government, most lately of all to Hitler's, and they fail to understand why his should have been

worse than any before. It will be much easier to rebuild their cities than to awaken their consciousness. In addition, they still have their deep-rooted feeling of superiority, the conceit of their national pre-eminence.

WALKING through the town of Pforzheim, I had the impression that some great punishment had been visited upon the place by law. Pforzheim doesn't exist any more. It is utterly destroyed; the skeletons of houses stand in rows amid chaotic rubble. One seems to be walking through a movie lot: everywhere are backdrops, stage-sets, and make-believe house fronts. A completely dead and abandoned city makes one feel oppressed and unbelievably sad; your only wish is to escape the sight as quickly as possible. On the other hand, the impression made by a half-destroyed city like Freiburg, when you see people walking on the once so populous Kaiserstrasse, its main thoroughfare, is more eerie than sad. In Freiburg I saw people inside the ruins saying prayers and putting flowers on crosses that had been set up with name plates.

The sight of Stuttgart was particularly startling. This city has been terribly maimed, and one never escapes the décor of silent ruins. But among them a huge crowd of people moves back and forth continuously, normally dressed and as busy as usual.

As far as my own experience goes, most people are decently dressed, sometimes even approaching peace-time standards. Most, including children, still wear leather shoes, whereas in France, and especially in Paris, the pavements and stairs echo to the clacking of wooden soles, which are worn not only by children but even by ladies of society. Wherever you look in Paris you see how shabby, ill-matched, and torn are the clothes of middle-class people, of professors and of the students at the university. The well-dressed population of Germany makes a sharp contrast. The reason is obvious: during the four years in which the Nazis were plundering the rest of Europe, the people of Germany prospered. Money and goods entered the country in abundance.

Many, if not most, are still living on this money (call it the wages of sin) and they still wear clothes that will probably last, making exception for those who lost everything through fire and bombs.

In a densely populated city like Stuttgart—increased by an influx of refugees from other towns—another, and at first surprising, thing can be noticed that later on seems quite natural: people move about between the terrible ruins as if nothing had happened. They have accustomed themselves completely to the sight of the destroyed buildings. It no longer makes any impression on them. Thus it is a mistake to assume that this sight might have an educational effect. The natives see that this was what the war was like, that this was the result of such and such bombings—but that is all. They think no further. People go to work, stand in line for food.

There are theaters, concerts, and movies, all crowded. Streetcars are running. The lack of goods has brought "barter cartels": associations of clothing, fixture, furniture, shoe, and book firms, etc. You pay down with a barter article, and at another store receive in return the article you desire, if it is available.

The question arises: where do all these people live? Well, they live "somewhere"—but, of course, not in the way they used to. They live in old bunkers, air-raid shelters, barracks, etc. They live among the ruins. One day I noticed something moving at the bottom of a burnt-out house in Mainz, and heard voices. A heavy sheet of iron was lifted, and a head appeared. Down in the windowless cellars people were living with their families, sleeping and cooking. Man can get used to anything. (I remember vaguely that around 1925 I saw something similar, if not even sadder, in Lublin, in Poland—and at that time there was peace, and conditions were normal.)

Strange, to see how people manage to rig up "dwellings," even businesses and warehouses, in the middle of the ruins or in some corner of an unsafe building, or in a surviving wing. Storekeepers invite

you to enter their establishments through dark and desolate hallways. Tradesmen have established themselves in the entrance of a large department store whose upper part has been destroyed. In the basement, the department store proper offers its marvels in a single fairly large room lined with shelves, and with salesgirls behind every counter. People are crowded about the small quantities of rationed articles shown; only superfluous objects can be sold freely, little straw dolls, book-marks, etc.

WHEREVER I went, I never saw—that is, until now, at least one whole year and more after the end of hostilities and the beginning of the truce and the military occupation—any rebuilding worth mentioning. Everywhere the highways and sidewalks have been cleared, although not completely in every case. It is rumored that the underground pipes and cables are being repaired, but everywhere above ground the movie-lot streets and the skeletons of houses still remain, waiting to be torn down.

The Germans themselves have published studies and plans for the so-called *Enttrümmerungen* (clearing of debris) program. I was told that in a South German town the program was to be started by the rebuilding of the burned municipal theater. This plan is probably not as absurd as it might look. If not merely a "theater" is to be erected, but a large meeting-hall with stage and podium, many who cannot enjoy decent living accommodations will be able to find a place where they can escape for a few hours from their cellars and basements, and where they may find in the interim diversion and perhaps edifying entertainment.

A plan similar to this has been carried out in Mainz in the French zone. There an old anti-aircraft barracks has been converted into a "university." The population acclaimed the project. Many thousands of unemployed young people were out in the streets—which were no longer streets. Many of them were ignorant. All these young men and women have to occupy themselves

somehow, and they are eager to learn. Most of the libraries are destroyed, and books are impossible to procure, which creates a sociological problem that under the circumstances is also a political one. What can be done? They are being brought together to receive instruction.

Their educational program takes two things into account: the complete absence of instruction during the war, and its miserable quality under the Nazi regime. Since a full-fledged peace-time university cannot yet be established, a "people's" university has been set up—which, even aside from the present emergency, happens to be an excellent idea. The "people's" university in Mainz has abandoned the specialized and professional curriculum of the standard university and replaced it, aided by a staff of about fifty carefully screened professors, with something that has become very necessary in all four zones of this country: elementary instruction in fundamental subjects that touch upon man and society. These courses are given in conjunction with classes providing the student with basic training for his special field. The various faculties are supposed to keep in touch and cooperate with one another; discussions on vital public problems and on the future of society are being promoted between and inside the faculties, with participation of students and teachers alike. This effort is being recog-

nized for the intelligent and up-to-date project it is, and during its one month of operation it already has killed more than two birds with one stone.

BUT what do the Germans live on? With their means of production partly destroyed, and partly idle because of lack of materials and continuing large requisitions, what do these millions do? Another important question is: what is going on in the minds of these people now that the direct influence of Nazism has ceased to act upon them—at least in an official way? Do they have a vision of the future, is the will to do something already crystallizing somewhere? It is impossible to answer in a few words, but I should like to say this: the minds of the intellectuals are in a great muddle, they grope for slogans without having a sufficiently clear idea of the historical situation at the present moment. Many cling to mere words like "Europe" or the "West." In the Russian zone, of course, different ideas prevail. But before the political situation in the four zones that once were Germany is clarified and stabilized—which will take place without the consent or participation of the Germans—all discussion remains mere talk. And, as people here are quite aware, what they say has no importance whatsoever; it can amount to nothing more than chatter in the theater—before the curtain goes up.

THE PRESENCE IS IN EXILE, TOO

A Story

J. AYALTI

"**W**HERE I come from, when people want to compare somebody's good luck to something, they say, 'He's living the life of God in France!' Let me tell you, I wish all the enemies of Zion the sorry face our religion wears in this country!"

With these words Reb Issachar, "the foreman of the Kaddish Minyan" (the quorum of ten), as they used to call him in the Jewish quarter of Paris, began his conversation the last time we met, on a bench in one of the squares of that neighborhood.

He tucked in the heavy black linen cloak that he wore winter and summer, sucked in his sunken cheeks, and, scratching his sparse yellow beard with two fingers, as was his habit when engrossed in speculation, Reb Issachar continued, "Yet if you so wish, you might prove just the opposite—the *contrary can be proven!* You can deduce an entirely opposite conclusion from the story I am about to tell you: that is, that the Master of the Universe, so great and strong is He—*His glory filleth the universe*—that even in Paris, within these forty-nine gates of contamination—God preserve us!—you may find

a glint of holiness, a spark . . . it calls from the depths . . . *from the very depths. . .*"

For quite a number of years now I had made a habit of meeting Reb Issachar. When you sit for weeks on end in crowded libraries, or when you let yourself in for hour-long discussions about Marxism, pacifism, and such-like affairs in smoky cafes in the Latin Quarter, after a while you are suddenly seized with the passion to hear a simple Yiddish word. At such moments I would look up Reb Issachar.

Though he was no great scholar—in his time the most he had ever been was head *shames*, sexton, of a small synagogue in Skola, Poland—yet Reb Issachar had rubbed shoulders in the company of Jewish scholars, had listened for thirty years to a succession of Mishnaic passages, had with his own hands looked into a "Spring of Jacob," and in the course of accepting a pinch of snuff from some solid householder had known how to pick up a good phrase, an ingenious interpretation, or some textual modification.

How does a *shames* get from Skola to Paris? Very simple. The brother of the bride of his younger son had stopped over in Paris on his way to Argentina. So he brought over his sister, and she insisted on bringing her husband, and the latter brought along his father—Reb Issachar, that is, who had been a widower for ten years by then, and had no wish to remain in Skola "lonely as a stone."

But how long can a man go on rooming and boarding at his daughter-in-law's, especially when small fry arrive to fill up cramped quarters, and the expenses keep going up? So Reb Issachar took himself off to look around for one of his former livelihoods.

For in Skola Reb Issachar had been not merely *shames*; he had there filled all kinds

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of other functions as well, such as are peculiar to a "holy vessel": he had assisted at burials, supervised the infirmary ice-cellar, awakened worshipers to the dawn "Prayers of Forgiveness," and, during the month of Elul, said Memorials in the Eternal Home (the cemetery).

But how much money can one make from Jewishness in Paris? True, there live in the narrow streets of the District, perish the Evil Eye, a sizable number of "our sort" of Jews; there are kosher butchers, a few synagogues and—not to be mentioned in the same breath—a Turkish bath. And the day before the Passover, Frenchified Jews drive up in automobiles to purchase matzoth. . . . But all year round the populace is sunk in the affairs of This World; in this city, with its cinemas and theaters and electricity and politics, the little there is of Jewishness is diluted one to sixty.

So that, as a matter of fact, Reb Issachar's situation was not an enviable one. He said Psalms a few times for an invalid, engaged on the side in a business concerned with prayer shawls and prayer books, and earned a few pennies—but nothing more.

ONE day it happened that Reb Issachar was walking down the street, when an automobile stopped near him. A well-dressed young man, wearing glasses on his nose, issued forth. The young man turned to Reb Issachar and asked in a strange half-German, half-French, "You're a Jew, aren't you?"

"What do you mean? . . . Certainly!" answers Reb Issachar, a little taken aback.

"Perhaps you can come up to my home with a minyan to say Kaddish? I'm holding a memorial anniversary for my father."

Reb Issachar wanted to think the proposition over. But the elegant garments and the shiny auto, with the Kaddish right in the middle, so impressed him that he replied on the spot, "Certainly I can come! It's no small thing, such a good deed!"

And before he had time to look around, the young man had placed a calling card in his hand, with an address on it and the exact day and hour of the appointment.

Then he disappeared. "The child is not."

Assembling the first minyan was not so easy. For the party concerned had left him no petty cash, and Reb Issachar had no private capital for traveling expenses. In addition, all manner of persons dampened his spirits in the synagogue: someone had been playing a practical joke on him, they said, or he had made up the story out of whole cloth, and so forth. But Reb Issachar had faith.

When the quorum arrived at their destination, they found themselves standing before a tall, splendid building on a broad avenue lined with trees on both sides. The concierge, seeing such a crowd so early in the morning, would on no account allow them into the paved corridor, which he was busy washing at that moment. It was a sheer stroke of good luck that the fine young man appeared at that very instant. It seemed that he had had a premonition of the danger that threatened the minyan. The concierge bowed before him, gave him a polite "*bon jour*," and Reb Issachar's crowd allowed itself to be conducted in by the young man. They could not stop admiring the gleaming walls with their mirrors and "alabasters," and the expensive carpets spread on the steps. Inside the young man's residence, they were taken through many rooms and corridors into a room where they were asked to seat themselves on soft chairs.

The fine young man extracted an old prayer book from a closet. He held it carefully in both hands. It was an heirloom from his grandfather, he told them. He had lived in Strasbourg, this grandfather.

And this was the gentleman who gave Reb Issachar his first customers. Then prosperity began.

REB Issachar became an entrepreneur in the Kaddish business. There was no competition to speak of—after all, whole Kaddish minyans don't go wandering around in the streets of Paris. And the Frenchified Jews thought the world of him, as though he was the only one qualified to perform a real Memorial, and say Kaddish correctly.

There were many among these Frenchified Jews, said Reb Issachar, who had some spark of Jewishness left in them. Because in Gentile neighborhoods they somehow felt themselves not quite at ease, being neither here nor there. They were exactly like all other Frenchmen, yet somehow different; for a Gentile—no comparison!—crosses himself. They wanted to remember that they weren't born of stone, either.

Besides: all right, yourself you can do whatever you want: you can eat *tref*, desecrate the Sabbath, shave your chin—but do you have to blacken your father's face in the Other World?

Reb Issachar arranged everything in modern style, as it should be in such a metropolis as Paris. He prepared a special calendar, where every member of his minyan had a page of his own with his exact account. Each of the customers had his page, too, containing his address, the day of his Memorial anniversary, and the real Jewish name both of the deceased and of his son—for just go and try to say in the middle of a Memorial "the soul of Reb *Edouard*, in return for which his son *Jean Paul* contributes to charity." And the Frenchified Jews all have names like that! And just try and ask them to pronounce their names in the Holy Tongue!

But Reb Issachar was skillful in social matters and quickly found the right solution. Out of Madame Renée Claude he made the matron Rebecca, the daughter of Reb Kalman; Jean Paul François transliterated into Reb Jacob Feivel, the son of Reb Pincus, and so on. And this was the way he wrote them down in his calendar, in order that the following year, God be willing, he need not again break his head over their uncouth names.

IN THE body of the minyan itself, discipline and order reigned. In deference to the ways of the world one even trimmed one's beard a bit; before every Kaddish it was obligatory to spruce up the linen mantles. Reb Issachar had any number of applicants who would have been delighted to join his

company, but it wasn't so easy to be so honored. First one had to be a candidate, and stand in when somebody (God forbid!) was sick. It was only when somebody died (after a hundred and twenty years!) that a new member was taken into the company.

Reb Issachar was the boss; he held possession of the memorandum pad and did the bargaining with the Kaddish customers. He had even learned a few words of French, in keeping with the injunction, "And thou shalt know what to answer them. . . ."

As proof of which, during the days of Léon Blum, when all France was seized with the fever of striking and factories were being occupied on every hand, and his little crowd began to murmur under their mustaches (why, even the shoemakers and tailors, every Tom, Dick, and Harry was striking!)—Reb Issachar called his crowd together in a special meeting and addressed them in these words: "A raise is a raise," he said. "But what's the point of talking about striking on a Kaddish? Can the dead wait, God preserve us?"

Afterwards Paris calmed down. Strikes may come and strikes may go, but Kaddish remains. Again, as of yore, on every Kaddish memorial day his men would gather on the corner of Rivoli and King M streets and set out on their way.

On that same corner of Rivoli and King M is a small cafe. Its long front-room has a counter for patrons who prefer to stand; in the rear there is a small room with red tables, woven chairs, and soft couches that run the length of the room, for those who want to spend time over a glass of spirits. The cafe opens early in the morning, just when the night places in the noisy quarters of the city, in Montmartre and Montparnasse, are closing. The proprietor lights up the front room only. A truck driver will drop in and gulp down a tumbler of spirits on the run, or a worker who lives in the Quarter and has to ride to work will slip in for a nip. But the main business comes from the "young ladies" who wend their way thither after a night spent in earning their living.

This cafe is a kind of meeting-place for an

entire company of their kind. They come from the small streets round about: from the Street of Saint Martin, where they stand all night long at the doors of small dirty hotels and wink at passers-by; from the Halles where life is gay all night; from the nearby corner of the Boulevard Sébastopol, where they have their "Bourse," and from the Quarter itself, where one of them can be heard crying her wares in Yiddish.

They come into the cafe all worn out from sleepless nights, with pale faces and dull eyes. Carelessly, they put fresh make-up on their faded faces, using the wall-mirrors. Then they sit down at the counter in the front room and revive their flagging spirits with a small glass of warm coffee, while they count their night's earnings, which they draw out of their stockings.

REB Issachar's men usually met on that corner, because it was an intersection point of the small streets of the Quarter, because it was a more pleasant rendezvous, the cafe being illuminated, and because, sitting there, one could tell when the nearby Métro station opened. For one had often to ride a long time to reach the neighborhoods where the Frenchified Jews lived, and sometimes one had to walk quite a distance on foot. Sometimes it even happened that one had to travel to a villa outside the city limits. And the householders were particular about their coming very early—for fear of what people would say. Why should Gentile neighbors see such a conglomeration of Jews with beards entering one's home?

During the summer the minyan assembled in the street and patiently waited for the first subway. But winters, especially when it was raining, it was taking one's life in one's hand to wait outside. So they went into the unlit back room of the cafe. They didn't eat—Reb Issachar had struck a flat price for the season with the cafe-owner.

The first time they met in the cafe, the young ladies tried their luck with Reb Issachar's crowd. Since they have their own peculiar point of view about men, they concentrated their attentions on Reb Aaron.

Why pick on Reb Aaron? Because in the first place he was the youngest of the company, a mere stripling of fifty; and secondly he had just put on a new *surtout* that his son, an old-clothes man, had picked out of a bundle of garments bought at a sale.

It was still a quite handsome *surtout*, of gleaming black satin, and Reb Aaron, when he wore it, resembled a poet of the preceding century.

As a result, one of the young ladies sat down very close to Reb Aaron. Playfully she stroked his beard. "Come along," she honeyed him with her sweet little voice, "won't you come along with me, dear cabbage head?"

The young lady didn't mean to insult Reb Aaron—that's just the way they talk, said Reb Issachar. But Reb Aaron didn't understand her anyway. He grew pale as the wall, and lowered his head to the floor. He saw her only out of the corner of his eyes; she was rouged, wore a black fur, and looked, as far as he could make out, something like the Gentile apothecary's wife at home—or like one of the young gentlewomen who used of a Sunday to drive into town in their buggies from one of the surrounding estates.

And so Reb Aaron didn't dare push his temptress away. On the other hand, it was downright dangerous to remain in that compromising position. So as not to sink into "sinful contemplations," Reb Aaron commenced to think seriously of the severe punishments that the sinful person suffers in the Other World: how you spring from a tub of boiling water into a mountain of ice and back again; how you are transmigrated for seven years into a flea, how—

Rebuffed by a profound unconcern such as she had not expected to meet in an elderly gentleman, the girl picked herself up and went into the front-room. For a while Reb Aaron continued to smell the pungent odor of her perfume; then he opened his eyes. But his respite was short; soon there entered a second young lady, who again approached Reb Aaron, exactly as though Satan himself were trying Reb Aaron under his many notable disguises.

But Reb Aaron's moral thoughts vanquished that one's honeyed talk, too. The next morning the girls let Reb Issachar's quorum alone. They no longer ventured across the threshold, for the proprietor had explained the old men's function to them with the help of all sorts of figures of speech. Only curiously, with half-amused, half-devout glances, they looked through the glass door at the old men sitting in a corner. One of the girls, as she put her lipstick on, said to a friend, "A living like any other, *n'est ce pas?*"

The girls nodded sympathetically, and the proprietor, who was sorting the bottles on the shelves, summarized the situation with his customary succinctness: "*Chacun défend son bifteck!*" (Everyone protects his steak!).

A whole winter passed, and none of the patrons who drank at the bar again bothered to investigate the back-room where Reb Issachar and his men foregathered. But one day—and here is where the core of the story Reb Issachar had been telling me began—the door opened and on the threshold of the back-room there appeared the figure of a woman. Though no light was burning in the room, one could distinguish the physiognomy of the unbidden guest by the vague reflection that filtered through the thick glass of the door panes.

She was not tall, quite slim, of a dark complexion, with long eyelashes that came down over half-shut eyes. There was something about the woman that set her apart from the others.

"If it weren't for her painted lips, she would look like a bride," was the thought that occurred to Reb Aaron, and a tremor ran through his body.

Unlike the two guests of a few months back, the girl approached Reb Simcha, who was the eldest of the company and had a long gray beard that he refused to trim under any circumstances. She remained standing before him for a moment with her head lowered. Then she inquired in Yiddish, "You . . . you are Jews, aren't you?"

"Mmmm" the old man snorted in his

beard and turned his head in another direction. "Certainly we're Jews," he grumbled. "What else? . . ."

"It seems to me," said the girl, unsurely, "it seems to me—what month is this?"

"We're in the middle of Adar," a voice spoke up from a corner.

"God be blessed, only three days to Purim," someone else put in.

"Woe is me! Alack is me!" The stranger suddenly found speech. She intoned a bitter, homely melody. "Just as though my heart had foretold me! Today is my Kaddish memorial—for my old father, peace be upon him!"

A stream of tears flowed from her eyes.

Rachel—as she was known among her fellows—felt very lonesome in Paris. True—she was successful at her trade; there was allure and charm in her fresh grace. But alone in her room Rachel often grew melancholy. "All alone . . . neither friend nor redeemer . . . neither Sabbath nor holiday." She would bewail her lot in the very words with which her mother had commiserated upon her fate when once, many years before, Rachel had gone home for a short visit.

HER friends had families who lived in country villages, or even in the city itself. Some wore a cross or a medallion with a "holy picture" that hung around their necks. Besides, they had their own chapel, a small church in Montmartre for the exclusive use of sinners and outcasts. The holy man who officiated at the altar was their father confessor; when one of them had some misfortune happen to her—say her lover had taken away her last penny and beaten her in the bargain because she did not earn enough for him—then she would go to the holy man, light a candle before the holy picture, and pour out the bitterness of her heart. Nor did they forget their patroness when they left the hospital, all healed.

Rachel never visited the chapel, although her friends often spoke to her about it and assured her that their patroness made no distinction between faiths. She cried her eyes out, reading the letters her mother wrote

in thanks for the money Rachel sent her.

So it was that there was pain in Rachel's heart when she was reminded that that very day was her father's memorial anniversary. Suddenly, it became quite clear to her. Her father had appeared to her in a dream that morning; she had spent a sleepless night standing in a narrow archway under the rain. When at last she had dozed off for a moment in a strange hotel bed, she suddenly saw her father's eyes full of pleading. The caresses of a still unsatisfied customer drove away her father's image.

AT THE outcast's sobs the quorum grew tenderer. Even old Reb Simcha looked at her from under his thick-knit eyebrows and shook his head. "Woe and alack! A Jewish daughter!" He suddenly remembered how many trials and tribulations he had had to undergo before marrying off his own three daughters.

"God is merciful," he sighed.

Rachel lightened at such words of consolation. "Then you *can* make a Memorial," she cried. She turned to the company, as though her salvation depended on them. "Then you *can* say the Kaddish—"

The old men exchanged questioning looks. Rachel examined their threadbare garments. "I can pay! I'm not asking it for nothing! Whatever you ask, I'll pay!"

And Rachel bent and raised her dress above her knees. All at once she felt embarrassed. Turning her back to the company, in one swift movement she removed a few banknotes from her stocking.

"No, no," Reb Simcha shook his head. He was speaking not so much to Rachel as to his fellows. "It is a specific writ: *The gift of a whore and the sale of a dog. . .*"

It was at this point that Reb Issachar came out of hiding. What right had the old man to mix in businesses that did not concern him? Money matters were in Reb Issachar's province, and if he wished, they would do it for nothing—his was the last word!

Reb Issachar was accustomed to look for the best in every person.

"How about those Frenchified Jews," the thought occurred to him. "Are they any better? Is their money any more kosher?—don't they eat *tref*, and aren't they ashamed of their Jewish names? No, who is any better in this country! *When Israel is in Exile, then the Presence is in Exile, too!*—As the cantor sings at Kol Nidre: we give permission to worship with the transgressors!"

However, in order not to fall under the temptation of money, he ventured a proposal.

"Perhaps you can go to a synagogue? If you ask the sexton—"

"How can I wait? I'm dying for sleep!" the girl felt that she had a foot in the door. "Why, is my franc worthless? You'll be earning a wonderful good deed, a *mitzvah*."

It just so happened that the last two members of the minyan arrived at that moment. Now they could have all set out for the house of a fine Kaddish customer who lived in a distant neighborhood. But Reb Issachar issued his command: "First we'll finish this business! This once those others can wait. It's all right. Reb Issachar will earn a good deed, too!"

IN THAT instant he decided that he would accept no payment from this girl. All his life people had been putting him off with a couple of francs while others earned the good deeds. This time *he* would earn the good deeds—and two of them, at that. For he would both be helping a poor orphan, and performing a "true deed of mercy" for the deceased.

And so they washed their hands with water that Rachel carried from the counter; and they hung a garment over the glass doors; and they pushed the square tables into a corner—that they might not be reminded of the sinful couples that sat at them of evenings. And Reb Issachar betook himself to making a right proper Memorial.

These names he didn't have to translate.

". . . the soul of Reb Chayim Ber, the

son of Reb Meir, in return for which his daughter—How?" he turned to Rachel.

"Rachel." She understood at once what he was asking.

" . . . in return for which his daughter, the matron Rachel. . . ."

And, since it was growing somewhat late, they applied themselves quickly to the Kaddish.

CURIOUS as to why Rachel was lingering so long in the back-room, and why she had come running hastily to the boss, with tears in her eyes, and asked him for a basin of water, one of the girls stole over to the glass door on tiptoe, and softly pushed it ajar. Moving the draped garment aside, she looked into the back-room. She stood where she was for a long time, as though frozen to the spot. Soon a second girl came along, then a third. They pressed together in the narrow entrance and then singly slipped into the room.

But inside they remained standing near the door, disconcerted. In the light of dawn

the room seemed transfigured by witchcraft: the tables and chairs were crowded into a corner where they stood like frightened and shivering sheep; the soft, padded couches had been undressed of their loud red week-day attire; ten frowning backs dressed in black shook to and fro, hurriedly, under extended, stiffened arms. And a ringing voice that seemed to come from somewhere far off drew out long, mysterious syllables in a mixture of song and tears.

Through the huddled bodies of the girls ran a tremor, and they caught at the crosses and holy medallions around their throats.

So standing, permeated with awe, little by little they recognized and grasped at one word, often repeated, chorused by the invisible mouths. And when the Kaddish was finished and the last word was dissolving in the air, pressing their holy images between cramped fingers, the girls repeated devoutly one after another:

"Amen."

"Amen."

"Amen."

JEWISH MUSIC ON RECORDS

A Guide for Listeners

KURT LIST

PHONOGRAPH records, once dismissed as "canned music," today hold a high estate—indeed they represent a kind of official canon of public taste. In this sphere, Jewish music occupies an uncertain position. The best part of Jewish music has never been recorded. Much of what has been recorded is no longer available; whatever is available can be purchased only in a few stores, usually in solidly and traditionally old-style Jewish neighborhoods.

Are we to assume then that Jewish musical tradition has found no foothold among Jews in this country?

The widespread musical activities of temples and Jewish organizations would contradict this. Why then are recordings of Jewish music so meager—and so largely limited as to outlets?

Jewish musical tradition stems from so many different countries, is so variegated, so colored stylistically by the various regions in which it was created, that it has not been profitable under the conditions of mass production to record pieces of Jewish music in their original native forms. Here the

record companies have taken the usual way out; most of the Jewish compositions they have recorded represent the most obvious selections from synagogues, Jewish theaters, and social halls. Most of this music consists of watered-down versions of genuine Jewish melodies. Produced with an eye to the widest consumer market, such music has found only a relatively small number of interested customers among American Jews; for, quite rightly, most Jewish music-lovers have felt that what was offered them was not worth serious consideration.

In any case, record companies seem to have concluded that there is no sizable market for Jewish music. They have restricted production and concentrated exclusively on the market provided by the more recent immigrants from Poland and Russia. These do not make very high demands—the process of acculturation keeps most immigrants too busy to cultivate their tastes. And the companies do not even attempt to exploit Jewish recordings for exotic quaintness, as they have done with such other "ethnic" music as the Irish or Italian.

Whenever something is produced in mass—even if only for a relatively small group—a few valuable and genuine items will find their way into the output (often upon the insistence of the performing artists themselves). But these items usually occur accidentally, without plan or purpose. Thus, although the Eastern European mood prevails in the recordings of Jewish music, the musical tradition of the Ashkenazim as a *coherent style* is completely absent in execution. Needless to say, all performances are strongly influenced by American "arranged" music, and lack the individuality of genuine tradition.

The absence of Palestinian folk songs on

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records is harder to explain, considering the extent of the Zionist movement in America. But then Zionists have always preferred to talk about, rather than investigate, the content of traditional Jewish art.

In the following survey, which takes in all recordings likely to be available in stores in Jewish neighborhoods or that can be ordered through any dealer directly from the factory, I have attempted to classify records according to type and style. That this attempt can only result in an approximation is largely the fault of the present situation with respect to records. The reader should be aware that the following classifications are by no means exact.

Synagogue Music

SYNAGOGUE music is the most important in the Jewish tradition because it stems, at least in theory, from a background common to all Jews. In American synagogues a distinction must be made between Reform and Orthodox musical practice. Since the *hazanim* from Eastern Europe show the greatest vocal qualities and an extremely sensitive feeling for style, even the Reform temples have employed them extensively. Thus the *hazanim* were gradually influenced toward a modification in some degree of their traditional style and toward a partial acceptance of the moderate reform in synagogical music instituted in the 19th century by the great Austrian cantor and composer, Salomon Sulzer.

This reform was the result of the rejection of the concept of *Galut* nationalism in Jewish art, which involved the sharp separation of Jewish culture from the culture surrounding it. Sulzer also rejected the earlier and more radical Reform tendency to supplant the Eastern synagogical chant with secular German tunes. Sulzer tried to reconcile East and West and his essential achievement was to reshape the traditional cantorial song. (I am not concerned here with his changes in the order of prayer, or with his discarding of the chant to the Pentateuch and other such measures—only with his reorganization of musical style.)

True, Sulzer deprived the traditional Eastern song of its native flavor, but it seems doubtful whether it would have survived at all had he not reshaped it melodically according to the requirements of Western classical harmony.

The American *hazanim*, more closely tied to the East and less proficient musically than Sulzer, have not introduced any conscious reforms. They sing as the occasion and their respective positions require. Always expert in improvisation—which only too often has made them run away with themselves—they have disregarded Sulzer's veto against such practice and have managed to rescue some of the Eastern flavor without antagonizing the younger and more modern generation.

Hazanim like Zevel Kvartin, Josef Rosenblatt, and Mordecai Hershman were idols of the Jewish America of the 1920's, more because of their vocal and virtuoso accomplishments than because of the style in which they sang synagogical music. All of them made excursions into operatic fields and none of them was successful there. As *hazanim*, however, they preserved some features of the traditional melodic line—if, indeed, with a certain lack of taste in phrasing and with the accompaniment of romantic clichés in the harmonies of the instrumental groups that supported them. These features often combined to distort the essence of synagogical music and to direct it toward the false sentimentality of the Al Jolson notion of a cantor.

Of the above-mentioned trio, only the records of Rosenblatt and Hershman are still available; those of Kvartin, who had the best voice of the three and also best followed cantorial style, are all out of print. Both Rosenblatt and Hershman have been recorded by Columbia, and all their discs are worth hearing. Rosenblatt has made two discs: *Y'hi Rotzon* (8224-F) and *Oshamnu Mikol Om and Rachel Mevakeh Al Boneho* (8225-F). Hershman is more copiously represented; you can hear him in *Tal and Hashem, Hashem, Eli Rachum Vechanum* (57050-F), *Akavyu Ben Mah-*

lalel Oimer and *Habeit Mishomaim Ureh* (57051-F), *Sh'ma Koleinu* and *Al Tashlicheinu Lees Ziknoh* (57052-F), which last are his most genuine renditions. Hershman can also be heard, with organ accompaniment, in *Brochos Fun Halel* and *Modim Anachnu Loch* (57053-F), and *Aneinu* and *Halbein Chatoeinu* (57054-F). And with orchestral accompaniment, he sings *Umipnei Chatoeinu* and *Ovinu Malkeinu* (57055-F), and *Misratzeh B'Rachim* and *Eilu Devorim* (57057-F). The last two records are the least genuine and most sentimental of all.

Columbia has also put out a vocal album by Victor Chenkin, under the title "A Victor Chenkin Recital" (M-435), in which several synagogical songs in the style of the *hazanim* are competently sung, among them the famous *Kaddish*.

An album produced by Asch and called "Songs of Israel" (610) features Cantor Leibele Waldman in the perennial favorites, *Kol Nidre* and *Eli, Eli*. Both songs are typical examples of Western influence, despite their insistence on the minor key and some pseudo-modal harmonic turns. The same Cantor Waldman can also be heard on a recently recorded Disc album entitled "Cantorials" (900), which are more in keeping with the synagogical tradition of the United States, despite a rather pompous and out-of-proportion organ accompaniment.

Among newer releases, the most important is an album by Decca (A-41) in which Moshe Rudinow sings "Traditional Hebrew Prayers" to organ accompaniment. Mr. Rudinow is cantor of New York's Temple Emanu-El and his selection is most representative of modern synagogue service. His album, featuring compositions by such outstanding Jewish synagogical composers as Sulzer, Louis Lewandowsky, and Joseph Achron, is on a high musical level, for all the music it contains has been either composed or arranged by competent musicians, and Mr. Rudinow himself is a singer of note. Moreover, this Jewish music is translated so completely into Western terms that it begins to constitute a new, separate, and

valid phase of Jewish musical tradition. As such, it is definitely preferable to the occasional distortions of such old-style cantors as Rosenblatt and Hershman, who mix Eastern traditional melody with Western elements, but do not integrate them. Mr. Rudinow's album includes some of the best-known passages from the Sabbath, Rosh Hashanah, and Yom Kippur services, among them *Kol Nidre*, and an excellent example of cantillation on the Pentateuch, in a passage taken from the book of Exodus.

Cantor Jonah Binder is concerned with a special segment of synagogue music in his album "Sabbath Prayers" (Disc 901). Accompanied by a chorus, the cantor offers a semblance of the Friday night service as one might hear it in most American synagogues of the conservative type. Although neither the presentation nor the music impress the listener as spectacular they will probably be felt as the most coherent and authentic demonstration of Jewish religious life on records. Their average quality gives one the feeling of being at home to a possibly greater degree than some of the other musically superior recordings.

"Israel Sings"

IN ADDITION to the commercial recordings, there is also a privately prepared album of twelve sides that was produced last year by the Hebrew Union College on the occasion of its seventieth anniversary. Entitled "Israel Sings," the album features outstanding items from the Eduard Birnbaum collection, which is in the college's possession and is composed of scores of a great deal of synagogical music, chiefly in the Ashkenazic manner. Birnbaum himself was a cantor who performed in such German cities as Magdeburg, Beuthen, and Koenigsberg (where he died in 1920). The recordings, distributed directly to collectors by the Union of American Hebrew Congregations in Cincinnati, have been prepared and supervised by Eric Werner, the college's music director. They are accompanied by a booklet furnishing explanatory notes. "Israel Sings" is important, yet disappointing. Important, because it demon-

strates that the reconstruction of temple singing can be done only by private, institutional agencies and not by commercial companies. The disappointment lies, among other places, in Dr. Werner's attempt to rearrange the melodies of the original manuscripts in a way alien to their musical essence. One finds this most disturbing in the magnificent Hasidic melody, *En Kelohenu*, which, although sung with fine feeling by Cantor Emil Rosen, is deprived of much of its power and strength by the tinkling harp accompaniment devised by Dr. Werner. (Incidentally, the performance is one of the crucial factors in the restoration of traditional Jewish music; much needs to be done to remedy the sloppy practices of some of the *Hazanim* now in America and at the same time to discourage the "modernization" of time-honored melodies.)

"Israel Sings" is, however, superior to commercial recordings in the selection of its material. Although the Ashkenazic influence is prominent throughout, a fair historical picture is also given of the music of Western European Jewry and of the influences that played upon it. Thus here is the monody, *Eulogy on the Death of Moses*, which was probably composed in the 12th century; another selection shows how the Catholic music of Palestrina influences Salomone Rossi's *Shir-Hama-Alos* around the turn of the 16th century; a strange mixture of Handel's texture with Jewish modality is found in *Yishlam Shalem B'Sholom Rav* by the early 18th-century Sephardic composer, Abraham di Caceres; while the influence of Italian opera even affects the Lithuanian cantor, Nissi Beltzer, in his *Lo Omus*, composed in 1824; and the influence of Mendelssohn and the German Romantics, so decisive in 19th-century Ashkenazic music, appears in Abraham J. Lichtenstein's *Ma God'Lu Ma-Asecho Adonoi*. This constant succession of external influences that often reached the point of obliterating native Jewish idiom symbolizes the tragedy of the Jew who, in attempting to integrate himself in Western culture, often surrendered his own identity.

By and large the performances in "Israel Sings" are by competent people—Frederick

Lechner, who alternates between the Central Synagogue of New York and the Metropolitan Opera; Pearl Besuner, also of the Metropolitan; Cantor Abraham Shapiro, and others. Less satisfactory is the chorus, which tends to emphasize the middle voices over the upper and lower parts in Rossi's composition. As for the program booklet, it says little that is relevant to the music, besides being incorrect in its oversimplifications—to say that "the Roman plain-song came out of Palestine" is a vulgarization of historical facts.

It is a pity on the whole that this album is not more authentic than it is. Private institutions might realize that if they are to compete with commercial companies, they can do so only by featuring better performances and better music—not by surpassing the commercial companies in errors of taste. Yet despite all these reservations, one recommends "Israel Sings" as practically the only existing approximation of a historical survey of synagogue music.

Some of the synagogical melodies have become quite popular outside of Jewish circles, and have been adopted by secular singers and salon orchestras of all kinds. They are presented in hybrid forms, in arrangements that accept only the melodic structures and cramp these into the clichés of the fireside ballads of the 80's. None of these last can actually be considered Jewish music, and I mention them here only for the sake of completeness and to point out the difference between these products and the genuine cantorial approach.

Thus there are the two songs that non-Jews and many Jews, too, consider "representative" Jewish music—*Kol Nidre* and *Eli, Eli*. The latter is played by the Boston "Pops" Orchestra under Arthur Fiedler, coupled with *Rachem* on a Victor disc (12536); and it can also be heard on two Decca records, one performed by the Decca Salon Orchestra (3023), and the other by Fred Waring's Glee Club and Orchestra (29120). *Eli, Eli* is also on a Columbia disc (257-M) played by the Sandler Trio and coupled with *Kol Nidre*, which can be

heard on a Decca record too (15046) played by the Decca Salon Orchestra, and on a Victor record (DM-680) played by the cellist Pablo Casals, accompanied by the London Symphony Orchestra under Sir Landon Ronald. The last is a beautiful performance, but can hardly be called Jewish music.

Judaic Music

IN HIS excellent book, *Music of the Ghetto and Bible*, Lazare Saminsky carefully describes the differences between Hebrew and Judaic music. Saminsky writes: "The Judaic type is grounded in the sharply rhythmic and ultra-expressive, orientalized idiom showing an abundance of borrowed and neutralized traits. The Hebrew order is rooted in the traditional religious melos with its rich and calm ornamental recitative, with its fine major turns so characteristic of the old synagogal song." Accepting Saminsky's definition, we find two types of genuine Judaic music: the Hasidic song and dance, and the folk song. Very little of this music has been recorded, but what has gone down on discs is less falsified than synagogue music. True, in the modern polished interpretation, a great deal of the primitive ecstatic quality and mysticism of the "Dybbuk" atmosphere has been lost. But at least a considerable part of the essential musical structure has been preserved.

Among recorded Hasidic music I consider Decca's album, "Traditional Hebrew Melodies" (104), most genuine and representative. Irving Schlein, a capable musician well-versed in Jewish music, conducts the Hebrew Folklore Sinfonietta in *Reb Schmuels Chasidic Nigun* and *Reb Schmuels Nigun*, *Arabian Nigun and Dance*, *Unser Revenu*, the *Dance of Reb Meyer*, and *M'lavah Malkoh*. Unfortunately, the music is presented instrumentally—not only in the dances, but also in the songs, whose true nature is thereby distorted, for they are intended for the voice alone. On the other hand, they could have been executed authentically only by Hasidim. Consequently, the album—which also contains

some folk songs to be discussed below—is about the best possible under the circumstances.

Less musical, but quite adequate in spirit, is the rendition of *Ch'sidishe Nigun* by the Boibriker Kapelle on a Columbia disc (8221-F). Several items of the "Victor Chenkin Recital" (Columbia M-435) could fall into this category: *Freilachs*, *Der Rebbe Elimelech* and *Sha . . . Still*! Mr. Chenkin's rendition is too artful, however, to give any valid notion of the intention of Hasidic music.

As for folk music, I wish to mention here only those items that are on a higher musical level and that are still alive today in Jewish communal life, without having been more or less artificially introduced by commercial interests, or the Jewish theater and cabaret. In this category fall mainly Eastern European and Palestinian songs. The subject matter of the first runs the whole gamut of human emotions—most notably those connected with love and children (for example, lullabies)—while the Palestinian songs are preoccupied with the daily activities of the community.

Musically, the Eastern folk song, like the Hasidic song, stems from the 18th and 19th centuries. Rhythmically rich, it depends partly on vocalization and free improvisation, and only seldom does it imply any harmonic consequences, be they modal or Western. When recorded, these songs are performed generally in modernized arrangements; this costs them a great deal of their flavor, especially when they are rendered by instruments that adhere to a strict score instead of by the free voice with its limitless register of expression. Instrumental performances of Jewish folk songs are given by the Hebrew Folklore Sinfonietta in the Decca album of "Traditional Hebrew Melodies" (104). The album includes two lullabies: *Schluf, mein Feigele* and *Ai-le, hi-le, Feigele*, and two love songs: *Her nur di schein maidele* and *Du sollst nicht gehn*.

A more genuine performance can be found in Jan Bart's vocal rendition of *Zmiros* and *Hatzlichon* No (Columbia 8229-F) and *Mein*

Teiere and *Amcho* (Columbia 8230-F). The tenor is accompanied by Sholem Secunda's Orchestra and manages to convey a fairly authentic impression of the music.

The modern Palestinian folk song is a hybrid and tries rather self-consciously to become the expression of a national attitude. It derives a great deal of its melodic material from the Yemenite-Arab folk songs, but its basic texture adheres to late 19th-century Western music. A few of these Palestinian songs are to be found in the Asch album of "Jewish Folk Songs" (608), which happens to be one of the finest releases in this field, thanks to the stylistically sensitive performance of singer Ruth Rubin, and despite some rather unprofessional arrangements for the accompanying instruments by Gertrud Rady. This album also contains a few Eastern songs, as does the Asch album, "Traditional Jewish Folk Songs and Dances" (400), which, however, is rather trite in both selection and performance. Disc's album of "Hebrew and Palestinian Folk Melodies" (902) contrasts some of the older Jewish folk tunes with some material that is dressed up in a comparatively modern cloak. None of this is very authentic, mainly because of its performance by a string quartet, the sonority of which is rather incongruous with the melodic material of the *Havdolo* or the original texture of a *Chassidic Dance*.

The national anthem, *Hatikvah*, also belongs in the category of the modern Palestinian folk song. Although the melody is definitely Western-Slavic, Naphtali Herz Imber's lyrics and Jewish history of the past fifty years have made it part and parcel of the Jewish heritage. Unfortunately, it is available only in a poor rendition by the Decca Salon Orchestra (3023).

Entertainment Music

ONE step below folk music on the aesthetic ladder is Jewish entertainment music. This can roughly be divided into the music of the *badchonim* and that of the *klezmerim*. The distinction is a formal rather than an aesthetic one. *Badchonim* music appeals mainly through the emotional impact of its

lyrics, while the music of the *klezmerim* is rhythmical dance music and serves almost exclusively to provide accompaniment to Jewish festivities such as Simchas Torah, Purim, weddings, Bar Mitzvahs, and so forth. None of this music should be confused with Hasidic music, which comes directly from the orbit of piety. Despite the fact that it implores God frequently and has borrowed considerably from both synagogical and Hasidic material, Jewish entertainment music is thoroughly secular.

The tradition of the *badchonim* is as old as that of Israel. They were the folksingers who earned their livings as minstrels wandering from festivity to festivity in Jewish communities. They were the earliest commercial entrepreneurs in the field of Jewish music, not because they accepted payment for their musical services—the *hazanim* did that too—but because their functions were determined by economic and not by religious factors. Nor were their activities limited to music alone. They were also jesters, performers, masters of ceremony, jacks-of-all-trades. In the past they embodied the liveliest and most kaleidoscopic elements of Jewish life and folklore, combining in their art, humor, anecdotes, the Purim play, philosophy, religious and secular music—all that made up the old Jewish cultural life.

Nor was the subject matter of their songs always gay and lively. From the peculiar, historically determined mixture of Jewish gaiety, satire, tears with laughter, and deep *tristesse* and homelessness, they evolved a style in which it was not uncommon to jump abruptly from deepest despair to boundless hilarity, from frivolity to profoundly felt sentiment. Always in need of money, the *badchonim* remained in close contact with their audiences and reflected popular cultural needs in all their activities. When the Jewish theater developed from the Purim play in the early 18th century, it became the very nerve center of the existence of the *badchonim*, and the remnants of their art can still be found in modified form on the Jewish stage.

Since they depended so much upon popu-

lar support, those *badchonim* who failed to find professional employment on the modern stage had to adapt their art to the showmanship and the vaudeville technique of the cabaret or operetta theater. Most of the contemporary *badchonim* have succumbed completely to this combination of pressures, and their performances have become a strange mixture of Eastern folk tune, musical revue *double-entendre*, Tin Pan Alley cliché, frivolity, and maudlin sentimentality. Their songs deal mostly with "romance" in the style of the American popular song and the lyrics do not stop short of that unabashed suggestiveness that the late Ring Lardner inveighed against.

Nevertheless—or precisely because of this—the music of the *badchonim* is the type of Jewish music that enjoys the greatest popularity in this country—a fact borne out by the great amount of recorded *badchonim* music. None of it is actually representative of Jewish folklore as it flourished in Eastern Europe before World War I, but it does reflect the state of mind of the immigrant in America who knows Broadway though he has never found his way beyond Second Avenue.

Quality varies greatly among the performers of *badchonim* music. Most entertaining and versatile of those I have heard on records are Aaron Lebedeff and Seymour Rechtzeit. Lebedeff records for Columbia, and among his better discs are *Roumania*, *Roumania* and *Das Oibershte fun Shtoisel* (8226-F), *Skrip Klezmerl*, *Skrip* and *Az Men Farzucht*, *Un S'Is Gut* (8227-F), *I'm Crazy for She* and *Tzen Kopikes Hob Ich* (8231-F), and *Odessa Mama* and *Yach Tshiri Bim* (8233-F). Seymour Rechtzeit has made some good records for Columbia, among them *Azoy Vi Du Bist* and *Chasene Lied* (8233-F), and *Abisel Friher* and *Hartz Meins* (8234-F). I have not heard his Victor recordings, but several of their titles are *Ich Sing*, *Belz*, *Dem Nayen Sher*, *Ich Hob Dich Tzufil Lieb* and *Der Yiddisher Nigun*.

Cantor Mordecai Hershman has also recorded some *badchon* music for Columbia,

but his efforts in this field sound artificial and tortured. He is heard to better advantage in synagogue music. Among the discs he has made are *A Postuchel* and *Der Yid in Beth Hamedresh* (57057-F) and *V'Yo V'Yo Ferdelach* and *Die Negidim un die Kabzonim* (57059-F). The latter song would be an exceptional example of Jewish folklore were its performance less strained.

Among lesser known performers are the once prominent Isa Kremer, who renders *A Maseh* and *Gei Ich Mir Shpazieren* on Columbia (8228-F), and a group of singers who have turned out an album of "Jewish Folk Songs" for Asch (604) that contains some of the most popular items of this type. Miss Kremer has also recorded several Yiddish songs with a discernible Rumanian folk influence, adding to it some of her acquired American-style glamor. Two of the three records produced by Seva have on one side *badchon* music and on the other synagogical melodies, which, however, in the popular rendition of Miss Kremer, impress the listener more as part of the "kontzert" that follows a show in the Yiddish theatre than as part of a genuine temple service. The records are *Di Mahatonim* and *Hazliho-No* (J. M. 700/1), *A Maydl in di Johren* and *Rabaynu Tam* (J. M. 700/1), and *A Wieglied* and *Der Reite Prisiv* (J. M. 702). However, none of these recordings is anything but average in quality.

Victor has good performers in the Bagelman sisters, who handle their material with vivacity and intelligence. Their records are *Shloimele Malkele* and *Oy Mama* and *Der Alter Zigeuner*.

What distinguishes all these songs from the average Tin Pan Alley product is their affinity with Eastern and Jewish melos and a certain absence of skill and polish in their execution. But their basic aesthetic function has approached that of the American hit song very closely and there have been several cases in which they penetrated this field and made the grade, not only as Jewish, but as American best-sellers. For Tin Pan Alley, the melos of *badchon* music has always exercised the charm of the exotic,

and it has been frequently imitated by Gentile performers. To some extent it has played the same court-jesting role as Negro music.

Naturally, all the successful examples of this hybrid type have been recorded repeatedly and are available in many versions. There is neither space nor justification for listing them here. For a comparison with the more genuine *badchon* music, one can listen to such hits as *Bei Mir Bist Du Shein*, *Yes My Darling Daughter*, Cab Calloway's *Ot Azoy Sugt Der Tailor*, and the *Yiddishe Rumba*.

The history of the *klezmerim* closely parallels that of the *badchonim*. However, being instrumentalists exclusively, they were not necessarily bound to religious ritual or Jewish subject matter in their art. Consequently, their affinity with the surrounding culture in Eastern Europe was stronger and their ties to it were expressed in such ways as performances at peasant weddings and so forth. Furthermore, since they did not find any permanent foothold in the theater, the *klezmerim* remained wandering musicians even during the more stable days of Jewish culture in the 19th century. Their music shows two main traits: a close affinity with Eastern European and Slavic melody (some authorities even claim that all Jewish music has been affected by Eastern influences by way of the *klezmerim*) and a relatively pure and authentically preserved style of performance that was only slightly altered by the change from ancient to more modern instruments.

In the light of the present state of *klezmer* music, it is not surprising that it frequently resembles Eastern folk tunes or the compositions that have incorporated Eastern folk tunes in a Western symphonic edifice. Enesco's *Rumanian Rhapsodies* often sound very much like Jewish music and the *hora*, now a Palestinian national dance, is said to be of definitely Rumanian origin. The dividing line is hard to draw here. However, since both Jewish and Eastern styles have interpenetrated so intimately, it is natural enough to accept the music played by

small Jewish orchestras in this country as genuine *klezmer* music, no matter how strong the Eastern European influence may be.

The audience for the *klezmerim* in America is sharply confined to the immigrant families who cling to the old ways, and the number of *klezmerim* is small, and their skill inferior; consequently, the amount of music recorded by them hardly allows for any adequate representation. The best among the recorded items is the album played for Decca by Al Glaser's Bucovinaer Kapelle and entitled "Jewish Folk Dances" (103). Some of the music presented here derives from the Hasidic orbit—in any case there is no definite borderline between the two spheres—and it is all dance music. The featured solo instruments are the violin and the clarinet, which is in keeping with Magyar and Rumanian folk tradition. The album contains representative specimens of almost all popular Jewish dances, such as the *hora*, the *freilach*, and the *doina*. The Rumanian melodic influence is obvious, but there are also Bulgarian and Russian dances in the album.

On the Columbia list two commendable records are to be found. One is the rendition by Naftule Brandwein's Orchestra of *Bulgar Ala Naftule* and *Hore Mit Tzibeles* (8219-F), and the other is a disc that features clarinetist Dave Tarras—also to be heard with the Bucovinaer Kapelle in the Decca album—against an orchestral background, in two Rumanian dances entitled *A Rumenisher Nigun* and *Rumenishe Doina* (8220-F).

Decca's single "Medley of Hebrew Dances" (1589) is too elegant to be genuine.

Art Music

ONCE outside the field of Jewish tradition proper, one is faced with the vast amount of music written by Jewish composers who have incorporated Jewish material into work that otherwise belongs completely to Western tradition. I have not listed the music of any of these composers, not only because it would take too much space, but also be-

cause none of these instances of Jewish incorporation or inflection represents anything but the intermittent or sudden consciousness on the part of a Westernized Jew of his heritage. Many of these compositions—and the list would include items by Mendelssohn, Meyerbeer, Goldmark, Halévy, Bruch, and others—constitute valuable and, in frequent cases, absolute contributions to Western music. But they mean little to Jewish music proper.

However, there is a field of endeavor which, while clearly dependent upon the evolution of Western music, attempts in its subject matter and choice of material to create a new tradition of Jewish art music. Here are found composers like Bloch and Achron—to mention only two of the most prominent. Whatever of their music has been recorded is universally available, because, though striving toward a Jewish tradition, it has found favor with the general public as well.

The best artist in this category is doubtless Ernst Bloch, who is represented on the phonograph by three excellently recorded and well performed works: *Abodah*, which is coupled with Ravel's setting of *Kaddisch*, and played by Yehudi Menuhin (Victor 15887); *Schelomo*, performed by the cellist Emmanuel Feuermann and the Philadelphia Orchestra under Stokowski (Victor DM-698); and the superb performance by Szigeti and Foldes of *Baal Shem* (Columbia X-188), which is intended as tonal description of the life of the Hasidim.

Only one of Joseph Achron's works has been recorded, and it is his most popular composition, the *Hebrew Melody*, performed by Jascha Heifetz (Victor 6695). A rendition of this tune by Mischa Elman was released by Victor in April of this year (under the label 11-9111).

Finally there is Leonard Bernstein's *Jeremiah* (Victor DM-1026), which is on the borderline between American and Jewish music.

Among the non-Jewish composers who have used Jewish material in its more or less original form, Serge Prokofieff is prob-

ably best known. His *Overture on Hebrew Themes*, op. 34 (Disc 4020) was written during the composer's stay in the United States—as the blurb indicates, while living in the Bronx. This may have influenced the composer towards the use of the material but it hardly helped him to create any Jewish art music, which in all probability was hardly his intention. Thus the *Overture* remains but an interesting Prokofieff work and is devoid of the Jewish flavor which both Bloch and Achron understood.

This is but a meager list when one realizes how much favor Jewish art music has found with the general public. Certainly, a complete recording of Ravel's *Chants hébraïques*, from which the above-mentioned *Kaddisch* was taken, and which may be disputable as Jewish but definitely not as great music; a disc version of some of the stage music by Achron; and a recording of excerpts from Ludovico Rocca's opera *Dybbuk* are all well worth making—not to mention many works by other, lesser known but no less expert, Jewish art composers.

But lacking even more are recordings of the contemporary effort to create a revival of Jewish synagogue and oratorio music—especially since this movement has gained such a firm foothold in modern American synagogues. The music of composers like Lazare Saminsky, Isadore Freed, Abraham W. Binder, Gershon Ephros, and many others should find its way onto records; it indeed deserves wider circulation.

What is needed most of all, however, is a large collection of records, something like the French *Anthologie sonore*, that would preserve the most important monuments of Jewish music of all categories and all periods in the manner of a historical survey—and in genuine, competent, and adequately recorded performances. Such an enterprise would probably require cooperative non-commercial backing. Nevertheless, it is an imperative task. Only then will a standard be provided by which the present and future generations will be able to assess the works of composers who endeavor to continue the Jewish tradition of music.

THE MONTH IN HISTORY

Labour's Master Plan

ALL THE world was divided into two parts. One was the Soviet Union, which was using its military strength and its propaganda organizations in other countries to achieve world dominion through political totalitarianism and economic change. The other was the *mariage de convenance* of capitalist America and socialist Britain brought about by their common desire to resist the Soviet threat to their political freedom and economic interests.

In this mixed union, America was the senior partner physically, and England was the senior partner ideologically. Britain, with a policy of imperial liquidation, economic democracy, and political freedom, was offering the world a positive alternative to totalitarianism and the best hope of avoiding war. The United States threatened totalitarianism with battleships and bromides, but it offered no alternative to the Soviet solution for economic decay except a misnamed free enterprise which the world had already found unworkable. But America had money and resources and military strength which,

in its anti-Soviet fears, it was temporarily willing to share with socialist Britain, though this aid would be used to implement a policy of which one effect might be to increase the isolation of the American capitalist economy. The danger was that American capitalism's imperialist tendencies might crystallize in time to replace the old-style British colonialism with a new kind of politico-economic domination.

The struggle was now clearly in the open; it was no longer necessary to apologize for mentioning it. In England it was possible to see the struggle in terms of Socialism versus Stalinism. In America it could be seen in terms of Capitalism versus Communism, or as the struggle of Socialism against both Capitalism and Communism. But it was not possible to deny the existence of the struggle, to wave it away with comforting but ingenuous pleas for more "understanding." And only the simple-minded could still hold the notion that any of the world's lesser problems could be settled outside its context.

It was a struggle in which men found themselves having to take sides.

Materials and Factors

So it became necessary for the man of good-will to examine the materials and the factors with which British Socialism had to work. There seemed nothing else to work with and nothing else that could be brought into the picture in time to meet the threat of war and destruction.

In British Labour's struggle for Socialism with freedom against Communism with repression, the basic elements were as follows:

1. The British Labour government with its program of democratic Socialism at home and abroad. British Labour was wedded to an undramatic gradualism, and to law and order. Also in its tradition there was a firm adherence to civil liberty.

2. Britain in the world economy. Britain

SIDNEY HERTZBERG, regular conductor of this department, takes over from Maurice Goldbloom after a two months' absence in India where, as Consultant to the American Famine Mission, he met scores of Indian leaders, including Nehru, Gandhi, and Jinnah, and covered 7,500 miles, visiting Indian cities and villages. In reporting and analyzing Jewish affairs, Mr. Hertzberg's point of departure is a broad view of world history that seeks a longer perspective than that of the daily newspaper's headlines, official statements, and three-day sensations. He brings to this task lengthy experience as news analyst and editor with *Common Sense*, *Current History*, *Time*, the *New York Times*, and other publications. His reports, like other contributions to COMMENTARY, reflect the writer's judgment, and do not necessarily express the opinion of the editors.

was a nation that had to export. It did not have the vast internal resources of Soviet Russia or the United States; its exports were not a device to take up the slack in domestic employment or to find a profitable investment for surplus domestic capital. Its exports were its life blood.

3. British Labour's imperial heritage. The British Empire was not of Labour's making but Labour would have to liquidate it. It would have to liquidate the Empire in a way which would enable the British Isles to keep alive economically and in the face of the hatred engendered by centuries of British colonialism that threw doubt on British intentions even when they were real.

4. The American ally. The United States could make or break Britain economically. It seemed willing to do neither, but instead to keep it alive. Except that it was anti-Soviet, American world policy had not yet clearly emerged. But if world domination by American capitalism should replace British colonialism, the democratic alternative to Stalinism might become gutted and impotent. British Labour was racing against not only the Soviet program of expansion, but also against the American impulse to domination. America was not a firm ally.

5. Socialist allies. Within its commonwealth, British Labour had Labour governments in Australia and New Zealand, and vigorous socialist movements in Canada and India. In Europe and to a lesser extent in other parts of the world, there were socialist movements that would support British Labour if it should exercise moral leadership.

6. The growth of nationalism. From Casablanca to Borneo, subject peoples wanted first, and as a prerequisite to anything else, guarantees of national independent existence.

It was with this equipage that Western democrats had to face expanding Soviet power. And within this context it was possible to examine Britain's acts during the year the Labour government had held power.

Economic Nationalization

At home, British Labour was proceeding with nationalization at a moderate but inexorable pace. Those who felt that freedom could exist only under free enterprise so far

found no comfort in the process: freedom in Britain had never been more robust. A program of social insurance, more extensive than anything Beveridge had advocated, was under way.

To meet the peculiar demands of its economic position, Labour had geared Britain's whole economy to the manufacture of exports despite the temporary sacrifice of improvement in domestic living conditions.

By and large, British Labour's domestic program seemed to be operating with a smoothness that belied the enormous difficulties involved. This impression was enhanced by contrast with the fantastically complicated problems British Labour faced abroad.

Removing the Cornerstone

In this field, the first and most crucial step had been taken. The test of Britain's intentions was India, the cornerstone of the old empire. On September 2, 1946, with the assumption of office of India's first popular central government, India was on the road to complete independence.

The process in India involved three steps. First, the formation of a popular interim government involving substantial transference of power. Second, the writing of a permanent constitution for a free India and the complete transference of power. Third, the conclusion of an economic treaty between India and Britain which would reorganize economic relations to the advantage of both.

The first step had already been taken. The stage had been set for the second step with the election of a constituent assembly. The third would come later.

Was Britain serious? Was there a catch somewhere?

To turn back or to halt the process the Labour government had set in motion would have been disastrous for Britain. For Britain could not have held on to India anyway, and in the doomed process of trying to hold on, Britain would jeopardize her chance for economic survival and world influence. Whether it was for these compelling reasons or for ideological reasons or for a combination of both, it seemed that India, after two and one-half centuries of British rule, was to be free.

Sign of Good Faith

There was concrete evidence of good faith and of the existence of a new Britain. While British Labour's offer of independence to India was being considered by India's political leaders, Britain was given an excellent excuse to call it off or involve it in interminable delays. The reactionary Moslem League, angered by the unwillingness of the progressive Congress party to confine its representation on the executive council to non-Moslems, withdrew from all participation either in the interim government or in the constituent assembly to which it had already elected members. This was a serious blow because the Moslems were India's largest minority and could make trouble. Here was a ready-made gift horse to British Labour, born of the divide-and-rule policy of its imperialist predecessors. Some Indian Nationalists would not have blamed the British for scrapping the plan. But British Labour was not interested. It proceeded without the Moslem League, despite the risks in India and the possible displeasure of Jinnah's fellow-Moslems in the Middle East. In India divide and rule was dead.

Meaning of a Free India

The West, in its insularity, was only dimly aware of the epochal events in India. A great new nation was emerging out of the centuries of miasma which Western imperialism had exuded. For a billion people from Gibraltar to Singapore it was an object lesson in the capacity of progressive Western democracy to shed imperialism. It would mean that the struggle of dependent peoples against imperialism need not become a race war between East and West.

Furthermore, the leaders of the new Asiatic power were more devoted to democracy and peace than were the leaders of most nations that Britain and America regarded as allies. They had the desire to bring India itself—a nation of 414,000,000, one-fifth of the world's people—out of centuries of feudalism and disease and into an era of plenty and well-being unheard of in the East. In so doing India could lead all of Asia, and show the way even to a faltering China. A free and democratic India, carrying with it leadership of Asia, could be a decisive ally for

Britain and America in the struggle for a free world.

In short, what was going on in India could be a turning point in history.

In Europe, Labour was trying to make the best of the folly it had inherited from Yalta and acceded to at Potsdam. With sufficiently vigorous support of democratic socialist forces in Germany and in the rest of Europe, the Continent might yet be saved. But, except in Germany, there was little sign of such support. Especially in Greece, Labour seemed too willing to maintain alliances that invited disaster.

What British Labour had done at home and in India amounted, in the long pull of history, to a good year's work. It seemed to be following a pattern of putting first things first.

On balance, it was a record that stood up even without the arts of propaganda in which Labour played a hopeless second to the Soviets. But men of good-will were afraid to believe it. They were in the grip of despair and disbelief in the virility of their freedom, which condition was one of the main achievements of the totalitarian propaganda to which the world had been subjected.

The Middle East

It was chiefly in the Middle East that Britain's immediate policies cast suspicion on her long-term ends. In the past, this area had meant to Britain a source of oil and a passage to the East. For the new Britain, the Middle East had the same significance. But Britain's purposes in the world had changed, and the Middle East was a hotly contested prize in the clash between democracy and totalitarianism.

The simple formula that Britain quit the Middle East could not apply. It meant that the area would be left to Arab feudalism or Soviet totalitarianism or some combination of both. The British could quit India with some assurance that the country would be left in the hands of progressive forces that would play a constructive part in India, in Asia, and in the world. In the Middle East, such forces had little strength. This condition was in part an aspect of Labour's imperial heritage. British imperial policy in the

Middle East had always avoided the economic development which was usually a precondition for the growth of modern democracy. This policy had also been followed in India but with less success. British hegemony over the Middle East left it devoid of industrial or agricultural development and of any transport except the Suez Canal. Apart from military installations, pipelines, and refineries, the Middle East was essentially a desolate waste which, because it could support little life, was impregnable to invasion.

Nationalism Ueber Alles

But lack of development, while it might prevent the growth of democracy, had no such stifling effect on nationalism. The unavoidable fact that the British Labour government faced in the Middle East was the fact of a burgeoning and intransigent Arab nationalism. Though it was supported by modern as well as backward Arab groups, its triumph would not have meant the victory of democracy and internationalism, which had always been basic precepts in Indian nationalism.

The force of Arab nationalism came into conflict with another nationalism—Jewish nationalism.

The nationalism of the Arabs, the Indians, the Indonesians, the Irish, the Slovaks, the Ukrainians, and of dozens of other groups around the world was founded on a basic and incontestable fact—all these groups lived on the soil they wanted to control, and in each case constituted the overwhelming majority of the population. This was not true of Jewish nationalism—except that there was a minority of Jews who lived in Palestine. Jewish nationalism, based on heavily contested historical and legal grounds, and fired by centuries of religious and folk emotion, derived its greatest support from the need of thousands of Jews for a haven—a need that lay heavily though not unbearably on the conscience of Western nations. This fact gave Jewish nationalism a disproportionate international aspect which made the aspiration of 414,000,000 Indians for freedom from foreign rule in their own country seem, to much of the West, of less political importance than the establishment of a Jewish state by the transfer of a million Jews from

other parts of the world. Jewish nationalism, to the Arab, was simply an aspect of British imperialism.

And so it was to nationalists in India and throughout the East. The Hindus among Indian nationalists supported the nationalist aspirations of Moslems in the Middle East and opposed a Jewish state despite their differences with the Moslems in India. The comparisons that Indians regarded as valid were not between Indian nationalism and Jewish nationalism, but between Pakistan and Zionism—an independent Jewish state within Arab territory and an independent Moslem state within Indian territory.

The Zionist Contribution

But the Jews in Palestine—without an independent state of their own—were making a crucial contribution to the area. They had brought with them a modern technology in industry and agriculture and a determination to build political and economic democracy which the Near East had never before known. For British Labour's policy in the Middle East, this aspect of Zionism could have been a godsend. Here, in microcosm, was the kind of development that British Labour had to carry out in the whole Middle East, not only because democratic Socialism was the business of the Labour government, but also because such a policy would be the only safe substitute for Arab feudalism or Soviet expansionism. Industrialization in the Middle East, accompanied by an increase in the standard of living and in purchasing power, would also mean a new market for goods where virtually none existed before.

Would British Labour carry out such a policy? Could it, and at the same time accommodate Arab and Jewish nationalism in Palestine?

For a year, it seemed that Labour had no answer at all to the problem in Palestine except repression. Labour had inherited an explosive situation. But the diversion of refugees to Cyprus, the continued imprisonment of Zionist leaders, and the detention of thousands of the Yishuv, could be no final answer to Zionist violence. It was, after all, the duty of the mandatory power to put forward a definite and coherent policy, which alone could relieve the situation.

The federalization plan, officially approved by the Labour cabinet and brought forward late in July as a basis for discussion, at last provided a framework by which British policy in Palestine could be tested.

Economic Development

On the economic side, the plan involved substantial loans from the United States for the development of the Middle East. If this aspect of the plan were carried out, it would mean a reversal of the old imperial policy. The plan also provided for freedom of inter-territorial transit, trade, and commerce, which would facilitate cooperation between the provinces in development projects. Within the Jewish province, land-transfer regulations would be abolished, and this would open a larger area for Jewish purchase of land than was now available. The government of the Arab province could, if it so chose, permit Jewish land purchase in its area.

Political Control

The substance of the political set-up was that it continued British control with limited local autonomy. The plan reserved for the central government—the British—exclusive authority over defense, foreign relations, and customs and excise. Elected legislatures within the provinces would exercise other governmental functions. From among the legislators, the British High Commissioner would appoint an executive consisting of a chief minister and a council of ministers. All bills passed by the provincial legislature would be subject to the veto of the High Commissioner, who presumably was to be guided only by concern for peace and the protection of minorities. The High Commissioner would also have power to intervene "if the provincial government fails to conform or exceeds its proper function." Eventually, Palestine would become a United Nations trusteeship.

Immigration

Ultimate control over immigration would be exercised by the central government acting only on the basis of recommendations by the provincial governments. The controlling principle would be economic absorptive

capacity. The issuance of any immigration certificates, it was made clear, was dependent on acceptance of the total plan. If the plan were accepted, every effort would be made to bring 100,000 Jews into Palestine within a year. The United States would be asked to undertake the responsibility of transporting them to Palestine and providing them with food for the first two months after their arrival. Because Palestine could not absorb all Jewish refugees, the plan also involved efforts to find new homes for them among members of the United Nations and the creation of conditions in Europe that would enable the resettlement of a substantial number there. Pending establishment of the new International Refugee Organization, the resettlement of refugees would be promoted through the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, with emphasis on South America, particularly Brazil.

Possibilities of the Plan

The plan satisfied neither the Arab demand for an Arab Palestine nor the Zionist demand for a Jewish Palestine. But Herbert Morrison, who described the plan as "intermediate," declared:

"In the long term, it leaves the way open for peaceful progress and constitutional development either for partition or federal unity." Partition presumably held out the possibility of a Jewish state. This possibility, however theoretical, involved a radical departure from Ernest Bevin's repeated insistence that Palestine must become a Palestinian state only, and from the Anglo-American Committee's firm declaration that Palestine should be neither an Arab nor a Jewish state.

If cooperation between Arabs and Jews was essential, then federalization seemed the furthest it was possible to go toward meeting national claims without slamming the door on such cooperation. Partition, which the Jewish Agency seemed ready to accept and which Arabs vigorously opposed, would have made such cooperation virtually impossible.

The problem in the Middle East was not basically the conflict between Arab and Jewish nationalism. The problem was how to extend the boon of political and economic free-

dom to all its inhabitants and thus strengthen freedom throughout the world.

The federalization plan seemed to provide the basis for a compromise that served Britain's ends in the Middle East, and provided for every interest of Zionism, except the paraphernalia of nationhood—which paraphernalia was not concomitant with human well-being, as Jews had good reason to know from their experience with German, Polish, Slavic, and a dozen other nationalisms.

If, under this plan, Palestine could become a nation in which Jews now living there, and any other Jews it could absorb, were able to carry on their lives in freedom and contentment, Zionism could not reject it lightly.

The Skittish Ally

Britain made realization of the plan dependent on American support, which was not immediately forthcoming. Despite intense diplomatic activity behind the scenes in Washington, an outburst of fervent pre-election Judeophilia in Congress, and the intense activities of the Zionists, the government of the United States, in its official and sovereign capacity, still had no stated policy for the Middle East and Palestine.

After months of intensive comings and goings at the White House during which the President and his spokesmen devoted much of their time to denying rumors, the President's secretary finally, August 16, came up with a lean announcement which left the basic situation in status quo. The statement in full follows:

"Although the President has been exchanging views with Mr. Attlee on the subject, this government has not presented any plan of its own for solution of the problem of Palestine. It is the sincere hope of the President, however, that as a result of the proposed conversations between the British Government and Jewish and Arab representatives a fair solution of the problem of Palestine can be found and immediate steps can be taken to alleviate the situation of the displaced Jews in Europe.

"It is clear that no settlement of the Palestine problem can be achieved which will be fully satisfactory to all of the parties con-

cerned and that if this problem is to be solved in a manner which will bring peace and prosperity to Palestine, it must be approached in a spirit of conciliation.

"It is also evident that the solution of the Palestine question will not in itself solve the broader problem of the hundreds of thousands of displaced persons in Europe. The President has been giving this problem his special attention and hopes that arrangements can be entered into which will make it possible for various countries, including the United States, to admit many of these persons as permanent residents.

"The President on his part is contemplating seeking the approval of Congress for special legislation authorizing the entry into the United States of a fixed number of these persons, including Jews."

The President's position was unenviable. He had to placate domestic Zionist intransigence. He had to work with the British. He had to work with the Arabs. He had to satisfy domestic sentiment which was at once for a humanitarian gesture toward Jewish refugees, overwhelmingly against military involvement in the Middle East, and unsympathetic to financial involvement. Under these circumstances, it was not surprising that, at least in public, he should leave the long-term solution to the round table conversations scheduled to begin September 9 in London. Who would be invited, and on what terms the invitees would accept, became objects of frenzied maneuvering as the month ended. One thing was made clear: the basis of the conversations would be the federalization plan and not—as the Jewish Agency was insisting—an independent Jewish state.

But the President did seem determined that some specific action be taken to resettle refugees. The indication that he might urge legislation to permit the entry of displaced persons into the United States seemed likely to get no further than the contemplative stage without much more public support than was initially forthcoming.

Under the President's executive order facilitating immigration, 3,462 immigrants had entered the United States up to August 7. Of these 2,477 were Jews.

INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: SECOND PHASE

Organizing the World's Conscience Step by Step

H. LAUTERPACHT

AT THE very outset of World War II the notion of an international recognition and declaration of human rights had been put forward by governments and by private bodies and individuals as one of the major purposes of the struggle. In common with other international lawyers, it seemed to me necessary to investigate whether and to what extent the idea of an international affirmation and protection of fundamental human rights is capable of being translated into terms of positive law and of working legal institutions. Written before the San Francisco Conference, my own book,

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The International Bill of the Rights of Man, was intended to explore alternatives and forward the general movement, but not to advocate any specific method—by an international bill of human rights or otherwise—for solving what has been for centuries the enduring and most fundamental problem of law and politics. The American Law Institute, a body of high reputation both in the academic and practical realms of law, and the Commission for the Study of the Organization of Peace, under the leadership of Professor Shotwell, resolved to devote special study to the subject.

The urgency of that task became even more apparent after the "four freedoms" of the Presidential message of January 6, 1941, and the British prime minister's faith, expressed in 1942, that the time would come "when this world's struggle ends with the enthronement of human rights," matured in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals with their recognition of the promotion of "respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms" as one of the objects of the United Nations and as one of the "conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations."

It was natural that the idea of the international protection of fundamental human rights should assume the attractive and convenient form of an international bill of the rights of man. At the same time it became increasingly clear that only prolonged and conscientious study could show whether this seemingly revolutionary idea was not an ineffectual catchword or, worse still, a transparent device for replacing by a high-sounding formula the already existing obligations for the protection of minorities in some countries.

Such study has become even more im-

perative, now that the peoples of the United Nations have reaffirmed, in the opening passage of the Preamble of the Charter, their "faith in fundamental human rights" and "in the dignity and worth of the human person," and have incorporated among the purposes of the organization the objective of "promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all." The Charter has gone beyond a mere general and prefatory acknowledgment of that wide purpose. As a principle, it runs throughout the Charter and permeates its vital provisions in the matter of the jurisdiction and the functions of the General Assembly, of the Economic and Social Council, and of the objects of the system of trusteeship. More than that: the Charter expressly contemplates the establishment of a commission for the promotion of human rights. Among the various commissions recommended in this context by the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations, the Commission on Human Rights occupied the first place; it is the only commission specifically referred to in the Charter in connection with the future work of the Economic and Social Council. The first objectives of the Commission, as envisaged by the Preparatory Commission, the recommendations of which have been fully adopted by the first Assembly of the United Nations, is "the formulation of an international bill of rights." These are important developments.

The Effect of Charter Provisions

THERE is always a danger that we may exaggerate the scope, the significance, and the practical effect, in law or action, of words and phrases occurring in compacts and treaties between states—the Charter of the United Nations is a treaty—and in resolutions of international conferences. They often conceal, behind a pretentious solemnity of expression, a mere agreement to disagree and a desire not to shock public opinion by a revealed and acknowledged absence of unity of purpose and of action. Frequently the apparent comprehensiveness of the principal undertaking is nullified or reduced to trifling

dimensions by seemingly innocuous reservations. Thus, it has been suggested—somewhat pessimistically—that the provisions of the Charter in the matter of human rights, even assuming that they are otherwise intended as creating a legal obligation, have been rendered purely nominal by the seventh paragraph of Article 2, which lays down that "nothing in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state."

However, if it is not permissible to lull the conscience of peoples by an unwarranted assumption of progress, it is equally undesirable to underrate the significance of such results as have been achieved. Such timid and conservative caution deprives law, including international law, of that powerful source of strength and vitality which is fed by a common faith in its reality. The provisions of the Charter, including those on fundamental human rights and freedoms, are not a self-executing piece of machinery acting with an automatic precision and yielding automatic results. They will be interpreted and implemented under the impact of such persevering conviction and sustained fervor as the enlightened and not wholly unorganized opinion of the world will be able to maintain. For this reason it may be the duty of all persons of good-will to resist, in this weighty matter of international safeguards of human rights and freedoms, that tempting inclination to realism which often fails to capitalize the achievements already accomplished and becomes a brake upon progress.

The Charter Marks a Great Step

THE provisions of the Charter which make the respect and observance of fundamental human rights and freedoms a matter of international concern open a new epoch in the field of international law. Undoubtedly, it is possible to point to certain international precedents in support of the view that the Charter is not altogether revolutionary. The infrequent and controversial practice of humanitarian intervention (a practice often

controverted by the admission of governments that intervention is legitimate only when the interests of the foreign States are involved); the numerous treaties for the suppression of slavery, of traffic in slaves, and of forced labor; the treaties for removing some of the causes and hardships of statelessness and double nationality; the system of protection of minorities; the recognition of the principle that aliens (but not nationals) are entitled to be treated in accordance with a minimum standard of civilization—which was in strict law a right of their state, and not a right of their own; the occasional grant to individuals of the right of access to international tribunals (as under the Polish-German Upper Silesian Convention); the ruling of the Permanent Court of International Justice that, if the contracting governments so desire, individuals may acquire rights directly under a treaty—all these examples may be invoked as evidence that international law prior to the Charter was not altogether disinterested in the fate and in the status of the individual.

However, the very enumeration of these precedents brings into relief the profound significance of the change effected in the Charter. Its clauses are not intended to lay down clear, specific, and invariably enforceable legal obligations; they certainly do not, with one possible exception of enforcement by the Security Council, confer upon the United Nations the right of direct intervention in the domestic affairs of states. But these very limitations tend to emphasize the fact that, for the first time in history, the recognition of the sanctity and of the ultimate value of human personality has become the theme—solemn, deliberate, and repeated—of the most fundamental international enactment. To what extent the position of the individual in international law has undergone a change as the result of the Charter is difficult to assess. But we are entitled to assert that a far-reaching change has taken place and that it is now within the grasp of the statesman and of peoples to translate that potentiality into terms of law. At the same time a parallel transformation in an-

other direction has taken place. The individual has been made more than a beneficiary of rights. Another Charter—that annexed to the agreement of August 8, 1945, for the Trial and the Prosecution of Major War Criminals—fully identified itself with the salutary principle that the subject of international duties in the sphere of contractual and criminal law is not only or primarily the mystical entity of the metaphysical state but also the *individual* acting on its behalf.

Abandon the Bill of Rights?

IN VIEW of the character of the change, are we not doing a disservice to a great cause by narrowing it down to the issue of an international bill of the rights of man—an idea which bristles with difficulties and which is regarded by many as wholly impracticable? Is not this a case of *le mieux est l'ennemi du bon*? There is substance in these questions. We are certainly not justified in proclaiming that without an international bill of human rights the provisions of the Charter on the subject would be reduced to a shadow of their potential self. Even without a bill of rights, the recognition of fundamental human rights, as well as the mandatory authorization of a Commission on Human Rights, would be an event of transcending importance. As the proposals of the Preparatory Commission adopted by the first Assembly of the United Nations suggest, the Commission on Human Rights has before it, irrespective of the task of drafting a bill of rights, a wide and beneficent field of activity. This includes: "formulation of recommendations for an international declaration or convention on such matters as civil liberties, status of women, freedom of information; protection of minorities; prevention of discrimination on grounds of race, language, or religion; any matters within the field of human rights considered likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations."

But by abandoning the idea—now offered to it in a tangible form by practical statesmen—of a comprehensive international bill of the rights of man as the first and foremost object of its endeavors, would not the Com-

mission on Human Rights be reducing from the very inception its own stature and that of the United Nations? When a disciple of Pomponazzo, the philosopher of the Renaissance, in an effort to avoid the dangerous subject of the immortality of the soul, began his lecture by an exposition of Aristotle's treatises, his audience broke out into the impatient shout "*Quid de anima?*" ("What of the soul?"). Would not the Commission on Human Rights be called upon to answer a similar question if, in yielding to the impulse to be more realistic than the realism of statesmen, it were to resign itself to treating the idea of an international bill of the rights of man as a mere pious aspiration? Fortunately, as is shown further along, this is not the way in which the Commission has interpreted its task.

Too Far or Not Far Enough?

YET there is a tendency, voiced by writers of authority, to adopt the view that an international bill of the rights of man is an undertaking fraught with so many difficulties that it ought to be abandoned, at least at the outset, in favor of specific conventions bearing on individual rights such as freedom of speech, the right of assembly, the right to free information, proper judicial safeguards in criminal trials, and the like. This seems to be the view, put forward in COMMENTARY [January, 1946, "Enforcing Human Rights Internationally"], of some of the friendly critics of my proposals. Professor Corbett is of the opinion that I go "too far and too fast," while Professor Jessup believes that the bill as proposed is "too ornate."

There have been, on the other hand, criticisms of the proposed bill of rights on the ground that it does not go far enough. Thus it has been pointed out that a bill of rights which does not provide for international supervision and control of the power of the state to suspend the bill of rights by emergency legislation or by a proclamation of a "state of siege," is deficient in one of its essential aspects (a view propounded, for instance, by Mr. Jaffin in *Columbia Law Review*, November, 1945); that a bill of

rights which does not enjoin, in mandatory terms, trial by jury in criminal matters or equality of the sexes is sadly incomplete; and, in particular, that the value of the bill as proposed is seriously if not fatally affected by the absence of direct access of individuals to international tribunals for the enforcement of their fundamental rights. I had discarded all these attempts at completeness not for the reason that they are not attractive, but because I did not think that they are either practicable or at present indispensable. This is still my view.

Undoubtedly, there is room for a wide divergence of opinion as to the contents of the rights to be protected by the bill. Shall it, in addition to the uncontested rights of personal freedom, include trial by jury, equality of the sexes, the right to a nationality, with the consequent abolition of statelessness, the right to expatriation? Shall it attempt to give effect to the inalienable right of man to government by consent and to freedom from tyranny? Critics have expressed the view that the incorporation of that fundamental right is an ambitious embellishment which may imperil the prospect of the bill as a whole.

But, it may be asked, what is the value of the various personal rights of freedom if they do not include the fundamental right to government by consent, and what is the moral authority of a bill which leaves that freedom on one side? But if we do include the right to government by consent, how are we going to apply it not only to the problem of political dictatorship, but also to the complicated question of self-government of colonial and dependent peoples? If we adopt the obvious and inescapable principle of equality before the law as part of the bill, how are we going to make it effective in relation to racial inequality and discrimination, including the problem of colored peoples in various parts of the world? To what extent are we to incorporate the economic freedoms? Assuming that, by the remotest of chances, we secure agreement as to the content of the rights to be incorporated in the bill, how are we to settle the problem

of enforcement? For, clearly, unless we are satisfied with a mere declaration, the question of implementing the bill of rights is the crux of the problem. How shall we apply the various methods of enforcement to the various categories of rights?

Enforcing the Bill of Rights

THE question of enforcement is even more baffling than that of the selection of rights to be protected. From this point of view an international bill of rights presents difficulties much greater than those raised by a declaration of rights within the state. Moreover, it must be realized that the obligation of enforcement of the observance of human rights by the United Nations goes beyond any obligation accepted in the Charter. If the members of the United Nations were to subscribe to a bill of rights authorizing such enforcement, they would be adding to their obligations in the same way as by signing the Optional Clause of the Statute of the International Court of Justice they would be assuming a duty, which does not exist under the Charter, to submit so-called legal disputes to the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. Whatever may otherwise be the meaning of the domestic jurisdiction clause, it at any rate lays down clearly that authoritative enforcement is, in the absence of agreement to the contrary, outside the scope of the Charter.

It is natural to consider these formidable complexities as decisive and, on reflection, to resign oneself to the abandonment of what in the realm of practical politics appears to be a phantom likely to disperse our efforts and to divert them from ends which are practicable. In fact, this is the second psychological stage through which the student of the subject is likely to pass.

The first phase is the realization of the urgency and of the cogency of the proposal. The eventual dependence of international peace on securing fundamental rights of man and on elimination of tyranny, which is in itself a danger to security, is generally admitted. So is the fact that no law, including international law, can survive or raise

a valid claim to moral authority unless it safeguards the inalienable rights of the individual human being who is the ultimate unit of all law. That intimate connection between the protection of the individual and the requirements of an enlightened international law reveals itself in many often unexpected ways. Witness, for instance, the insistence, which has formed part of the practice of Great Britain and the United States in the last century, on an adequately expressed consent of the population as a condition of recognition of revolutionary governments.

In the second stage, that of resignation evoked by seemingly insoluble difficulties, the despondency of the sympathetic investigator is heightened by the legitimate fear that an international bill of the rights of man may reduce the compass of human rights to the lowest common denominator determined by the requirements of agreement between fifty sovereign and equal states, and that it may become a plausible gesture covering the design to do away with more tangible obligations in the sphere of protection of minorities. To the futility of that gesture there would thus be added a new and disintegrating threat to public morality.

Probably, however, in the case of the conscientious student of international affairs, the second stage of resignation is a purely provisional phase. The notion of an international proclamation of enforceable fundamental rights of the individual is an inescapable postulate of reason and of the ultimate purposes of international law and of international peace. In such matters the human mind does not easily concede defeat.

Separate Conventions or One Bill?

CAN we hope to do justice to the subject through the expedient of dealing piecemeal with individual rights by means of separate international conventions on some such subjects as freedom of speech, freedom of information, freedom of assembly, freedom from discrimination on racial or religious grounds, and the like? It may be an illusion to assume that by adopting that method we

get rid of all the main difficulties confronting an international bill of the rights of man. The acute problem of enforcement would still remain with us. A convention, for instance, establishing an effective right to equality before the law and to absence of discrimination on racial and religious grounds—which means in effect a universalized minorities treaty—would raise problems of enforcement different only in degree from those inherent in a general bill of rights. But there is a more fundamental objection. These rights are, in a real sense, interdependent. There may be little meaning in attempts to secure, for instance, equality before the law and absence of discrimination so long as the rights of personal freedom—such as freedom from arbitrary arrest—are left unprotected. There is a superficial attractiveness in adducing the example of the gradual but imposing achievements of the International Labor Organization through the successive draft conventions and recommendations adopted by its conferences and ratified by governments. But there is no true interdependence between the Reduction of Hours of Work (Glass Bottle Works) Convention, 1936, and the Convention of 1935 on the Maintenance of Migrants' Pension Rights. The same applies to the other numerous conventions concluded under the auspices of the International Labor Organization. Moreover, there is only a limited attraction in an analogy between conventions safeguarding fundamental human rights and such enactments concluded under the auspices of the International Labor Organization as the Minimum Age (Trimmers and Stokers) Convention, 1921, or Medical Examination of Young Persons (Sea) Convention, 1921. Neither is it edifying to contemplate the prospect of a convention on equality before the law or on freedom of speech being exposed to the slow trickle of ratifications on the analogy of many an international labor convention.

On the other hand, these doubts concerning the system of a piecemeal realization of human rights by means of specific conventions need not be decisive. It is clear, for

instance, that the successful conclusion and operation of any such single convention would provide an example and a stimulus for the more comprehensive codification and implementation of human rights. The main though certainly not inevitable danger of such gradualness is that it may become an occasion for renouncing the great opportunity and obligation offered by the idea of a comprehensive international bill of the rights of man.

Getting the Bill of Rights Accepted

ADMITTEDLY this is a task of unprecedented complexity. It cannot be the result of a rapid process of international legislation. It must be the product of preparation and study infinitely more laborious than that which preceded, for instance, the Hague Codification Conference of 1930. Thus it would be the business of the Commission on Human Rights to set up an authoritative and expert body to prepare, after a prolonged study and investigation, a provisional draft of the bill. The draft would have to be examined and approved, with suitable changes, by the Commission itself with the object of producing a solemn enactment of intrinsic juridical value and of compelling moral appeal. The object of the draft would be to give effect to the great and essential purposes of a bill of rights without reducing its stature by anticipating objections from all likely quarters and by attempting to achieve the greatest possible measure of agreement. For it is obvious that no bill of rights which is not a travesty of its purpose ought to be drafted in such a way as to accommodate itself to the situation, however contemptuous of the natural rights of man, that may be found in any of the states that may adopt it.

The draft, backed by the authority of the Commission on Human Rights, would have to be laid, in the first instance, not before governments but before the world at large by way of a report to the Economic and Social Council. The draft would then be studied once more, in the light of expressions of opinion received from individuals and private and public organizations and insti-

tutions, by the special body set up by the Commission and by the Commission itself with a view to informal submission to governments for their observations and criticisms. After having received these, the Commission would formulate the final draft for solemn submission to the Assembly of the United Nations as a starting point for a conference convened by the United Nations with the object of adopting the bill of rights.

This is a painfully laborious and elaborate procedure. But only some such thoroughness and deliberation will be commensurate with the magnitude of the task. That process of preparation may extend for years. So long as it is clearly perceived that the drafting and realization of the bill of rights remain a paramount task of the Commission, it can without derogating from the dignity of its function and from its reputation in the eyes of the world devote itself to other activities, including (if found feasible and not inconsistent with the prospects of the major task) the preparation of conventions bearing upon specific freedoms. But it is that major task, approached not as an infinite ideal but as a consummation to be achieved in our own day, that will enhance the stature of the Commission and supply a rallying point for the forces of progress and idealism in the world.

It is true that the work of the Commission on Human Rights and the interpretation of the provisions of the Charter in the matter of human rights and freedoms will be determined to a decisive extent by the political strength and by the standing of the United Nations in the world. But it is equally true to say that, in the long run, the power and the authority of the United Nations will depend on its active association with the faith, optimism, and idealism expressed in the enduring aspirations of mankind. Of those aspirations, those centered upon the promotion of fundamental human rights and freedoms are perhaps the most significant and most pregnant with possibilities. Circumstances have rendered necessary the infusion into the Charter of what appears to many a disquietingly excessive element of

realism and power. This element need not necessarily be fatal so long as we refrain from proclaiming it as inherently just and reasonable. More probably, it is a creature of transient political necessities and circumstances.

There are many persons who will deem it imperative that the impact of the dead hand of realism weighing upon the Charter of the United Nations be lightened by the compensating operation of ideals transcending any temporary accommodation with uncompromising claims of sovereignty. It is against that background that we may comprehend more easily the fervor of the passages bearing upon human rights and freedoms, as envisaged in the Charter, in the report of Mr. Stettinius to the President on the Charter of the United Nations: "The unanimous acceptance of this proposal [to set up a Commission on Human Rights] may well prove one of the most important and significant achievements of the San Francisco Conference. . . . The Commission on Human Rights will have the opportunity to work out an international bill of rights which can be submitted to member nations with a view to incorporation in their fundamental law, just as there is a Bill of Rights in the American Constitution. . . . It [the Commission on Human Rights] is a promise from this generation to generations yet unborn that this war, fought in the cause of freedom, will not have been fought in vain."

A Bill Without Enforcement?

THE Commission on Human Rights is concerned with a task the potentialities of which are greater and more significant than an international bill of the rights of man. The existence and the standing of the Commission would not be fatally impaired even if, after sustained and patient effort, it were compelled to reach the conclusion that a comprehensive, progressive, and effective bill of rights is not possible. But such admission of defeat would be a shock to, and an impairment of, those moral forces which in the long run are alone capable of sustaining the edifice of the organized community of

nations. For this reason it is to be hoped that there will be in this matter no surrender except for most compelling reasons and without exhausting other available though less ambitious alternatives.

In particular, should the question of enforcement threaten to become—as may well be the case—the stumbling block in the way of the adoption of the bill of rights, it ought to be a matter for serious consideration whether a bill of rights devoid of specific provisions for enforcement would necessarily be a valueless and in the end a retrograde enactment. There was, prior to the Charter of the United Nations, some warrant for such a view, which I inclined to accept. But it is possible—perhaps probable—that the Charter of the United Nations has made a profound difference in this respect. For although the Charter does not provide for the enforcement, in the strict sense of the word, of the observance of human rights and freedoms, it makes such observance a subject of concern for the United Nations. It is of little consequence that this is at the same time a matter which in the language of the Charter is essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of states and as such outside the scope of *intervention* by the United Nations. “Intervention,” in the accepted terminology of international law, is dictatorial interference; it is enforcement. However, apart from such direct enforcement and intervention, there is probably nothing in the “domestic jurisdiction” clause of the Charter which prevents the limited implementation of the principle of respect of fundamental rights by *discussion, report, and recommendation*, especially if the latter is not addressed specifically to an individual state. Neither does it necessarily rule out investigation and inquiry, not amounting to direct intervention, in the territories of the members of the United Nations. (This important aspect of the question is brought out with some clarity in the Report to the President of the United States on the Results of the San Francisco Conference and in the statement of Dr. Pasvolksy, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, before the Senate

Committee on Foreign Affairs: *Hearings on the Charter, 79th Congress, First Session*, pp. 102-103, 310-312, 320.)

In view of these possibilities, an international bill of the rights of man in the nature of a declaration not accompanied by express provisions for enforcement might not be altogether without value. It would give a more tangible form to the general language of the Charter; it would revitalize it in this respect; and it would make easier the implementation, by measures not amounting to direct enforcement, of the objects of the Charter in the matter of fundamental human rights. That purpose, to the extent to which it forms part of the Charter, is not affected by the reservation of matters of domestic jurisdiction. There is no warrant for the view that by incorporating that reservation the authors of the Charter reduced or intended to reduce to a mere form of words the great object of safeguarding the fundamental rights and freedoms of man.

The Task is Begun

THERE is good reason to believe that both the Commission on Human Rights, as at present constituted, and the Economic and Social Council, to which the Commission is responsible in the first instance, are determined to use to the full the possibilities opened up by the Charter. In February 1946 the Economic and Social Council set up a nuclear Commission on Human Rights composed of nine persons, including Mrs. Roosevelt who has since been elected chairman of the Commission—a happy augury. The nuclear Commission will, in due course, give place to a full Commission of eighteen members, nominated by governments—members of the United Nations—after consultation with the Secretary General, and confirmed by the Economic and Social Council. The latter will select the eighteen governments concerned. The Council has formulated the task of the Commission as comprising the submission of proposals, recommendations, and reports regarding an international bill of rights; international declarations or conventions on civil liber-

ties, the status of women, freedom of information, and similar matters; the protection of minorities; and the prevention of discrimination on grounds of race, sex, language, or religion.

The Commission, which met between April 29 and May 20, 1946, has interpreted its terms of reference in a way which suggests that it intends to make the international bill of rights a central aspect of its activity. Thus in its report submitted to the second session of the Economic and Social Council, the Commission put on record its view that an international bill of rights covers substantially the other subjects of its task as outlined above and that that fact must determine the character of its work in the future. The following passage in the report indicates the temper of the Commission: "The Commission proceeded with this examination in full realization of the grave importance of the task entrusted to it by the Charter of the United Nations. It fully realized the importance of achieving and promoting the recognition and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, in the hope of drawing from the last world war, which demanded the sacrifices of so many lives, the lessons which will aid us to achieve the highest aspirations of mankind."

The Commission decided that it was within its competence to draft a bill of human rights for circulation among the governments of the United Nations for their comments. It wisely left for future consideration the intricate but weighty question of whether, in due course, the bill should be adopted by way of a resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations, as an appendix to the Charter to be incorporated as part of the national constitution of the members of the United Nations, or as a general convention between states.

What is significant and encouraging almost beyond expectation is the attitude of the Commission to the question of the reality of the bill. The Commission put on record its view that "practical and effective measures" must be taken in the cause of

the promotion and observance of human rights and freedoms. It declared that each state "must feel bound to adopt"—the French text is even more emphatic—"in accordance with its system of government, measures to safeguard the observance and to provide against the violation of these rights and freedoms that are proclaimed in an international bill." The Commission expressed its belief in the need "for an international agency of implementation entrusted with the task of watching over the general observance of human rights, in order to prevent the recurrence of acts as monstrous as those which formed the prelude to the second world war." In view of this paramount necessity for making the observance of human rights a reality, the Commission envisaged the contingency of political action and requested the Economic and Social Council to take this aspect of the problem into consideration in connection with the future determination of the status and of the powers of the Commission on Human Rights.

Not a Losing Battle

THESE pronouncements are of unusual import. Their significance is not impaired by the fact that the representative of the Soviet Union abstained from voting on the question of implementation on the ground that, having only lately arrived in New York, he had not been able to give sufficient attention to the matter. The fact remains that the Commission formally recommended that "it shall be considered that the purpose of the United Nations with regard to the promotion and observance of human rights, as defined in the Charter of the United Nations, could only be fulfilled if provisions were made for the implementation of the observance of human rights and of an international bill of rights."

What is equally important is that that recommendation was fully endorsed by the Economic and Social Council. The Council also requested the Secretary-General to make arrangements for the compilation and publication of a yearbook on law and usage

relating to human rights, the first edition of the yearbook to include all declarations and bills of human rights now in force in the various countries. Similarly the Council decided on the publication of plans and declarations on human rights by official and unofficial organizations.

The United Nations has thus entered on what may be called the second phase of a planned and coordinated effort to make fundamental human rights part of the positive law of nations. This aspect of the work of the United Nations is in the conscious process of becoming a powerful source of hope and a rallying point for the forces of idealism and optimism amidst the travail and disillusionment of a shattered world. In the fulfillment of that task the Commission on Human Rights and the Economic and Social Council must be able to count on the sustained support of public opinion—both sympathetic and critical—of the world.

We are not confronted here with diplomatic bodies or unimaginative officials intent upon stultifying and reducing the stature of a great idea. On the contrary, there is visible in the approach of these organs of the United Nations a sincerity and a fervor which, on occasion, almost invite a counsel of caution. It will be noted, for instance, how the proposals outlined in this article for the drafting of the bill of

rights go much further in the elaboration and in the safeguards of procedure than those adopted by the Commission.

Thus the second phase of the international bill of rights does not give the impression of a losing battle. The Charter is emphatic in the affirmation of the principle of the exclusive jurisdiction of states with regard to matters falling exclusively within the scope of their domestic jurisdiction. But the Economic and Social Council, in a resolution adopted June 21, 1946, invited the Commission on Human Rights to submit proposals for the effective implementation of human rights and fundamental freedoms. There is no inconsistency between the Charter and the resolution of the Council. The resolution is not intended to interpret the Charter. Its object is to pave the way for the voluntary renunciation, in the spirit of the ultimate purposes of the Charter, of part of the exclusive omnipotence of the state for the sake of an ideal essential to the peace of the world and transcending the state itself.

If the United Nations continues to build its structure on these foundations of faith and principle, its permanent edifice will be erected upon an impregnable rock of spiritual grandeur and of moral authority. It will be able to draw upon a reservoir of power which will stand it in good stead in the inevitable time of trial.

FRANCE: NOTHING IS CONCLUDED

Totalitarianism Has Still to be Defeated

BERNARD LECACHE

PARIS

IT IS indeed disillusioning to rub elbows with the great of this world, and all the charm of the Parisian summer cannot alter the fact. Like everyone else, I have seen Messrs. Byrnes, Bevin, and Molotov. As for M. Georges Bidault, he is to be seen moving through all kinds of doors, either at the Constituent Assembly, in the lobbies of the big hotels, or at the meetings of his party. I watched these persons at first in my capacity as a professional journalist, intent, in his search for honest information, on smoking out their little secrets.

I have also watched them from a less impersonal point of view, one dictated by the anxieties that preoccupy anti-racists like myself. And such anxieties are justified these days, what with recent developments in Palestine, Poland, and elsewhere. No doubt we had come to expect much more from the Big Four than they were able to give; for, any way you look at it, what they left on the desks of the Luxembourg palace, in that stuffy and solemn building where laws were once made and unmade, will hardly satisfy anyone. Which proves again that the writing of the peace is a giant's task calling for men of unusual stature.

You have read in the papers that the four

foreign ministers have come to an agreement on several points of the scheduled program. Newspapers are inherently optimistic. As a matter of fact, what our four ministers have chiefly done is draw up a statement of impotence in which a series of misunderstandings artfully spun out are recorded, and in which care has been taken to save face all round. M. Georges Bidault has played his subaltern's role, first by helping Mr. Byrnes conduct a ticklish operation, then by helping Mr. Molotov get what he, Bidault, could in all decency scarcely ask for himself.

Mr. Bevin's and Mr. Byrnes' divergences of viewpoint have already become a twice-told tale. And all the flowers of rhetoric can hardly conceal the disagreements between these two and Mr. Molotov. France's representative, M. Bidault, has been poorly compensated for his diplomatic efforts and conciliatory moves. The last day of the meetings, his three colleagues administered him a smart rebuff in the matter of Allied policy toward Germany; the sting of this was felt by every section of French public opinion.

This is perhaps why the French seem only moderately appreciative of the honor devolving upon them as hosts of the Peace Conference.

The Peace Conference opened at a time when Paris was trying to numb itself in an effort to forget the rigors of the last winter and spring. Far too many among the common people have well-nigh forgotten the taste of meat. Too many children have only a vague remembrance of butter and milk. Too many households are still living on six thousand francs a month—that is, fifty dollars for three or four persons, a sum that represents a ridiculously low purchasing power in view of the prices of the most essen-

KNOWN as one of the most active defenders of human rights in France, BERNARD LECACHE is a native Parisian and a Jew who edits *Le Clou*, a political and satirical weekly founded by himself, and heads the Anti-Racist Alliance. M. Lecache's role in the Resistance was short but active—he was arrested in Algiers in 1940 by the Laval regime and released in 1942 by the arrival of the American forces. As a military correspondent and otherwise, he took part in the liberation of Italy and France. This is his second report from France to appear in COMMENTARY.

tial commodities. How could the French, particularly the urban French—leaving out of account the minority of the privileged who nourish themselves in the black market—be legitimately expected to get excited about such things as international conferences or to believe passionately in a peace that is so slow in materializing?

Intellectual Conformism

THE spirit of the Resistance, having been gradually diluted, has by now practically vanished in the face of the difficulties created by our country's realities. The political parties have again come to the fore, and to such an extent that independent thinking has absolutely no chance of making itself felt. Intellectual conformism has taken over everywhere. To express yourself without constraint, in absolutely free language, is not permitted now either in politics, or in the press, or in literature—least of all in diplomacy. The experience we are now undergoing here is one familiar practically to the whole of Europe. You begin to suspect that Hitlerism, before being driven out of the countries it had oppressed, did indeed manage to corrode all minds and souls. In any case, it has left behind such a mark that it would be folly not to take it into account and estimate the danger implied.

In other words, totalitarianism is still trying to install itself, or at least refusing to give ground, even while brave efforts are being bent toward the restoration of democracy. There is no more striking example of this state of affairs than France. Undoubtedly certain politicians are right in considering the tenacity of totalitarianism as the result of fifth-column activity. And they are also quite right in believing that the purging of traitors and the punishment of collaborationists have not been pushed energetically enough to rid us completely of Vichyites and French Nazis. This indulgence displayed by men in high places toward sowers of hatred is exacting a heavy toll today.

It must be owned that the French, or at least a good many of them, have contracted

a singular tolerance in both thought and action toward racist doctrines. A number of incidents crowding to the surface of French political life demonstrate that this evil has not yet ceased to spread.

There is also the absolute indifference with which the authorities and the lawmakers, unmindful of their public utterances, receive the legitimate complaints of Jews asking for restitution of plundered property. A ministerial line seems to have been laid down according to which all such protests are to be shelved. Certain regulations and decrees will, in effect, henceforth categorically deprive despoiled Jews of any chance of regaining possession of their property. This is not stated expressly, but it is what happens in actuality. Thousands of cases remain without recourse simply because neither the responsible authorities nor the police officials show any willingness to obey the plain injunctions of elementary justice.

Numerus Clausus?

HEARTENED by this indifference, racists and anti-Semites—who are supposed to be definitely outside the law by now—are plucking up new courage. Their organizations, camouflaged under names that fool the government alone, hold meetings under the eyes of the police and openly vote motions calling baldly for the exclusion of Jews from French social and economic life. A well-known deputy sitting at the extreme right of the Constituent Assembly, M. Joseph Denais—former proprietor of the anti-Semitic sheet, *La Libre Parole*, which the late Edouard Drumont used to edit in the days of the Dreyfus Affair—has just publicly demanded the establishment of the *numerus clausus* for Frenchmen of Jewish origin; this, without any protest being raised by the democratic parties and organizations. Neither the Communists nor the Socialists nor the Radical-Socialists nor the Popular Republicans thought it at all necessary to point out the scandalous and anti-French character of his remarks. Only the anti-racist organizations attacked Denais.

Walking through the hallways of the

Chamber of Deputies, surrounded by Deputies themselves, I alluded to the shocking character of Denais' language. One of the Deputies, a member of Leon Blum's party, answered me:

"You're foolish to allow yourself to get so upset, my friend. After all, Hitler is buried under the ruins of the Wilhelmstrasse!"

"Just how sure are you of that?" I asked him.

He looked at me as if I were crazy and went his way. That very evening, right in the downtown district of Paris, on the Boulevard Sébastopol, a bomb burst, blowing up the store of my friend Crazover.

Bear with me while I tell you about Crazover. For his part he would gladly dispense with the publicity I am giving him. Crazover came from Poland shortly before 1914. This Jew at the very beginning of the First World War volunteered for the French army, and then spent four years in the trenches. By the time he returned from the war, he had won, along with the Croix de Guerre, French citizenship. Twenty years later he fled Paris before the Nazis.

Miraculously, he came back after a harrowing ordeal in German concentration camps—only to find his shop on the Boulevard Sébastopol occupied by a collaborationist who had quite simply stolen his property. We at the International League Against Racism and Anti-Semitism had to go through negotiations and litigation before Crazover could get his shop back. The day he got it back a gang of Jew-baiting scoundrels—with a police superintendent looking on—attacked him so savagely that he had to be sent to the hospital. He recovered, but his recovery was probably an error, for a bomb was exploded, destroying the shop which was his and his family's livelihood.

Two weeks have elapsed since all this took place and as yet there has been not a sign of an official inquiry—or of any action whatsoever. I said to M. Edouard Depreux, the new Socialist Minister of the Interior: "Watch out. Something that starts merely as a bomb going off in a Jew's home may

end up as a bomb blowing your swivel-chair a mile high!" He called me a great joker and ushered me out of his office with an affectionate chuckle.

The Communists

ARTHUR KOESTLER's *Darkness at Noon* (published here under the title of *Le Zéro et l'Infini*) is the book of the moment. The book stores cannot supply the demand, and the publishers are said to have sold out their latest printing within a few hours. And there is a story going the rounds that a delegation from the French Communist party recently visited the publishers, Calmann-Lévy, and offered to buy the entire edition of Koestler's book, on condition that no copies be distributed to the public. The publishers, having a non-Communist conception of freedom of thought, refused the offer.

Why are the Communists, who in France count a million followers, so anxious to prevent the circulation of Koestler's book? Simply because Koestler, a former Communist and the intimate friend of some of the Soviet leaders condemned and executed by the People's Tribunal of Moscow, has ventured to place on the order of the day the problem of Communist doctrine and its individual and collective consequences. In Koestler's view, blind obedience to the party leads inevitably to the suppression of all independence of thought, to the abolition of individual liberty, and the annihilation of personality.

Things have not yet gone that far in Communist circles in France itself. The national temperament is not inclined to blind obedience, and political conditions do not permit the leadership of the party to take such decisive measures against its militants as would be possible in the Soviet Union. In our country, the "liquidation" of the unorthodox goes no further than their expulsion, accompanied very often by bitter campaigns of vilification in the columns of *L'Humanité*. It is not unusual to see expelled Communists go over immediately to the Right. There is no real inner drama here, except within the consciences of a few

men of integrity who cannot adjust themselves to organizational discipline.

Nevertheless, there are some signs leading one to suspect that the Communist leaders and their followers are rather troubled by the fluctuations of Kremlin foreign policy. The many opponents of Messrs. Thorez, Duclos, and Marty—opponents recruited both from reactionary circles and from democratic circles with socialist inclinations—rejoice in the belief that a profound *malaise* has overcome the Communist leadership, and that very sharp conflicts have arisen within the party itself.

There may be some truth in this, for active Communists are forced every other day to readjust their economic demands and electoral tactics to the changing positions taken by Moscow; and it is clear that various international problems have provoked debates within the party, revolving around the problem of saving face. Yet the Communist party acts with a tactical flexibility that allows it to make the most sudden and unexpected turns without losing contact with the masses that follow it. For whenever shifts of Soviet policy put the Communists in an embarrassing position, they are rescued, inevitably, by the maladroitness of their enemies, who never fail to come to the rescue with a political diversion.

Certainly, the Communist leaders know that France is unanimously in favor of a severe policy towards Germany. Thorez supports Bidault in every speech he makes, and he is not far from admitting that even de Gaulle has the right policy as far as Germany is concerned. Thorez fights vigorously against the establishment of a "Western bloc," which he considers a menace directed against "our Soviet ally," but he favors administrative autonomy for the Saar and inter-Allied control of the Ruhr and the Rhineland, as against the centralized administration of Germany demanded by Molotov.

Under the circumstances, how can the French Communists "align themselves" with the policy of Moscow's foreign office? If you ask the Communists themselves, the answer

is very simple: "We have nothing to do with the contingencies of Soviet policy, we are patriots above all."

And yet articles still run in the Communist press that unreservedly support Molotov and his collaborators, thus directly contradicting Thorez.

This contradiction may surprise those who are not initiated into the "dialectical" maneuvers of the party. It is hopeless to try to explain. It is enough to point out the phenomenon, while pointing out at the same time that Thorez' million followers accept all this in silence and do not discuss it. If they do discuss it, it is only in the greatest secrecy.

Another example of the subtlety with which the Communists handle the problem of French foreign policy is the case of Italy and Yugoslavia. The Italian Communists shout for the return of Trieste to Rome. But the French want Trieste to go to Belgrade. The French Communists are the first to denounce the "Italian plotting" on the Nice frontier, and the most vocal supporters of the demand that Tenda and Briga be given to France. At the same moment, Togliatti and the Italian comrades storm against the "annexation" of Tenda and Briga by France.

Thus the French Communists are resolutely hostile to Moscow's position on the German question, while they support Moscow on the Italian question. Which permits them to say to the people of France: "See how careful we are of your interests! Do we not defend the national interest against *everyone*?"

"Besides," they add, "the Third International is dead." Is it really dead?

The party "machine" is no longer controlled by the Comintern, but pro-Soviet mysticism has never been as strong among the old militants of the party as it is today. There are the words of the aged Marcel Cachin, venerated by the Communists: "If my Party is wrong, I will be wrong with my Party!"

But one danger for these old militants lies in the influx of new party-members during

recent months. Instead of three hundred thousand, there are now more than a million. And this million is made up of all sorts—the pure and the impure, actors like Maurice Chevalier, writers like the poet Aragon, industrialists like the airplane manufacturer Marcel Bloch—will these people always be ready to agree that if their party is wrong, they must be wrong with their party?

If they cannot accept this, they will be "liquidated," "purged." The Communist party seems to move in zigzags, but in reality it moves toward only one end: the total assumption of power when the right moment comes. And until that moment comes, it does not mind contradicting itself.

The Anti-Racist Alliance

THERE are pleasant as well as unpleasant facts to report. In the face of the anti-Jewish activity—the corollary, incidentally, of an anti-Semitic campaign now under way in Alsace and the coal basins of Northern France—we have accomplished a kind of miracle such as sceptics never expected.

After eighteen months of laborious and delicate negotiations, we have in fact succeeded in completely fusing the two great French anti-racist organizations. The International League Against Racism and Anti-Semitism, or L.I.C.A., and the National Movement Against Racism, or M.N.C.R., held June 16 of this year a magnificent Unity Congress. From their fusion has emerged a single organization, the Anti-Racist Alliance, to the presidency of which I have had the redoubtable honor of being called. Two organs, *Fraternité* and *Droit de Vivre*, will now enable us to increase our propaganda and extend our activity to places where most urgent problems await our attention—thus, for instance, to the regions of North Africa in which Mohammedans form the majority. Another urgent task is the re-establishment of contact (which has already been begun) with our friends in the Near East—for time is pressing.

The section of the International League Against Racism and Anti-Semitism at Tel

Aviv has already sent us an appeal whose meaning we understood only too well; and our brothers in Egypt have also sent us emissaries.

At the same time we are reviving the World Rally against Racism (*Ralliement Mondial contre le Racisme*), which has lain dormant since 1939. And we are counting very much on the generous help of COMMENTARY in announcing our preparations for a World Anti-Racist Congress to be held this autumn in Paris.

We are eager to have present or represented at this World Anti-Racist Congress every movement, every tendency, every school of thought, that stands ready in any way to make common cause with us in combating the renascent danger of international racism.

We believe we can already count upon friends in Great Britain, Switzerland, Belgium, Holland, Scandinavia, Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Greece, the USSR, and Italy. We now need the substantial friendship of Jews and non-Jews (including non-whites) in the United States, Canada, Mexico, and Latin America.

Some people in America have already communicated with me, having seen my previous communication in COMMENTARY. I make bold to express the hope that they will shoulder a share of the burden we have to carry.

Palestine

ALTHOUGH I have never been a zealous partisan of Zionism, the spectacle of present developments in Palestine has aroused in me the closest solidarity with the *halutzim* of Eretz Yisrael. I feel as never before the necessity of making a common front with them against the dangers now threatening them.

How is it, though, that people of all shades of opinion here in France have come together on the question of Palestine, regardless of their differing personal positions toward Zionism?

It is because of the circumstances under which Hady Amin El Hussein, the Grand

Mufti of Jerusalem and a great war-criminal to boot, was able to escape from France, and because of the political character of those who helped him reach the Near East; also because we have no illusions as to his aims—which are quite simply to drench Palestine in fire and blood. And because, finally and most important, justice is with the Jews of Palestine, and that ought to be enough to silence every prejudice and preconception.

The task of the Anti-Racist Alliance in the days to come will be to work out a Jewish-Arab understanding. It is a problem of which we have some knowledge. We have already undertaken to solve it, with excellent results, in Northern Africa.

Parallel to this we shall have to rally our aid to the surviving Jews in Poland. Documents now in our possession show that Polish anti-Jewish activity is closely connected with the machinations of German and Austrian Nazis who still remain at liberty to conspire against European peace, thanks to the

strange forbearance of the Allied commands.

Nothing is Concluded

I BEGAN this letter from Paris on a pessimistic note. I feel that in this I was mistaken, and I beg to be pardoned by my readers. To recover the optimistic note, it is enough for me to recall the arduous road up which we have toiled since 1940.

At that time we stood on the eve of our initiation to the prisons and camps of Auschwitz and Ravensbruck. At a time when everything seemed to forsake us, we still knew that the truth would issue victorious.

That was when I published, as my own challenge to Hitler, an article which earned me twenty-eight months of imprisonment. It bore the title: "Nothing is Concluded."

Very well, nothing is concluded, either one way or another. We simply have to renew the battle to save the innocent. And I rejoice to know that we are determined!

FROM THE AMERICAN SCENE

SARAH TO SYLVIA TO SHIRLEY

A Jew by Any Other Name—

A. A. ROBACK

MANY are the aspects of names and naming: names affect the persons who bear them, names are taboos, names act as charms or prophylactics. Look, for example, at the beneficent intentions of such names as *Alter*, *Zeydel* ('grandpa'), *Khayim* ('life'), and so forth. The Jewish sages attached so much importance to names that the tractate *Gittin* in the Talmud, which deals with the laws of divorce, was supplemented, centuries later, with various treatises (*Tiv Gittin*) on names—motivated, among other things, by the great danger of mistaken identification.

The choosing of names for offspring offers a difficult problem to most parents. Not so—at least in theory—with Orthodox Jews, who traditionally name their children after worthy forbears, and so perpetuate the same names from one generation to another regardless of changing fashions. Therefore it is a piece of historical irony that in our present environment, the names of Orthodox

Jews supposedly so perpetuated have become so transformed—sometimes ludicrously, sometimes almost scandalously—as to be unrecognizable. *Isaacs* have grandchildren "christened" for them after their death who answer to the names of *Erwin*, *Eric*, *Edward*, and *Edmund*. *Nathans* have grandchildren called *Norman* and *Norbert*. And have we not seen how *Moses* hath blossomed into *Morris*, *Maurice*, *Moritz* (in Germany), *Murray*, *Morton*, *Milton*, *Mortimer*, etc.?

But most Jews still bear an "original" Jewish first name underneath the complementary or protective Gentile name. And it is perhaps a comment on human vanity that it is this original Hebrew or Yiddish name that is pronounced over them—following a whispered conference between rabbi and relatives—just before the last remains are gathered to their fathers.

Particularly painful to the lover of the traditional is the neglect Jews show toward that richest of all treasures of given names, the Bible—a treasury pre-eminently their own.

The cover of the June issue of *COMMENTARY* showed the names of sixteen writers who are Jews. Only three of them bore traditionally Jewish first names. Of the six names shown on *COMMENTARY*'s editorial staff, only two have traditionally Jewish first names. But let no one be tempted into rash sociological or ideological conclusions about the Jewishness of this particular group, or any other. The names of the presidents of three (out of four) of our leading Jewish theological seminaries are *Louis*, *Stephen*, and *Julian*—while the three chief officers (out of four) of the American Jewish Com-

PSYCHOLOGIST, lecturer, literary critic, philologist, ABRAHAM A. ROBACK's interests are multifarious. Born in Russia in 1890, he came to this country in his early youth, studied at McGill University in Montreal, and received his Ph.D. at Harvard, where he subsequently taught for three years, after which he became associated with the Massachusetts State Department of Education. Dr. Roback has published many books, among them *Jewish Influence in Modern Thought*, *The Story of Yiddish Literature*, *I. L. Peretz*, and *William James—His Marginalia, Personality and Contribution*. The Yiddish Collection at the Harvard Library was organized by Dr. Roback.

mittee are Joseph, Jacob, and David. Of the sixteen officers of the Zionist Organization of America, only seven have traditionally Jewish names—and these officers, mind you, belong to an older generation.

Alas, the habit seems well-nigh universal. What causes Jews in every country, not only in the United States, to discard their traditional Biblical names and adopt Anglo-Saxon, French, German, or Slavic ones instead? Protective coloration is the obvious answer—and hand in hand with that goes the typically Jewish desire to provide one's offspring with every advantage.

Which reminds us that it is only fair to mention that one should not hold the individual responsible for his name. This is a literal instance of the sins of the fathers being visited upon the children.

THE assimilation of alien names from the surroundings in which they happen to find themselves is no recent habit among Jews. It dates from Babylonian days. A surprisingly large number of Tannaim and Amoraim, the creators of the Talmud, bore Aramaic, Babylonian, and even Greek names—thus Rabbi Tarfon (*Tryphon*).

From this period on, every age of Jewish history saw a small number of alien names trickling into the community. These names were naturalized and—time's revenge!—in the course of time became regarded as typically Jewish names. To cite but a few examples: *Feivl*, or *Feivush*, or *Feibush*, comes from the Greek *Phoebus*; *Kalman* from the Greek *Kelonymos*; *Sender* from the Greek *Alexander*; *Todres* from the Greek *Theodoros* ('God-given'); *Shprintze* from the Italian *Speranza* ('hope'); *Bunem* from the French *Bonhomme* ('jolly fellow'). And *Yente* comes from the Italian *Gentile* ('well-born')!

More than half of these names—originally considered "classy"—have not only lost their distinction but have become, like *Todres* and *Yente*, precisely those appellations that characterize the vulgar man and woman. Thus the formerly "well-born" *Yente* is now the generic ignorant housewife.

Jewish names of German origin have suffered a similar decline; like *Getzl* from *Goetz* (see Goethe's *Goetz von Berlichingen*), or *Feitl* from *Veit*, they are now used almost exclusively in a comic context. Thus

the once most respectable *Gomprecht* (cognate with *Gompert* and *Gompers*) has become the jocular *Gumprakh*, used only in proverbial turns of speech.

The moral of all this would seem to be: the higher they fly, the harder they fall. Fancy names have a brilliant but shortlived career. But the more "homely" Jewish names of Biblical origin, for all their present unpopularity, have never fallen into quite the same universal desuetude; while Jews proliferate in *Cliftons*, *Leslies*, *Kenneths*, and *Stephens*, Gentiles continue to name their children *Joseph*, *David*, *Miriam*, *Esther*, and *Sarah*. And at the same time the vogue of certain Gentile names among Jews seems inevitably to lead Gentiles to shy away from these names. In Germany *Moritz* disguised *Moses* for many decades until it began to dawn upon Jews that Gentile Germans had dropped the name from their original repertory. And *Hugo*, which disguised *Jacob*, and *Kurt*, which might be *Hersh*, were recently beginning to meet the same fate. Once Gentiles abandon a name because of its predominance among Jews—i.e., once that name becomes, despite its alien origin, a typically Jewish name—then Jews themselves must adopt a new substitute. And when the substitute, too, gilded though it may be, begins to savor of the ghetto, the hunt must be spread even further afield.

It has been the same story in this country and in England as in Germany. A historical dictionary of Jewish names could be compiled, showing their evolution or devolution.

LET us hazard a few examples of what such a dictionary might contain:

ABRAHAM—In England *Bram* is popular; in Austria it was *Adolf* (which means 'noble wolf'); in Russia it would be *Abrasha*; in France, *Alphonse* or *Armand*; in Germany *Armin* was rather popular; in this country the evolution has been *Albert*, *Alfred*, *Arthur*, and *Alvin* (perhaps the most popular). One ventures to predict that the next phase will be *Aldrich*.

BERL—There are, of course, *Bernard*, *Bertram*, *Bennett*—but what's wrong with *Beryl*?

VELVEL or **VOLF**—Inevitably *William*, but *Warren* and *Wilton* are on their way, and I predict *Wellington* in the near future.

KHAYIM—German Jews started with *Hey-*

mann, which American Jews took over, discarding the *e*; but when *Hymie* began to sound even more Jewish than *Khayim* itself, *Herman*, *Charles*, and *Chester*, in that order, stepped in to fill the breach. In Latin America the Jews have a godsend in the name *Jaime*, which sounds practically the same as *Khayim*, even though it is really cognate with *Jacob*.

SAMUEL, SIMON, SOLOMON, SHOLEM—These can be lumped together, since they have a common fate in this country. The evolution goes: *Sidney*, *Stanley*, *Seymour*, *Shelley*, *Sanford*, and *Salwyn* or *Selwyn*, presumably in the direction of ever greater elegance. But *Seymour*, meaning originally "sea moor," is not one whit more aristocratic than *Sidney*, which came into vogue in the wake of Sir Philip Sydney's fame (it was originally derived from a Phoenician root that means "charming"—see the Biblical city of Sidon). Nor, for that matter, is *Shirley*—which became popular in England because of Charlotte Brontë's novel of that name—any more elegant than *Rachel*; or *Sybil* any more distinguished than *Sylvia*, though the former has lately been gaining popularity among Jews.

ISAAC—This name was never popular among ambitious Jews. In Galicia it was masked under *Ignatz*; in this country its disguises are legion. *Isidor* or *Isadore*, hailing from France and the old country in general, was the first variant. In America it became, somehow, closely associated with *Irving*—which means a "fierce sea-faring companion," whereas *Isaac* is derived, according to the Bible, from the root "to laugh." *Irving* came into vogue some sixty years ago, helped no doubt by Sir Henry Irving's fame. Lately, however, it has fallen from grace—for the obvious reason that too many Jews bear the name. Other forms have been discovered and other names resorted to—*Irwin*, *Ervine*, *Eric*, *Edward*, *Edmund*. Next in line are *Eugene*, *Evan*, and heaven knows what.

MOSES—This is another name that Jews in the West fight shy of. In Russia it is *Misha*, an assonant, if not logical, equivalent of *Moishe*; in France *Maurice*; in Germany, as we mentioned above, *Moritz*. In English-speaking countries it has been metamorphosed into *Morris*, *Morton*, *Marvin*, *Melvin*, *Martin*, etc. It is true that *Moses* seems

derived from the Egyptian *Musa* ('child'), and it is possible that *Moses* himself came of Egyptian parents, as Freud suggests. But the fact remains that *Moses* was the Jew of Jews, the greatest man we have produced, and surely his name should carry at least as large a halo as *Mortimer* or *Malcolm*.

HERSHEL (from *Hersh* or *Hirsh*)—This became in turn *Harry*, *Henry*, *Herbert*, *Howard*, *Harold*, *Harvey*—and even *George* (through the Russia *Grisha*; the Russians substitute *g* for *h* always).

TO GIVE any more examples would be redundant. When a girl whose grandmother was called *Sarah* received the name *Sadie*, the change was made in order to lift the girl out of the common run. As she grew older the girl often discovered the disadvantages of *Sadie* and tried to pass as *Sophie* or *Sally*; her grandchild, the chances are, received the name of *Sylvia*, which, as she too grew up, she might take the liberty of changing to *Sybil*. If a man of Polish descent is called *Stanley*, you can be reasonably sure he was baptized *Stanislaus*; but if he happens to be Jewish, you can be equally certain that his grandfather was called *Samuel*. When asked once whether I knew the given name of Jacob Schiff's father, I answered that it might be *Moses*—though I had never looked it up. "Why *Moses*?" was the next question. I answered: "Because Jacob Schiff's son is called *Mortimer*." My deduction proved correct.

The "fancy" name must, of course, have a certain currency among Gentiles before Jews will use it. As a rule the name is not picked out of the air, or unknown to celebrity in literature, public affairs, or the movies. But why, in a given time, Jews will be seized with a mass-mania for two or three specific names, when so many other equally elegant and equally current ones are available, remains to be investigated by a social psychologist or cultural historian. A rich chapter in the history of Jewish acculturation in America could be written under the title "*Sidney*, *Irving*, and *Sylvia*, *Shirley*."

HAVE we no sense of incongruity when a Shapiro child is named *Tyrone*, which is just as Irish as *Patrick* and derived from the Greek word for "tyrant"? Not until the boy

in later life changes his euphonious surname—which in Aramaic means “beautiful”—to Speare or something like that, will the discord be resolved (that is, if his features and intonations permit). But a boner becomes a howler when a Jewish child is given a name like *Natalie* (Yiddish: *Nitul*), which, like the French *Noël*, is associated with Christmas and is cognate with the Latin word attached by traditional usage to the birth of Jesus. A similar *faux pas* is committed when a Jewish girl is named *Dolores*, which is derived from the epithet given Mary as she viewed her son on the cross—*mater dolorosa*. It is to be noticed, however, that American Jews have shown a reluctance to adopt such names as *John*, *Thomas*, and *James*—*Dolores* and *Natalie* may be one thing, but these three apostles seem to be quite another.

The bridge between the Jewish name and the camouflage name usually consists in nothing more than a slight assonance (or asininity): as when *Gittel* (ordinarily transformed into *Gertrude*, bad enough in itself) becomes *Christina*. Usually any real semantic connection is lacking. Nevertheless, many Jewish names are translated into Gentile equivalents with a certain appropriateness:—thus *Malkeh* (‘queen’) into *Regina*; *Gittel* into *Agatha* (both meaning ‘good’); *Baruch* into *Benedict*; *Nathaniel* into *Theodore* (‘gift of God’); and even *Saul* into *Paul*; and *Shepsel* into *Shepard*. Here at least the alien name becomes less frivolous and self-humiliating.

IT is claimed that a characteristically Jewish name is a drawback in the matter of a career. What is meant, of course, is that it is a drawback to be known unmistakably and immediately for a Jew. But aside from the fact that such diminutives as “Abe” or “Ike” have acquired comic, vulgar-seeming overtones (often at the same time affectionate ones—*vide* “Ike” Eisenhower), Bib-

lical first names seem to have proved no more of a worldly liability in actual fact than any other sort of name. This becomes quite evident once one consults one’s own experience.

When Gentiles dislike Jews they do not say, paraphrasing Juliet to Romeo:

*’Tis but thy name that is my enemy;
Thou art thyself, not a Cohen or
Levy.*

*What’s Cohen? It is not hand, nor
foot,*

*Nor arm, nor face, nor any other part
Belonging to a man. O, be some
other name!*

The fact probably is that when a Jew appropriates a fancy Anglo-Saxon or Scotch name like Stewart or Gainsborough, the Anglo-Saxons and the Scotch dislike him all the more for it.

ALMOST four hundred of the names in Evelyn Wells’ recently published *Treasury of Names* (New York, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1946) are of Hebrew or Aramaic origin—a greater proportion than one would have supposed still current among Americans at large. More’s the pity that so few Jewish children in this country bear them nowadays. For a name is a sign, and, as the philosophers tell us lately, signs constitute the basis of human culture. A name is a symbol that traverses and links generations, especially among Jews. It is the Platonic *eidos* surviving many successions of hands and feet and arms.

Names in a very deep sense are identities. To some extent the name is to the individual and family what the flag is to the state. If our neighbors are content to retain their Hoggs and Butchers, their Cowards and Bastards, their Crooks and Bloods, why should we Jews discard our Moseses and Josephs, Solomons, Ruths, Hannahs, Leahs, and Miriams?

CEDARS OF LEBANON

THE DEBATE ON THE MESSIAH AT TORTOSA

A 15th-Century Episode

SOLOMON IBN VERGA

SOLOMON IBN VERGA was an important medieval historian of the Jews in Europe. Born in 1460 in Seville, Spain, he emigrated to Portugal in 1497. There he was forced to undergo baptism in 1497; but he returned to Judaism in 1506, after his escape to Turkey, where he lived out the rest of his long life, dying in Adrianople in 1554.

His greatest work was *Shebet Yehudah* ["The Tribe or Rod of Judah"], which recounts the persecutions of the Jews and the religious disputations that took place in his time, many of which he himself witnessed.

The disputation ibn Verga tells about below lasted almost two years, from 1413 to 1414, and took place in Tortosa and San Mateo, two towns in the Kingdom of Aragon, of which state the anti-pope Benedict XIII (Pedro de Luna) was a native. The pope arranged the disputation as the result of agitation by the famous Dominican preacher, Vincent Ferrer, who had demanded that the civil authorities exclude Jews from the social and economic as well as public life of the land.

Joshua ha-Lorki, or Geronimo de Santa Fé, was a converted Jew who had become the

pope's personal physician; and the most distinguished Jews of that section of Spain were called upon to answer his arguments.

The disputation, coupled with Vincent Ferrer's preaching—and the threat of mob violence—caused many prominent Spanish Jews to become converted. And it also led Ferdinand I, King of Aragon and Castile, as well as the pope, to embody Ferrer's entire program in the form of specific laws against the Jews.

The debate was indeed a serious matter, but Abu Astruc's letter has its touches of humor, much of it self-critical, and he lets us know that he, for one, did not take the disputation very seriously: it was dangerous to the Jews but could be regarded as no real attempt to settle the question on its own merits.

The excerpt from *Shebet Yehudah* given below was translated by Olga Marx for *In Time and Eternity: a Jewish Reader*, an anthology of selections from Jewish post-Biblical written tradition, edited by Nahum N. Glatzer, which Schocken Books of New York will publish this fall. The excerpt appears here by Schocken's permission.—Ed.

THIS is a copy of the epistle that the great sage Abu Astruc sent to the holy congregation in Gerona, in the year 5173 [1413 C.E.], to the effect that the great men in Israel were distressed, and in trouble with the pope, because of a demand of Joshua ha-Lorki's, whom the Christians, after he had been converted to Christianity, called Maestro Geronimo de Santa Fé—which, taking the initial letters, spells *megadef*, that is, "blasphemer." For he had requested the pope [Benedict XIII, successor to Clement VII, the anti-pope, residing at

Avignon] to summon the wise men of Israel before him, so that he, Maestro Geronimo, could then prove to them that the Messiah had already come, and that Jesus was he; and this he intended to prove from the Talmud. Now these are the exact words of the epistle:

You, who are esteemed among the sons of Israel, you, the nobles in Judah, who in your "houses and walls have a monument and a name," where stood the stools for the Torah and the testimony, where the

stools for the Talmud have stood from earliest times—may you always keep alive the courage in your hearts. What you have known previously, know it now as well—that our helper “doth neither slumber nor sleep,” but saves us from those who scheme evil toward us. A shoot that came forth from among us thought to destroy us and to crush our religion down to the very earth. For he, Joshua ha-Lorki, invented thoughts to lead us astray, and to demonstrate that he was in truth a Christian and was keeping the new faith. And so he asked the pope to bid the chief among the wise men of Jewry to come before him, for it was his purpose to prove to us from our own Talmud that the Messiah had already come. And he told the pope that after he had proved this it would be legitimate to force the Jews to accept the religion of Jesus, since he, Joshua, was going to make all this true and apparent in the presence of His Holiness. I, however, now come unto you to inform you of all that has come to pass, and may you keep in mind the details, so that you can reply to any heretic. Know then that we have indeed escaped a danger that cannot be gauged, for we were facing numerous bishops and grandees, and many were eager to find us guilty. . . .

The delegates had a meeting to decide who was to be first to speak before the pope, and who was to begin with what, in their language, is called *arenga*. They all decided that Don Vidal Benveniste was to begin, because he is versed in all manner of knowledge, and can use the Latin language. They also decided not to behave like the learned Jews in the academies, where each interrupts the other's word and scoffs at him if he does not agree, lest the pope hold them in contempt, and also that they would address Joshua ha-Lorki and the bishops with calm and courtesy. None was to grow violent, not even if he were derided, and each was to strengthen the courage of the other, so that his heart might not sink.

Then we who were the delegates went to the pope with the help of God, “who delivereth the poor from him that is too strong for him,” and the pope received us with an agreeable countenance, and wished to hear the names of the places we came from, and asked each as to his name and commanded all to be written down. At

this we were greatly alarmed and tried to discover the reason for it from the scribe. He, however, told us that it boded no ill, for popes and kings were wont to have everything that happened during their lives written down in books, with due accuracy.

Then the pope said to us: “You, who are esteemed among the people of the Jews, a people that was chosen by a Chooser who has existed from time immemorial, and that, if it was rejected, was rejected because of its own failings—have no fear of this debate, for no wrong and no insult shall be done to you in my presence. Calm your thoughts and speak with a firm heart; have no fear and do not despair.

“Maestro Geronimo has said he wishes to prove that the Messiah has already come, and to prove it from your own Talmud. In our presence will it be shown whether truth abides with his word, or whether he has dreamed a dream. But you must not be afraid of him, because in a debate there is one law for both sides. Go then, rest in your lodgings, and come to me again early tomorrow morning.”

And forthwith he gave orders that we be given suitable lodgings, and of the food he himself ate, or of that which we are allowed to eat by the precepts of our law. And some of us rejoiced at the pope's words, and others were sad thereat—as is usual with Jews.

On the second day we came before the pope and found the entire great hall, where the debate was to take place, tapestried in many colors, and seventy chairs set up for the bishops, who are called *cardinales*, *obispos*, and *arzobispos*, and all of these wore raiment embellished with gold. All the great men of Rome were there, and what with the burghers and the grandees, there were almost a thousand persons, and it was thus every day of the debate. And then our “hearts melted and became as water.” Notwithstanding we said: “Blessed be he who has accorded of his glory to flesh and blood.” *

Then the pope began to speak, saying: “You, who are the wise men among the Jews, know that I have not come here, nor did I send for you, to decide which of the two religions is the true, since I am well aware that my religion and my faith are the

* Benediction on seeing a king: *Berakot* 58a

true, and that your Torah, while it once was true, has ceased to be so. You have been summoned only because Geronimo said he wanted to prove that the Messiah has already come, from the Talmud of your masters, who knew better than you. Therefore, speak only of this matter in my presence."

Then the pope turned his countenance upon Maestro Geronimo and said: "Do you begin the debate, and let them reply to you."

And Maestro Geronimo began: "'Come now, and let us reason together, saith the Lord. . . . But if ye refuse and rebel, ye shall be devoured with the sword.'"

Then Don Vidal Benveniste began the *arenga* in the Latin tongue, and the pope took pleasure in his wisdom and his language. And in the course of his speech Don Vidal complained of Geronimo, saying that it was not right for one who wishes to debate, to begin by using hostile words, for he had said: "But if ye refuse and rebel, ye shall be devoured with the sword." He had proved nothing for the time being, and yet was setting himself up as a judge and avenger.

At that the pope interposed: "You are right, but you must not be astonished at this evil way of his, for he was one of you."

THE third day was the beginning of the debate proper, and Maestro Geronimo began, saying: "In your Talmud, it is said: 'Six thousand years is the span of the world—chaos,* two thousand years, Torah, two thousand years, and two thousand years, days of the Messiah.'† From this it is evident that the Messiah has come within the last two thousand years, and who could he be but our Savior?"

Ha-Lorki took a long time in talking on this subject, and preached to his heart's con-

tent, until the pope said to him: "Geronimo, it has been known to me for a long time that you are a great preacher; yet not because of this have we come together, but to hear you prove what you have promised. Therefore, have a care that you lose not yourself in preaching."

Then he turned his countenance upon the delegates and said: "Reply to the passage he cited."

And Don Vidal Benveniste spoke: "Sir, let us first consider the characteristics of the Messiah, and then it will become evident whether he has already come, and if what is written about the Messiah holds for him who has come, we too shall avow him."

And the pope said: "That is no answer to the question put to you, for what has been said did not concern the characteristics of the Messiah, but only the sentence saying that the Messiah has already come. You are following the manner of contentious Jews, who when one asks them about one thing, slip over to the next."

Thereupon Don Vidal answered him: "Sir, our beginning was in the manner of wise men, for it is proper to speak first of the nature of the matter in hand, and then of the particular circumstances; scientists also follow this rule. But if this way does not please you, our lord, we shall not take it. And so I shall now speak of the passage itself, and say that wise Geronimo extracted from it what he pleased, and what supports his point, but disregarded what contradicts it. For toward the end of the passage, we read: 'But because of our iniquities, which were many, as much time has passed as has passed,' and this clearly proves that he has not come."

Then Geronimo replied: "According to this, you have not understood the words, or you pretend not to have understood them. For 'and two thousand years, days of the Messiah' is the pronouncement of the prophet Elijah, who said it to his disciples—and these passed it on in his name—as a passage in the *Tanna debe Eliyahu* proves, and the Talmudists know this; now those disciples or men of the Talmud who included this passage in their books, are the ones who added, 'But because of our iniquities, which were many,' and they added it to substantiate their belief that Jesus was not

* A period without a knowledge of the law. The end of this period is marked by the activity of Abraham, the first worshiper of God.

† The Talmud (*Sanhedrin* 97a) designates this saying as coming from the school of the prophet Elijah (*Tanna debe Eliyahu*). Geronimo considers this saying more credible than other Talmudic sayings, especially the explanatory addition, "But because of our iniquities, which were many, as much time has passed as has passed," which he regards as an invention of the "Talmudists."

the Messiah. But the prophet Elijah, being a prophet and knowing what was true, said only, 'And two thousand years, days of the Messiah,' in accordance with what he was aware of because of his gift of prophecy."

And Rabbi Zerahiah ha-Levi replied, saying: "It is probably more correct to assume that a passage originated with one man, rather than with two. When such is the case, the Talmud usually says: 'Rab Ashi, however, says,' or this one or that one says, 'But because of our iniquities, which were many.' That is why at the outset we said before our lord that we wanted to see if the characteristics of the Messiah apply or do not apply to him who has come, and for this reason: if the characteristics do apply to this person, then we will accept the passage according to Geronimo's interpretation; if the characteristics of the Messiah do not apply to him, then our interpretation is the true one."

And Geronimo replied: "But Elijah came long before the Jews went into exile, therefore we must necessarily say that the passage, 'Because of our iniquities, which were many,' was spoken by another, by one who was in exile. And so it originated with the Talmudists, and, moreover, corresponds with their views, as I have already said."

Then Rabbi Joseph Albo argued: "The Talmudists, through whom you are trying to disprove us, took that passage into the Talmud. But they would not have taken into it anything that was contrary to their views. Therefore, they believed that there were two possible periods of time for the Messiah—the time God has promised, or the time when Israel will be prepared and will turn to God. That is why the passage sets no time limit to the days of the Messiah, but speaks of 'two thousand years, days of the Messiah'—in other words, days prepared for the coming of the Messiah. If the Jews are worthy of him, he will come at the beginning; if they are not worthy at the beginning, but grow worthy within the period of time, the Messiah will come then. If they do not grow worthy within the period, but at the very end, then the Messiah will come at the end. But the two thousand years will not pass without his coming."

And the pope said: "Why do you not say that if the Christians are worthy of it he

will come at once, but if not, that he will tarry until the end of the two thousand years?"

The delegates replied: "We believe that the redeemer will come only for the sake of those who are in exile. For he who lives in peace, does he require a redeemer? The Messiah is needed by a people that lives in exile and servitude."

THEN Rabbi Matatiah said to Geronimo: "My wise sir, you prove from the Talmud that the Messiah has already come. Why, instead of this, do you not prove the contrary from that selfsame Talmud: For it says: 'Let the spirit of those breathe its last, who seek to calculate the end.'" [*Sanhedrin* 97b].

But here the pope interposed, saying: "I have heard this before and should like to know what it is interpreted to mean."

And Rabbi Matatiah replied: "We have no interpretation of it, we follow the plain meaning in the words themselves: A curse be upon him who makes calculations and declares precisely when the Messiah will come. This is very harmful to the people. For when the appointed time arrives, and he does not come, they fall into despair, and slack grow the hearts of those who hoped for weal and who were bound by the fetters and bonds of hope. And still another transgression is involved: God has hidden this thing from all peoples and from all prophets—yet this man is counting upon revealing it."

At this the pope was greatly angered, and said: "O people of fools, O foolish and despicable Talmudists! Does Daniel, for example, who calculated the term, deserve that it be said of him, 'Let his spirit breathe its last'? Truly, it appears that you are as sinful and rebellious as they."

Here Don Todros broke in, saying: "O sir, if the Talmudists are so foolish in your eyes, why do you refer to them to prove that the Messiah has already come? 'Nothing can be proved by fools'" [*Shabbat* 104b].

But at that the pope became still angrier. So Don Vidal took the floor and said conciliatingly: "It is not like His Holiness to be angered because of a matter that is being debated, especially since we were given freedom of speech. But we must have been guilty of some other thing, and so our words

erred. And that is why we beg you, O lord, to give us your favor."

And with this we left on that day, and the next morning we went our way again. But when we arrived in our lodgings, a bitter quarrel broke out between us and Rabbi Matatiah and Rabbi Todros, because they had been so incautious and failed to rein their tongues.

Geronimo began with another passage [*Yerushalmi Berakot II*], at the end of which Rabbi Judah says: "It is written in the Scriptures: 'And Lebanon shall fall by a mighty one. And there shall come forth a shoot out of the stock of Jesse.' This verse clearly demonstrates that which you cannot deny, namely, that on the day the Temple was destroyed, the Messiah was born."

And the wise Abu Astruc replied: "This passage has been discussed by great men in this world, in the debate between Maestro Moses and Fra Paolo.* And Don Vidal said that at that time the maestro explained that it did not mean the Messiah had actually been born. But even if we did say that he had actually been born, this would not involve a contradiction, because it would be possible for him to be born on that day, but to live in the Garden of Eden. Rabbi Moses Maimonides also writes that the Messiah was not born on the day of the destruction of the Temple, but that the passage means that from that day on a man is born in every generation who would be worthy to be the Messiah, if Israel were worthy of it. And so he thinks that the purpose of these words was to goad hearts to turn to God, and to expound to them that the Messiah was not dependent upon a fixed time. And that is the way Don Hasdai explains it also."†

THE pope replied angrily: "You have not come to my court to inform me of what your expounders say, but of what you yourselves say. Of what interest to me are

the explanations of those who lived before you, all this vain and idle quibbling to the effect that he was indeed born, but is not as yet come! If this is dependent on the merits of the Jews, why was he born at all? This need not have come to pass, and he might have been born on the day on which they were prepared and worthy!"

And the delegates replied: "If they were worthy this very day, and if the Messiah were born this very day, could a child who is one day old lead them?"

The following morning the pope said: "You Jews, you say terrible things. What sensible man would say that the Messiah was, to be sure, born, but that he lived in the Garden of Eden for a long time, and that he has now been living for fourteen hundred years?"

Then Rabbi Astruc jumped up and said: "Sir, since you believe so many improbable things about your Messiah, let us believe this one about our Messiah."

And the pope was so aroused by this that we feared his bitter anger would break forth like a fire, and we said to him: "Lord, what our comrade spoke was not fairly spoken and not in agreement with all the rest of us, and he spoke in jest, when he should not have done so, since the pope is not one of us."

We went to our lodgings and we all screamed at Rabbi Astruc, saying: "Our wrong be upon you! For you have put the sword in the hands of our foes. We agreed not to speak in the manner you have spoken. See, the pope was favoring our cause, and he came to our assistance more than to Geronimo's. But now that the pope is angered, who will protect us, if not heaven in its mercy? But 'we must not rely on miracles,'* where our own merit is so dubious."

Thus on that day we left the hall derided and ashamed, and the following morning we returned in great fear and distress. But God granted that we were in favor, and we found the pope with unclouded countenance.

* At Barcelona, 1263. Maestro Moses is Moses ben Nahman (Nahmanides).

† Hasdai Crescas, 14th-century author of the book *Or Adonai* ("Light of the Lord"), a writer against Maimonides.

* Talmudic saying: *Pesahim* 64b

THE STUDY OF MAN

"WHITHER CIVILIZATION?"

British Thinkers Ponder the Atomic Age

KARL POLANYI

ALTHOUGH in its quiet way England has staged a social revolution, he would be a courageous man who would assert that any conscious process of thought accompanied it. The English people have an almost innate reluctance to formulating

As GUEST commentator of this regular department, designed as a continuing account of activities and trends in the sciences concerned with man and society, KARL POLANYI reports the first postwar conference of the (British) Institute of Sociology. Aside from its intrinsic interest, our readers may find it illuminating to contrast the subject matter and approach of this British conference with sociological and other social science conferences in the United States. Dr. Polanyi is the author of *The Great Transformation* (1944), regarded by many as one of the great works on politics and society of our generation. He was born in Vienna in 1866 of Hungarian parents, and studied in the Universities of Budapest and Vienna. During the First World War, he served as a captain with the Austro-Hungarian army. With the coming of peace, he launched upon a distinguished career as a journalist and editor in Vienna. From 1924 to 1934, he was a member of the editorial staff of the *Oesterreichische Volkswirt*, a leading financial weekly, as well as a lecturer at the Peoples' University, and published papers in economic theory and politics. He left Vienna with the coming of the Heimwehr government and emigrated to London. He has lectured at Oxford University and the University of London. He was joint editor of *Christ and Social Revolution* and author of *The Essence of Fascism*. He spent the years 1940-1945 in the United States, a member of the faculty of Bennington College.

social ideas in words. Their own, time-honored semantics have taught them that words more often divide than unite. Thus, there is no English school of sociology. But there is an English method of social action, which subordinates thought to life, and seeks to find solutions in life itself. If one only tries long enough, questions may spontaneously resolve themselves, the English seem to say—and in any case one avoids the mistake of making them insoluble by attempting to force a solution where none is yet possible.

This method reigns at those summer meetings which combine the stimulus of a holiday in the countryside with the contemplative seclusion of ashram. It could be seen at its best at the first postwar Conference of the Institute of Sociology held at Reading University, July 26 to August 2.

TRUE, the method seems to leave all too many factors to the inscrutable working of chance—yet good care is taken not to allow the mills of the intellect to run out of grist. Products of first-class thinking are put at the disposal of the gathering, which is left free to react to them or not—as collective wisdom deems fit. This permits the very stuff of thought to be tested by the only valid test: the reactions of seriously interested persons to stark facts of the mind. Of course, there is a prepared program of lectures, open forums, symposia, and discussion groups; yet the Holy Ghost is allowed to move freely. No provision is made for the systematic treatment of a body of recognized knowledge; there is no covering of the ground, nothing but the rare phenomenon of a conversation carried on between differing and separate viewpoints—a hurling of shafts of light across none-too-well-defined provinces of human life, leaving the spectator to choose between the varied hints of truth.

Only to those who watch the Conference developing and moving warily from one subject to another does the underlying stream of thought reveal itself. The audience is largely composed of experts in their own fields, who still pretend to be merely an interested public with no special qualifications to judge the productions of the well-known speakers who put forth their views. Actually, it is the audience which picks up one thread of thought and drops another, pressing for clarification of one aspect, and letting another fade out of vision. The apparently random fits and jerks by which the proceedings move forward merely cover up a dialectic which ultimately is conditioned by the meaning of the total situation. In this case, the atom bomb was the true object of concern. Yet apart from one single address, which was devoted to the subject, and involved important enunciations, hardly any mention was made of the release of nuclear energy. The collective mind, in its silent rumination, had arrived at the conclusion that no more could be done about it; consequently, the less said the better.

In effect, what approximates to a state of acute distress over the international situation was one of the invisible poles of the Conference. Proof is the fact that the question of the relative contributions of America, Russia, and Britain to the problem of present-day industrial civilization was not even mentioned. For any discussion of it would have brought up the issue of Soviet communism in all its breadth and depth. That in turn would have catalyzed thought upon the world situation, the Paris Peace Conference, and the other intractable maladies of the hour. A tacit conviction that nothing could be gained at this juncture by treating these crucial questions by the clumsy method of public discussion made the conference refrain from tackling the obviously central issue.

IF INTENSE though silent *political* concern was one pole of the meeting, the other pole was the *religious* issue. With the atom bomb hardly mentioned, the Jewish-Christian tradition moved into the foreground. The repression of politics resulted in an overemphasis on religion.

This connection, though never mentioned, was probably apparent to all. That may be the reason why neither the differences between the various religious positions, nor even the unbridged gap separating religious and non-religious opinion, prevented the meeting from proceeding with its job.

Though the fact was never brought into the open, the gathering was deeply split on the

question of religion. The younger generation, on the whole, rejected the traditional lead given by the older members. It was this rift which made Professor Hodges' contribution on the failure of philosophy so poignant. Though personally belonging to the younger generation, he depicted the tragedy of non-religious thought with an almost passionate vehemence.

On the other hand, the main religious currents in England represented in the Conference struck an uncompromising note, as if to meet the challenge of the hour by an extreme formulation of their tenets. Youth, increasingly indifferent towards religion, was thus confronted with absolute statements of the various Christian positions.

The immediate issue of the day, the atom bomb, was dealt with in an informal, but authoritative fashion. The recently formed Atomic Scientists' Association, comprising a considerable part of British nuclear physicists, was represented by its president, Professor N. F. Mott of Bristol University, Fellow of the Royal Society. His address, chaired by G. W. Scott Blair of Reading University, was felt to be an important event.

Professor Mott declared that he, like his colleagues in America, wished to address himself to the public not as a scientist but as a citizen. "Science cannot flourish behind barbed wire—in the atmosphere of ten years' prison sentences," he said, alluding to the recent conviction of the King's College physicist, Dr. Nunn May. England does not fear the spirit of friendly rivalry either with the scientists of the USA or with those of the USSR. After these introductory remarks, he warned of exaggerations in regard to the military effects of the use of the atom bomb under present conditions. As long as atom bombs could not be produced by the 10,000—and this certainly would not be the case within the next years—the bomb was not a war-winning weapon. Its destructive effect was, on the whole, comparable to a raid of 1000 bombers carrying ordinary bombs. Yet, obliteration bombing did not cut short the German war effort. In effect, German war production continued to increase right up to the end of 1944. Now, both the USA and the USSR possess numerous industrial centers, the units of which are dispersed. Short of several tens of thousands of bombs, nothing in the way of a decisive military defeat could be inflicted on either of them. "To call a spade a spade," he said, "the Red Army would not be stopped on its march on Calais." The Atomic Scientists' Association based its practical policy on the Lilienthal Report, which he called "one

of the historical documents of the age." He supported its proposals to set up an Atomic Development Authority to own all uranium stock piles, and to become the prime body of atom research in the world. Outlawing of the use of atom bombs would be mere eye-wash. An international police force armed with atom bombs could not avert wars. Would you agree, he asked, to the atom bomb being used as a policing measure, for instance, in Palestine? Or to stop Argentina from misbehaving? A strong man can be restrained only by fighting him. Punitive measures alone could not prevent any powerful nation from making bombs. The use of the atom bomb must therefore be envisaged in a large-scale war of Great Powers. Therefore, he said, we must teach the nations to live together, *because they must*. The Atomic Scientists' Association does not combine its proposals with the demand that "veto" should be dropped in the Security Council. Even though the Russians are overdoing the use of the "veto," UN without Russia would no longer be an international authority in the true sense of the term. What we need is an acceptance by the Russians of the Lilienthal Report. Inspection on both sides of the frontier would then start. We must peg away until this happens. Russia has changed her policy more than once in the past; she may do so again. The Atomic Scientists' Association is determined to keep this realistic view before the public eye.

The audience gave an ovation to Professor Mott. And at the close of the Conference the following was unanimously adopted as part of the resolutions:

There was a progressive decline of moral judgment during the war, as evidenced by the widespread acceptance of obliteration bombing, and carried a big stage further by the use without warning of the atom bomb.

The Conference welcomes the initiative taken by the Atomic Scientists' Association of America and of Great Britain in bringing these issues before the public.

It calls upon its fellow citizens to urge the government to give full support to the Baruch plan for the control of atomic energy and to support similar provisions against the use of all weapons of indiscriminate extermination.

(The chairman of the Conference session emphasized that the resolutions were an act of the Conference and did not commit the Institute.)

ON THE theoretical level of politics, two lecturers offered original contributions: Professor George Catlin, late of Cornell University, and Professor Hsun-Cheng Shao, of National Tsinghua University, Peiping.

In their addresses, an orientalized West was being confronted by an occidentalized East. Professor Catlin said: "When we see the new teaching of psychologists, educationalists, philosophers, political scientists, anthropologists all pointing in the same direction, we may be sure that something will emerge as a new cast of thought, as significant in its day as the work of Adam Smith or of Jeremy Bentham (or of Karl Marx)." The problem of power consisted, it was increasingly realized, in superseding its dominative forms by its cooperative forms. This passed into a problem in education and even of religion. Here the issues of teleology, that is, of the norms and values of the required society, became all important. Professor Catlin had taken this position in 1929 and found no reason to withdraw from it in 1946. A galaxy of minds was moving in the same direction. Novelists such as A. Huxley, S. Maugham, A. J. Cronin, depicted the "good man" of Leibnitz's Perennial Philosophy. Writers such as E. Gill, J. Middleton Murry, J. Macmurray, G. Heard, and R. M. MacIver, had developed and deepened the idea of community. Educational psychologists, such as Isaacs, Anderson, and Horney; psychoanalysts, such as Suttie, Harding, Ranyard West, or Glover; social anthropologists such as Ruth Benedict, Dollard, and Malinowski; all had made important discoveries concerning man as a cooperative being. Niebuhr's analysis of pride, Russell's diagnosis of power, gave substance to the "remedial approach" broadly followed by Albert Schweitzer, M. K. Gandhi, and Aldous Huxley. As a practical matter, Catlin said, we need a great increase in the power of the religious spirit. He called for an unqualified support of organized religion, preferably of the Roman Church, for only in that way can the right psychological training be translated into political terms. In a conversation which he recently had with Gandhi, the Mahatma told him that "no religious man talks about rights and political guarantees; he is never a 'minority,' because he feels himself to be with God." This faced Catlin with the question, "Must we, in the name of Christianity, abolish all police and all courts?" But if so, what about Russia, the enemy of the Roman Church? Should the USSR go unrestrained? No, the medieval scholastics were sound when they established "the later churchly doctrine" on the subordinate and limited use of the "secular sword." Our world

tribunal is UN, and its armed executive is the secular sword. Nothing should stop us in our determination "to enforce without flinching the decisions of the world tribunal against the makers of all disorders," Catlin concluded.

WHILE Catlin was calling on the mystics of the East to help us in righting the balance of Western politics, Professor Shao offered a remarkable application of the most rational political science of the East to our problems.

Traditional political thought in China is often falsely regarded as "philosophical" in the contemplative sense of the term, and as "moralistic," that is, as an approach through the question of right behavior. Actually, Chinese political thought is based on stark realism in respect to the deadlock which is at the heart of political and social problems. Far from regarding that deadlock merely as a matter of ignorance (as Socrates might have put it) or of man's moral inadequacy (a view towards which the Christian tends), it accepts it as real and basic. Consequently, Chinese tradition is suspicious of "solutions" that would directly interfere with the deadlock or suppress one of its factors. Time is often needed for any spontaneous shift in the underlying forces to work itself out and permit of a direct solution. Again, the gaining of time is not a mere matter of patience and toleration—although the techniques of these virtues are highly developed—but of a concrete understanding of the nature of the balances involved. Professor Shao's conclusions in regard to the present world crisis were, accordingly, concrete. A world state is not yet possible; to believe in its proximity is therefore dangerous. On the one hand, it prevents us from facing actualities, on the other, it leads to the futile (and undesirable) attempt to eliminate differences by ignoring them. Here lies the danger of a utopian cosmopolitanism. Even in view of recent scientific advances with their threatening implications, existing differences can be blunted. In the future as in the past, such differences can contribute much to man's collective existence as long as they are rationally controlled, not eliminated through a process of leveling. Admittedly, the present bi-polar power constellation of Anglo-American democracy vs. Soviet communism may well lead to catastrophe. But it is not beyond the range of the possible to introduce such modifications as would make it workable and safe. The prime need is for the creation of a neutral belt or additional "poles of power," independent of the two dominating poles in the world today, thus forming a multi-polar system. In Europe,

Graeco-Latin civilization should be fostered and organized under the moral and cultural leadership of France, as one of the neutral poles. In Asia, China would have to bear the burden of being the neutral pole. Although she may have to go through a tragic process of transformation before achieving recovery and prosperity, she will prove equal to the task of blunting the edges!

AN EVEN richer orchestration than for the discussion of politics was provided for that of religion. Professor H. A. Hodges, of Reading University, opened with an address on "Philosophy and Civilization," which asserted that philosophy had ceased to provide any basis for the use of reason. "How long can such a civilization stand?" he asked again and again. The Roman Catholic thinker, Monsignor Ronald Knox, amazed the Conference by his answer, which was to the effect that Christianity was indifferent to the future of civilization. Donald MacKinnon, of Keble and Balliol Colleges, made it, on the contrary, the crucial test of Christianity, whether it is or is not able to save civilization. He called this religion's "total engagement in society." Confronted with the schism between agnostic and Christian, Professor Hodges demanded a new consciousness in which the two can meet. Without such an "understanding of understanding" the diremption of our civilization was final.

Hellenism, the self-conscious civilization of the Greeks, Professor Hodges said, is the only valid conception of civilization known to the philosopher. It postulates man as the rational animal, who fulfills his purpose in a city-state community ruled by reason. He is capable of an intellectual contemplation of the universe, because the universe itself is rational. In the 17th century, this basic concept was enriched: observation and experiment led to "progressive methods," employed in exploring a developing world. Reason now meant Enlightenment; deliberate purpose replaced intuition and emotion. Self-control offered itself as the content of the idea of freedom. Still, man and the world had a purpose, and man was rational in a world of reason. The fatal turning of the screw took place in the 19th century. Positive science and psychology undermined the rational idea of the world. Civilization was seen as the result of unconscious trends; the world, as an accident. In Marx and in Spencer, this was still accompanied by a humanist outlook and confidence in the future—"an optimism without cause." For survival—the highest value in the new evolutionism—depended upon factors none of which

was "civilized." For strength, cunning, and cooperation may well reach their peak in violence, applied science, and the herd instinct, respectively. No longer was an appeal to the concept of man as a rational animal implied.

Man can not understand a universe which is not understandable, said Professor Hodges. Nor would understanding be of value once survival does not involve civilization. Philosophy has criticized itself out of existence. There is no longer any basis for the use of reason. "How long can such a civilization stand?" On this note of unqualified despair Professor Hodges closed.

MONSIGNOR KNOX disowned civilization in the name of religion. The work of the Church is to colonize Heaven, the work of the reformer is to breed for Utopia. Religion thrives when civilization is sick. It is weak where civilization is strong. In the Athens of Pericles, religion was mere lukewarm municipal piety; the Augustinian period and the Renaissance were low points of religion. Religion and civilization were inimical—except where religion gained strength by revolting against civilization, or civilization advanced religion by persecuting it. "Am I hauling down the flag of religion, and handing over," Knox said, "to the poet, the artist, the scientist, the philosopher?" No, civilization can exist without them. The Victorians had no art, the High Middle Ages no science, the Augustinian age no philosophy. These adornments of life are in truth parasitic on the general well-being of society. The criteria of civilization are security of life, security and comfort. Yet civilization must decay if the age has lost the instinct of living dangerously. That precisely is happening in our time. The modern state, if it can keep clear of war and palace revolution, is omnipotent: man exists for the state. Behind the "iron curtain" the last remnants of democracy are being stamped out. And it is not much better in the West. Artists, scientists, philosophers, divines, should unite against the state, to avert the dehumanization of humanity. True, there are quarrels between them, but all must concentrate on Enemy Number 1, the menace of state-encroachment. Private quarrels can be settled later.

To no views did the conference react more strongly than to those so brilliantly expressed by Monsignor Knox. His intellectual nihilism was all the more clearly realized to the extent that it was proclaimed in the name of religion. All too obviously his "*Ecrasez l'infâme*" was hurled against the State with the intent of enthroning the Church.

Donald MacKinnon raised the religious issue

with an incisiveness reminiscent of Søren Kierkegaard's dialectic a century ago. His response was both global and total. Religion entered into the bitter battles fought in India and Palestine today. The Nazi creed confronted the Christian world. And in the clash between Russia and the West an essential component was the interaction of Marxist doctrine and the fervent Christian belief of an unreformed Church. "Christians are becoming self-conscious, perhaps for the first time," he said, "that their religion involves a total engagement in the life of the society in which a Christian has to live." Eventually, in Nazi Germany, Christians overcame the Lutheran split between Faith and State. Resisting on the religious issue, they were driven to resist on the political plane as well. Religious thinking reveals itself by its *crucial quality*; for unless it is crucial, it is nothing. "Russia can attack the democracies successfully," he said, "on one point: on the issue of imperialism. Indeed, how far do the achievements of democracy depend directly on imperial circumstances? Our consciences are still troubled by Hiroshima, Nagasaki. By its power to gain illumination on the relation between Russia and the West, our religion will be judged."

Clearly, in spite of the transcendentalism he shares with Knox, both the theology and the politics of MacKinnon were radically opposed to those of Monsignor Knox, who had preached the total disengagement of religion from civilization.

PROFESSOR Lewis Mumford's address (entitled: "The Nature of the Age in which we live, involving the problem: What action shall we take to suit the time and the place?") was chaired by Sir Alfred Zimmern, late professor of international affairs, Oxford University.

The problem of our civilization, Sir Alfred said, arose on three distinct levels: on the international plane, which involved the rule of law and the control of nuclear energy; on the plane of the good society, which demanded planning for welfare as well as social equality; on the philosophical or religious plane, which required the understanding of life on its deeper level. In all three he regarded Mumford as a leader of our time.

Lewis Mumford is a great name in England. His *Culture of Cities and Condition of Man* rescued for Britain the inheritance of Patrick Geddes, the Scottish genius, and made their author perhaps the strongest single influence in forming the revival of urban civilization here. With Aneurin Bevan's housing schemes and Lewis Silkin's New Towns Bill in the lime-

light, Mumford's ideas are far from being of merely academic importance in a country which is in the course of reshaping its whole national existence.

Professor Mumford has what is needed to transform theories and vistas into a dynamic message. "The task before me," he began, "is an impossible task; but our age has to attempt to fulfil the impossible." The first half of the sentence accounts for the facts; the second arouses our slumbering moral faculties. The call is not contrary to reason; yet, in order to be heard, it demands a re-interpretation of the functions of reason. This is attained by virtue of a fundamentalism which erects the idea of man's communal achievements into an absolute—let our ideals be subordinated to the single aim of saving the sources of higher life. Ultimately human civilization is a unity of its parts and functions, none of which is to be allowed to turn into an act of self-destruction against the idea of a meaningful common life. Far from being a construct of mere wish-fulfillment, such an ideal of civilization has a hard core of realism. It does not make absolutes of knowledge, efficiency, or even peace; it *sets the content of life above life itself*. We must forego our culture as it is, our civilization as it stands, our personality which we secretly idolize. *We must, as individuals, strengthen our weakest sides, and weaken our strongest*. Thus only can civilization be a unity, and live on. As far as the English mind is concerned, the secret of Mumford's appeal is twofold. The hint at a crucial experience makes him an authentic witness to some; to others the dethronement of absolutes transcending common human existence rightly appears as a restatement of the case for reason.

THE present writer delivered a talk attempting to establish man's freedom to shape his own civilization. He called for a rejection of the very concept of economic determinism, which would limit this freedom.

Man's dependence upon material goods—the economic factor—is not translated into an immediate incentive. What has been thus identified during the past century is nothing other than the working of the market-economy, which existed during the 19th century but which—with the exception of the United States—is in our time rapidly disappearing. Its peculiarity was twofold: First, it included markets for labor

and land, that is, for man and nature; consequently, the whole of society was embedded in the economic system. Secondly, motives for participating in production were reduced to fear of hunger and hope of gain; these incentives were regarded as being "economic." Actually, in no other human society of which we know, are hunger and gain motives for participating in production. On the contrary, such motives are of that "mixed" character which we usually associate with civic duties. The economic system is therefore embedded in *social relations*—these determine the form of economic institutions. No "economic determinism" exists under such conditions. Fear of the road to serfdom in a planned economy was proof of an uncritical belief in the validity, in general, of economic determinism. True, much of what we have come to cherish as freedom was a by-product of market-economy. In the future we shall have to plan for such freedom in a planned economy. The bill of rights will have to be extended into the industrial field, protecting the individual against abuses of the power agglomerated in the hands of governmental or trade union authorities. There is no reason for our not having as much freedom in a planned society as we wish to possess. It is human ideals, not economics, which are determinative outside a market society.

The educational problem was brought to the fore by Dr. John Bowlby and Kenneth Richmond, regional education officer of the British Broadcasting Corporation. Bowlby offered a most instructive account of educational experiments in the USA, while Richmond argued for a more equalitarian system of general education in Britain, combined with a reform of teaching method. Noel F. Newsome, late editor of the European news services of the BBC, a policy-making member of the Liberal Party, gave a forthright and embracing presentation of problems of freedom in a planned society. Montgomery Belgion gave an analysis of the criteria of civilization from the viewpoint of literary art. Discussions were conducted by A. Farquharson, Secretary of the Institute of Sociology and organizer of the Conference.

The problem of the three civilizations—American, Russian, British—was, as we said, not touched upon. Concern about the day after tomorrow took precedence over the freedom to scan the far horizons.

LETTERS FROM READERS

Back Talk from 86th Street

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I should like to comment on Aaron Frankel's "Back to Eighty-Sixth Street" in the August number of COMMENTARY, not only because I am deeply interested in the theme, but also because I have spent the last fifteen years working on 86th Street, struggling with the very problems Mr. Frankel discusses. I have, too, a somewhat personal interest in Mr. Frankel. He will not object, I hope, if I reveal that he was one of my "boys." If his essay implies that I have not done a very good job, I plead for clemency on the grounds that his essay also tells why. On 86th Street, being a rabbi is not easy.

But the job is not made any easier when a sensitive and idealistic chap writes about my Jews in anger. As long as Aaron insists that he did not need any "adjustment" after his return from the war, I cannot blame the anger on the stresses and strains of the veteran's state. I must attribute it to his failure to have thought through carefully the anxieties and the temptations of the 86th Street group. It is not difficult to turn Amos and find fault with the mink-coated, well-fed (on Green-grass sturgeon), manicured, and permanented kine of Bashan-Broadway. Nor, for that matter, is it any more difficult to denounce any group of people, rich or poor, Jewish or non-Jewish, for the faults they all share or for those they have uniquely evolved.

It is quite another matter to try to understand what makes these people tick. Aaron Frankel has viewed them quite superficially. For example, even in his description of the neighborhood, he omits altogether one of the most significant factors, namely, that the Jews line the avenues and the main cross streets, while the non-Jews, mainly Irish Catholics, occupy practically all the other side streets and the dwellings on Amsterdam and Columbus Avenues. This means, first, that the *only* Jews around 86th Street are virtually all middle class, living in the very midst of poor, almost slum-dwelling non-Jews. It means further that the Jewish boys and girls on 86th Street are very much aware of this disparity. And those who are not so aware are reminded of

it by little gangs of hoodlums who accost them and ask, "What's your religion?" and then take their money, or baseball, or skates away. Jewish kids are actually afraid to play in Central Park—even in daylight. This was not the case when Aaron himself attended my school.

When he writes, therefore, that 86th Street is "reputedly that street where Jews feel most comfortably at home," and bases all his subsequent paradoxes and contradictions upon that statement, he misses the mark completely. The Jews on 86th Street are less secure there than they would be in Brooklyn or the Bronx. In those boroughs, especially in the poorer sections, where Jews are not middle class, they share to a much lesser degree the individualism characteristic of the middle class. They are more community-conscious, they share experiences to a greater extent, and hence have learned to meet the hazards of anti-Semitism cooperatively. If they do not organize counter-gangs (which sometimes they do), they organize real centers of recreation. Or at least, the wealthier Jews organize such centers for them; and contributions come from the papas and mamas of the 86th Street kids who need such centers as badly—or worse.

The individualism of the middle class, one of the blessings of free enterprise and initiative, is deepened by the kind of buildings these people live in. They are cut off from one another. The buildings are what they are because land values are enormous, and buildings must yield a maximum return. This physical fragmentation, so inimical to communal-mindness, is not mitigated by any forces of inner cohesion. These Jews, like so many thousands of other Jews, have less and less in common as Jews. Their attachment to the language, literature, traditions, and folkways of their people weakens from year to year.

Yet they are still Jews, still uneasy as they drive their cars down the side streets, still fearful lest the doorman, the elevator man, the back elevator man, curse them for being rich. They are still faced with quotas in the schools—not only the colleges, mind you, but the elementary schools, yes, even the *nursery schools*. Aaron Frankel writes, "Perpetually

they fret that they do not yet 'belong,' and are not yet 'accepted.'" They are *not* accepted socially by their own "class"; and they are resented by the non-Jews of the economic class below them.

It is true that not all of them just "live out their martyrdom" on heavy cream and comfortable upholstery. Some of them "go into" liberal movements. But there too they are made to feel that they are Jews. Political parties are very conscious of the need for maintaining a careful equilibrium among the three major groups. And those organizations dedicated to bringing in the classless society are so predominantly Jewish in personnel that they form a new and different sort of ghetto.

Mr. Frankel happened to have the refreshing experience of meeting decent and fair non-Jews in the Army, and of avoiding any anti-Semitism. He should talk to some of my other boys with very different experiences. He would learn that the barracks were not very different from 86th Street for many of them.

Because he does not see the problem clearly, he not only cannot offer answers, he cannot even ask the right questions. He asks: Why can these people not stop being obsessed with their insecurity? Why can they not become interested in the larger question? The proper query should be: How can these people be given the inner strength necessary to cope with the antagonisms which surround them? How can they be provided with the morale to stop hating themselves because they are Jews?

I believe Mr. Frankel puts his finger on one clue to the answer when he says: "Unfortunately, they [the synagogues] are also conducted almost as private clubs or family affairs; unfortunately, the rabbis who lead the activities of these congregations rarely organize jointly for the long-range benefit of the community in common." Our leaders have not yet recognized how vital it is to create a form of community.

Aaron does not like Reconstructionism because he thinks it involves the creation of a ghetto. No. The ghetto is what we have now; the *community* takes this ghetto, this concentration of Jews in a particular area, and transforms it from a creature of external pressure into a creature of inner cohesiveness. The community gives *content* to Jewish life, mutual responsibility, culture and the arts, ethical standards, and social idealism. When Jews will have created a community in which they can feel at home (as they do not yet feel at home on 86th Street), when they will have consolidated their position as a group, their

individuals will be able to turn with confidence and self-assurance to the broader questions. No one who has not made his intimate, personal emotional adjustments is a fit candidate for remaking the world.

To the extent that philanthropies are now communally organized, the Jews of 86th Street have risen above the average of American middle-class folks. Jewish contributions to Federation and the UJA are something to be proud of (and account to a great extent for the reputation New York has for its generosity). When some of the other *mitzvot* of Judaism are as efficiently publicized and organized, these Jews will throw off the "bad values" of "American middle-class life."

If Aaron Frankel would like to do something for his people—and for our country—he might give himself to teaching them the values of the Jewish tradition. He might roll up his sleeves and do some social work with these unhappy rich people, to restore their faith in themselves, to wipe away their cynicism about American democracy (which is powerful in spite of their patriotism), to capture something of the proud spirit of resistance their brothers in Palestine are displaying.

A long time ago, Aaron almost wanted to become a rabbi. He could do worse.

RABBI IRA EISENSTEIN

The Society for the Advancement of Judaism
13-15 West 86th Street
New York

At Ease in Zion

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

The 86th Street-Central Park West neighborhood is middle-class and Judeo-centric, but what is there so deplorable about this? Jewish residents of the West Side are not primarily concerned with the morbid, pathological, and negative aspects of Jewish experience. They have a healthy attitude towards themselves as Jews and towards Jewish problems. While it is true that many are occupied with the reaction to anti-Semitism and a defense against it, there are more Jews on the West Side who are enthusiastic for the constructive movements of Jewry than perhaps in any other area of the United States. Knowing themselves blessed by fortune and circumstance, great numbers wish to be helpful in the advancement of the Jewish cause. They are anxious regarding the fate of Israel, and are determined to ameliorate Jewish suffering and to establish Jewish dignity. Much remains to be done on behalf of Jewish religious education, and many of the community seek to evade their

philanthropic, communal, and spiritual responsibilities. But the West Side is one of the most fruitful vineyards of Jewish service imaginable.

Moreover, 86th Street and Central Park West are far from being circumscribed *Juden-gassen*. Out of the West Side came the man who was friend and adviser of the late President Roosevelt during his gubernatorial and presidential career. Out of the West Side have come symphonic conductors, Supreme Court justices, borough presidents, playwrights, physicians, psychiatrists of eminence, and many of the leading personalities of American and Jewish life. West Side residents are to be found at concerts, at the great musical halls, at the Stadium, in the theaters, at banquets of civic interest, and the like. Whatever may be the Jewish consciousness of the 86th Street residents, they have a vital awareness of their responsibilities to the larger commonwealth and its culture.

"Back to 86th Street" appears coincidentally with Stanley Walker's "Farewell to New York" in the *Saturday Evening Post*. The latter is the jaundiced complaint of someone jaded by the stimuli the New York scene offers. The former is a confused criticism of one of America's most stimulating and enriching neighborhoods. I left California behind me in order to live on Central Park West near 86th Street, because the Far West represented a *Galut*, an exile, from the strategic center of Jewish life. At the same time, New York furnished an opportunity to bring into the orbit of Jewish interest many of the leading figures of contemporary culture. Perhaps Mr. Frankel may be interested to know that in one of the synagogues, three blocks from 86th Street, the guest speakers for the past year have included, in addition to a number of Christian clergymen, the following: Lillian Smith, author of *Strange Fruit*; Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Jr.; Pierre van Paassen; former Governor Charles Poletti, who spoke on "Face to Face with Fascism Since the Liberation"; Gordon Heath, the young star of "Deep Are the Roots"; Eddie Dowling, and numerous others of similar importance.

Every Main Street has its drawbacks, but I am afraid that no section would permanently satisfy writers of Mr. Frankel's temperament. Perhaps he will join Stanley Walker in some non-existent Utopia where life is lived according to one's passing moods and whims. As for me, I shall be glad to continue to walk across 86th Street and up and down Central Park West, greeting my friends on Sabbaths, the Holydays, and secular days, with *Hag Sameiach*, *Shabbat Shalom*, *Gut Woch*, and

Hasimah Tovah, as the occasion warrants. And by the same token, I am happy to continue to plan the program of the synagogue for the coming year, making sure that it will furnish abundant and many-sided nourishment of the mind, the heart, and the spirit to the multitudes of all ages who will come to us as in years past. Perhaps, if Mr. Frankel will be patient, he may discover that the 86th Street district is one of the most satisfying laboratories for the best values in Jewish and American culture.

RABBI LOUIS I. NEWMAN

Congregation Rodeph Sholom
7 West 83rd Street
New York

The Road to Security

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

"Back to Eighty-Sixth Street," by Aaron M. Frankel, sounds a warning that Jewish followers of a racial ideology should heed, right here in America. Our children are being brought up in a spiritual ghetto, completely encapsulated. The Zionist incantation for a Jewish homeland as a defense to anti-Semitism here is creating a complex in the minds of Jewish youth. Palestine is not the be-all and end-all of our existence. We need to create confidence in our American way of life. Americans of the Jewish faith should inspire their offspring to look for security, not insecurity; to expect a return on what we put into our American life. Let us join the cavalcade of America! That way points to security and progress.

HERBERT U. FEIBELMAN

Miami, Florida

Secularism is the Trouble

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Mr. Frankel has seen one aspect of American Jewish life through sour eyes. He is unquestionably correct in his statement that there has been an overemphasis by supersensitive Jews upon the so-called "Jewish Problem." From my own experience, and from my contacts with war veteran groups, I can also testify that we "sniff anti-Semitism on every tainted breeze," even when it does not exist.

I disagree completely, however, when he tries to maintain that the uncertainty which characterizes young Jews in America stems from overemphasis upon anti-Semitism. The uncertainty of young Jews in America, from my observation of nearly thirty years as a

Jewish communal worker, springs from much deeper sources within the Jewish community. . . .

We Jews in America live in a secular world. Our Jewish youth has been educated, consciously or not, to relegate the religious aspects of life to a minor position in their scale of values. . . .

Unfortunately, the Zionist secular interpretation of a Jewish way of living is not so compelling a philosophy of life here in America, precisely because the vast majority of our young Jews never intend to leave the United States. They show an interest in it; they are willing to work for it; but it cannot completely take its place as the philosophy of Jewish living which can help our American Jewish youth live their lives here in America. . . .

Some of our finest, most idealistic, and most intelligent Jewish youth have been fired by the ethics of the square deal, of democracy as Jews understand it, as applied in the field of economic justice. Thus, so many Jews became labor leaders, Socialists, and too many of them today are Communists. While this secular approach does embrace some elements of the Jewish tradition, it also leads Jews away from the basic Jewish philosophies. . . .

To my mind, what has probably done most to "stamp uncertainty upon young Jews" is the fact that we do not now have a widely accepted, emotionally moving, theoretically adequate philosophy of Judaism, which would enable young Jews to live comfortably as Jews and Americans here in this country. . . .

HARRY LEBAU

Young Men's and Young Women's
Hebrew Association
Elizabeth, New Jersey

Scholarship and Charm

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

. . . David Baumgardt's essay in the July COMMENTARY, "Grace After Bread," reads like a philosophic homily on grace. It combines the method of Midrash with the charm of a *causerie* of Sainte-Beuve. . . .

EISIG SILBERSCHLAG

Boston, Massachusetts

The Churches Admit Failure

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I have read Doctor Konvitz' article, "Whittling Away Religious Freedom," with great satisfaction, and find myself in emphatic agreement with his conclusions. I particularly appreciate his discussion of "released time," and feel that he is right in emphasizing the fundamental importance of this issue. The policy of "released time" is not only a wanton violation of the principle of the separation of church and state, but it is a shameless confession of the failure and weakness of the churches.

What the churches are doing in this matter is to utilize the power and authority of the school system to accomplish in the field of education what they have found it impossible to do in their own Sunday Schools. We can't get the children to come to our Sunday Schools, so we'll use the compulsory system of the public schools to force them to come! That is what the churches are saying and doing, and it's a disgrace!

I wish that Doctor Konvitz had included in his article a survey of the relation between the churches and the state during the war period. The way the churches surrender their spiritual freedom to become a part of the military set-up in time of war is another disgrace. If there is any time when the churches should be free, it is when the nation is at war. Churches cannot go to war without openly betraying the religion which they profess. Hence the scandal of the religious support of the state in time of war.

JOHN HAYNES HOLMES

The Community Church
New York

Acknowledgment

In our introductory note to the reprint of the essay, "Study as a Mode of Worship," by Nathan Isaacs, in the June "Cedars of Lebanon," we gave credit to *The Jewish Library, First Series*, edited by Leo Jung, from which the essay was reprinted with the permission of the editor. It should also have been noted that the essay first appeared in the pages of the *Jewish Forum*.—Ed.

BOOKS IN REVIEW

Where Liberalism is Vulnerable

THE FAITH OF A LIBERAL. Selected essays by MORRIS R. COHEN. New York, Henry Holt, 1946. 497 pages. \$3.75.

Reviewed by ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR.

As a political catchword, liberalism has notoriously lost whatever clarity of outline or firmness of meaning it ever possessed. In most European countries the so-called Liberal party is likely to be a reactionary party dominated by the *haute bourgeoisie*. In the United States the term still has a Leftist rather than a Rightist connotation, but only by the skin of its teeth. The recent "liberal" professions of Senator Taft are only the latest in the determined attempts on the part of conservatives to make the word their own. In this situation we may turn with special eagerness to a series of essays on *The Faith of a Liberal* by one of America's leading philosophers.

Dr. Cohen's collection contains essays written over the past twenty-eight years, but united by a pervading largeness of spirit, graciousness of style, and consistency of viewpoint. They reflect their author's profound devotion to the liberal temper, which he conceives not as a specific economic or political creed, but as "a faith in enlightenment, a faith in a process rather than in a set of doctrines, a faith instilled with pride in the achievements of the human mind, and yet colored with a deep humility before the vision of a world so much larger than our human hopes and thoughts." The unique characteristic of liberalism, he believes, is its commitment to scepticism, to tolerance, to free inquiry, to the methods and principles of rationalism. "In the end, there is no way in which people can live together decently unless each individual or group realizes that the whole of truth and virtue is not exclusively in its possession." Nor is liberalism the product of any special economic or political circumstance. It is "older than modern capitalistic economics. It has its roots in the Hellenic spirit of free critical inquiry which laid the foundations of the sciences on which modern civilization rests."

The great danger to liberalism, as Dr. Cohen

sees it, comes from its lingering attachment to the economics of free competition, to the "false philosophy of laissez faire, which assumes that if each will pursue his own economic profit, the good of all will be assured by an eternally pre-established economic harmony." Dogmatic Communism affords no solution either. "When the Communists tell me that I must choose between their dictatorship and Fascism, I feel that I am offered the choice between being shot and being hanged." But we must somehow combine the principles of collectivism and of individualism, and Dr. Cohen concludes that "for practical reasons, I think we must nowadays start with the collectivistic principle."

The concluding piece, "The Future of American Liberalism," was evidently written for this volume, and it does not disclose any important modification of the views expressed in the other essays, written over the past twenty years. It is thus legitimate to regard the whole book as an up-to-date statement of Dr. Cohen's position—in which case it is necessary to state frankly that the position has an old-fashioned air. Its questions and issues are not the questions and issues of the 1940's. Dr. Cohen's faith of a liberal will not provide much consolation for perplexed liberals today.

He is, in the first place, a little casual in dismissing the relationship between the spiritual climate of a society and its economic underpinnings. While there is no identity, say, between capitalism and liberalism, there is still a very real sense in which liberalism gets more fresh air and sunlight through the interstices of a competitive society than through the close-knit and inflexible grip of collectivism (or at least of any collectivism known to modern history). The occupational bias of the philosopher appears in this constant tendency to break down liberalism into ideas and trace the ideas back to Plato, rather than to examine the concrete conditions under which liberalism has emerged and become effective.

More serious, however, is the fact that the very terms of discussion have changed drastically from those in which Dr. Cohen wrote twenty years ago and is still writing. While in the 1920's it was necessary to establish the legitimacy of collective action, it is now neces-

sary to re-establish the legitimacy of the individual. Dr. Cohen writes, in a comment on Paul Elmer More, that "the problem of morality or justice is not soluble unless we tackle it in terms of social organization." This is, of course, true; but our emphasis today has returned to the individual, and our suspicion is that certain defects we have blamed on capitalism were in fact defects of any social organization, which may be aggravated as society becomes less chaotic and heterogeneous, less filled with internal checks and discontinuities.

It all gets back to the almost Huxleyan (T.H.) faith in human reason. Dr. Cohen's onslaught on the anti-intellectual critics of liberalism is revealing. His passionate recoil from the mild Pareto-and-water of James Harvey Robinson's *The Mind in the Making*, or of Thurman Arnold's *The Symbols of Government*, apparently comes from a deep fear of acknowledging the emotional and destructive impulses of man. His repeated and oversimplified attacks on the Christian view of human nature are equally revealing. Indeed, his statement of the Christian view—"Nature is sin. To indulge our natural impulses is sinful"—is not only vulgarization but bad logic; from a philosopher habitually so precise, such foreshortening seems almost protective in purpose, a desperate clinging to his own rational certitudes.

Dr. Cohen is worried over the fact that his type of liberalism is not a fighting faith. One reason may well be that in its rush to justify the beauties of human reason and social organization, this liberalism has underestimated the dark and subterranean forces of the human mind. Dr. Cohen is equally impatient with Augustine and with Freud (and he does not mention Sorel or Pareto); but, whether you use the vocabulary of religion or of psychoanalysis or of anti-rationalism, there are certainly human passions Dr. Cohen does not take account of. If liberalism is to survive, it must learn from its gloomier critics, not brush them aside with affirmations or sophistries.

Dr. Cohen is fighting or denying the unconscious instead of trying to assimilate it. *The Faith of a Liberal* may thus prove largely irrelevant to those persons who believe that the urgent problems of liberalism today are those being probed from various angles by men like Silone, Koestler, Niebuhr, George Orwell, Dwight Macdonald. But as a high-minded and eloquent statement of an appealing point of view, *The Faith of a Liberal* is inspiring and nostalgic reading. We can be grateful, too, that Dr. Cohen's penetrating essays on Holmes, Brandeis, and Cardozo on the Sacco-Vanzetti case, and on various aspects of American history

and literature, are now available in permanent form.

The Image of Hell

THE BLACK BOOK: THE NAZI CRIME AGAINST THE JEWISH PEOPLE. Compiled and edited by the World Jewish Congress, the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, the Vaad Leumi, and the American Committee of Jewish Writers, Artists and Scientists. New York, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1946. 560 pp. \$5.00.

HITLER'S PROFESSORS. By MAX WEINREICH. New York, Yiddish Scientific Institute, 1946. 291 pp. \$2.50.

Reviewed by HANNAH ARENDT

"As THE formal accusers of the German people before the bar of the civilized world, it may be properly demanded of the Jews that they prepare . . . a bill of indictment. It is easily done. . . . The blood of Hitler's victims cries from the ground. The purpose of our bill is to make the cry articulate."

But if the authors of *The Black Book* thought the story of the last decade an easy one to tell, they are sadly mistaken. The awkwardness of their book, for all its good intentions, is sufficient proof of that. It is not, however, simply a matter of technical skill. True, the material could have been better organized, the style less journalistic, and the sources selected more scientifically. But such and other improvements would have made even more obvious the discrepancy between the facts themselves and any possible use of them for political purposes. *The Black Book* fails because its authors, submerged in a chaos of details, were unable to understand or make clear the nature of the facts confronting them.

The facts are: that six million Jews, six million human beings, were helplessly, and in most cases unsuspectingly, dragged to their deaths. The method employed was that of accumulated terror. First came calculated neglect, deprivation, and shame, when the weak in body died together with those strong and defiant enough to take their own lives. Secondly came outright starvation, combined with forced labor, when people died by the thousands but at different intervals of time, according to their stamina. Last came the death factories—and they all died together, the young and the old, the weak and the strong, the sick and the healthy; not as

people, not as men and women, children and adults, boys and girls, not as good and bad, beautiful and ugly—but brought down to the lowest common denominator of organic life itself, plunged into the darkest and deepest abyss of primal equality, like cattle, like matter, like things that had neither body nor soul, nor even a physiognomy upon which death could stamp its seal.

It is in this monstrous equality without fraternity or humanity—an equality in which cats and dogs could have shared—that we see, as though mirrored, the image of hell.

Beyond the capacities of human comprehension is the deformed wickedness of those who established such equality. But equally deformed and beyond the reach of human justice is the innocence of those who died in this equality. The gas chamber was more than anybody could have possibly deserved, and in the face of it the worst criminal was as innocent as the new-born babe. Nor is the monstrousness of this innocence made any easier to bear by such adages as "better to suffer ill than do ill." What mattered was not so much that those whom an accident of birth condemned to death obeyed and functioned to the last moment as frictionlessly as those whom an accident of birth condemned to life (this is so well known, there is no use hiding it). Even beyond that was the fact that innocence and guilt were no longer products of human behavior; that no possible human crime could have fitted this punishment, no conceivable sin, this hell in which saint and sinner were equally degraded to the status of possible corpses. Once inside the death factories, everything became an accident completely beyond control of those who did the suffering and those who inflicted it. And in more than one case, those who inflicted the suffering one day became the sufferers the next.

Human history has known no story more difficult to tell. The monstrous equality in innocence that is its inevitable *leitmotif* destroys the very basis on which history is produced—which is, namely, our capacity to comprehend an event no matter how distant we are from it.

The spell is broken only when we come to the story of Jewish resistance and the Battle of the Warsaw Ghetto. *The Black Book*, however, deals with these events even more inadequately than with the others, devoting a mere nine poorly-written pages to the Ghetto battle—and without even mentioning Shlomo Mendelsohn's masterful analysis of the event that appeared in the *Menorah Journal* of Spring, 1944. No conceivable chronicle of any kind could succeed in turning six million dead people into a political argument. The attempt of the Nazis to fabricate a wickedness beyond vice did nothing

more than establish an innocence beyond virtue. Such innocence and such wickedness have no bearing on that reality where politics exists.

Yet Nazi policy, realized best in the phony world of propaganda, was well served by the fabrication. Had the Nazis been content merely to draw up a bill of indictment against the Jews and propagandize the notion that there are subhuman and superhuman peoples, they would hardly have succeeded in convincing common sense that the Jews were subhuman. Lying was not enough. In order to be believed, the Nazis had to fabricate reality itself and make Jews look subhuman. So that even today, when faced by the atrocity films, common sense will say: "But don't they look like criminals?" Or, if incapable of grasping an innocence beyond virtue and vice, people will say: "What terrible things these Jews must have done to have the Germans do this to them!"

In drawing up a bill of indictment on the part of the absolutely innocent Jewish people against the absolutely guilty German people, the authors of *The Black Book* overlook the fact that they lack the power to make the whole German nation look as guilty as the Nazis made Jews look—and God forbid that anyone should ever again have such power! For to establish and maintain such distinctions would mean installing hell permanently on earth. Without such power, without the means of fabricating a false reality according to a lying ideology, propaganda and publicity of the style embodied in this book can only succeed in making a true story sound unconvincing. And the account grows all the more unconvincing as the events themselves become more atrocious. Told as propaganda, the whole story not only fails to become a political argument—it does not even sound true.

Politically speaking, the death factories did constitute a "crime against humanity" committed on the bodies of the Jewish people; and had the Nazis not been crushed, the death factories would have swallowed up the bodies of quite a number of other peoples (as a matter of fact, Gypsies were exterminated along with Jews for more or less the same ideological reasons). The Jewish people is indeed entitled to draw up this bill of indictment against the Germans, but provided it does not forget that in this case it speaks for all the peoples of the earth. It is as necessary to punish the guilty as it is to remember that there is no punishment that could fit their crimes. For Goering the death penalty is almost a joke, and he, like all his fellow-defendants at Nuremberg, knows that we can do no more than make him die but a little earlier than he would have done anyhow.

From innocence beyond virtue and guilt beyond vice, from a hell where all Jews were of necessity angelic and all Germans of necessity diabolical, we must return to the reality of politics. The real story of the Nazi-constructed hell is desperately needed for the future. Not only because these facts have changed and poisoned the very air we breathe, not only because they now inhabit our dreams at night and permeate our thoughts during the day—but also because they have become the basic experience and the basic misery of our times. Only from this foundation, on which a new knowledge of man will rest, can our new insights, our new memories, our new deeds, take their point of departure. Those who one day may feel strong enough to tell the whole story will have to realize, however, that the story in itself can yield nothing but sorrow and despair—least of all, arguments for any specific political purpose.

ONLY a common subject matter justifies reviewing Max Weinreich's book together with *The Black Book*. His book possesses all the qualities the other so glaringly lacks, and, in its implications and honest presentation of the facts, constitutes the best guide to the nature of Nazi terror that I have read so far.

Soberly written from an expert knowledge of the organizational set-up of the Nazi machine, its larger part deals with the steps by which the Nazis carried out their "scientifically" planned program. Many documents that the Yiddish Scientific Institute ingeniously acquired for its archives are reproduced and, in addition, correctly evaluated. However, the list of the German scholars who collaborated with Hitler is not complete; many more names, especially from the humanities, could have been added. But even in this case, the book provides a good trunk to which supplements and additions can be grafted. The same holds true for the short bibliographies in the index. In his—understandable—excitement about many hitherto unknown documents marked "top secret" and many newly discovered sources, Dr. Weinreich has failed to pay enough attention to more easily accessible books and sources.

This happens to be more than a technical question. Dr. Weinreich's main thesis is that "German scholarship provided the ideas and techniques which led to and justified unparalleled slaughter." This is a highly controversial statement. It is true that some outstanding scholars went out of their way and did more to aid the Nazis than the majority of German professors, who fell into line simply for the sake of their jobs. And quite a few of those outstanding scholars did their utmost to supply the Nazis with ideas and techniques: prominent among

them were the jurist Carl Schmitt, the theologian Gerhard Kittel, the sociologist Hans Freyer, the historian Walter Frank (former director of the Reich Institute for Research into the Jewish Question, in Munich), and the existentialist philosopher Martin Heidegger. These names are lost, however, amid the mass of material Dr. Weinreich's book provides on lesser known scholars and scholars of bad reputation. Moreover, only a careful and complete bibliography of all these scholars' pre-Hitler publications would have shown their real standing in the world of scholarship. (Conspicuous by their absence are Walter Frank's books on the Stoecker movement and on the Third Republic, both of which already showed a strong anti-Semitic bias before Hitler.)

It is also true, and Dr. Weinreich is right to insist thereon, that Hitler showed one of his crucial insights into the nature of modern propaganda when he asked for "scientific" arguments and refused to use the standard crack-pot ones of traditional anti-Semitic propaganda. The reason for this surprising inclination of his for "scientificity" is simple and can be explained by the same example Hitler himself uses in *Mein Kampf*. He begins by stating that the advertiser of a new brand of soap would be doing a bad job if he admitted that there were other good soaps on the market. It is obvious, as every businessman knows, that the usual claim, "My soap is better than any other soap in the world," can be greatly improved by adding a little threat like: "If you don't use my soap you'll get pimples instead of a husband." And what you do, as long as you can't deprive all the girls who don't use your soap of husbands, is back up your claim "scientifically." But once you succeed in acquiring the power and put all girls with the wrong kind of soap beyond the reach of boys or, even better, monopolize soap-fabrication, "science" is no longer necessary.

So while it is perfectly true that quite a few respectable German professors volunteered their services to the Nazis, it is equally true—which was rather a shock to these gentlemen themselves—that the Nazis did not use their "ideas." The Nazis had their own ideas—what they needed were techniques and technicians with no ideas at all or educated from the beginning in only Nazi ideas. The scholars first put to one side by the Nazis as of relatively little use to them were old-fashioned nationalists like Heidegger, whose enthusiasm for the Third Reich was only matched by his glaring ignorance of what he was talking about. After Heidegger had made Nazism respectable among the élite at the universities, Alfred Bäumler, well-known as a charlatan in pre-Hitler times,

stepped into his place and received all the honors. The last to fall into disgrace with the Nazis were people like Walter Frank who had been anti-Semites even before Hitler rose to power but nevertheless managed to cling to some remnants of scholarship. In the early 40's Frank had to surrender his position to the notorious Alfred Rosenberg, whose *Myth of the Twentieth Century* had revealed no inclinations whatsoever toward "scholarship" on its author's part. The point here is that the Nazis most likely mistrusted Frank precisely because he was *not* a charlatan.

The only science the Nazis appear to have actually trusted to some extent was racial "science," which, as we know, has never yet gone beyond the stage of somewhat crude superstition. But even racial "scientists" had a rather hard time of it under the Nazis, being asked at first to prove the inferiority of all Semites, chiefly the Jews; then the high standing of all Semites, chiefly the Arabs (for the Jews as a "*Mischrasse*" did not belong to the Semites)—and then, finally, even having to abandon their pet notion of "Aryan" superiority for the sake of Japanese susceptibilities. More interesting, however, than all these "results of research" that changed according to political necessity, was the unchanging docility of the "scholars" concerned. And to finish the picture, there is the fantastic ease with which the victorious Allies were able to persuade top German scientists, who had held the key to important military inventions and worked with more or less devotion for the German war effort, to transfer the scene of their activities to the enemy's country.

Dr. Weinreich's book pays too great a compliment to these professors by taking them too seriously. Their shame is pettier than that and they were hardly ever guilty of having "ideas." That not one of the first-rate German scholars ever attained to a position of influence is a fact, but this fact does not mean that they did not try to. And even so, the majority of them were soon taken aback more or less by the outspoken vulgarity of the representatives of the Nazi regime—not, however, by their crimes. If anybody wants a real glance at the physiognomy of the average German professor under Hitler he should read the candid confession of Gerhard Ritter, professor of history at Freiburg, in the April, 1946 *Review of Politics*. This anti-Nazi professor kept his real opinions so secret and had so little knowledge of what was going on that he could feel that "the machinery of the Hitler Reich . . . did not function well." And he was so involved in the "deeper life of the intellect," so busy preventing "the inevitable damage from becoming too great," and so con-

vinced of his chances to "publish . . . independent views on historico-political questions"—although "there were certain impassable limits to [his] freedom as teacher"—that the Gestapo, to his own great surprise, decided to use him for propaganda abroad. . . .

ONE of the most horrible aspects of contemporary terror is that, no matter what its motives or ultimate aims, it invariably appears in the clothes of an inevitable logical conclusion made on the basis of some ideology or theory. To a far lesser degree this phenomenon was already to be seen in connection with the liquidation of the anti-Stalinists in Russia—which Stalin himself predicted and justified in 1930. He argued at that time that, since parties are nothing but the expression of class interests, factions inside the Communist party could not possibly be anything else than the expression of the interests of "dying classes" in the Soviet Union or of the bourgeoisie abroad. The obvious conclusion was that one had to deal with these factions as one would with a hostile class or with traitors. The trouble is, of course, that nobody except Stalin knows what the "true interests of the proletariat" are. Yet there is available an infallible doctrine on the course of history and the origin of human opinions that makes it possible for anyone not feeble-minded to obtain this knowledge—so why not Stalin? Besides, he holds the power. The expression, "dying classes," makes the argument even more convincing because it is attuned to historical progress—in accordance with whose laws man does only what would happen anyhow. The point at issue is not as to whether this is still true Marxism—or true Leninism either—but the fact that terror should appear as a logical, matter-of-course conclusion from a pseudo-scientific hypothesis.

This "scientificity" is indeed the common feature of all the totalitarian regimes of our time. But it means nothing more than that purely man-made power—mainly destructive—is dressed in the clothes of some superior, superhuman sanction from which it derives its absolute, not-to-be-questioned force. The Nazi brand of this kind of power is more thorough and more horrible than the Marxist or pseudo-Marxist, because it assigns to nature the role Marxism assigns to history. While the basis and source of history is still man, the basis and source of nature seems to be nothing at all or consists only in nature's own laws and functioning. The Nazi interpretation of these laws culminated in the tautology that the weak have an inclination to die and the strong an inclination to live. By killing the weak, we merely obey the orders of nature, which "sides with the

strong, the good, and the victorious." And Himmler would add: "You may call this cruel, but nature is cruel." By killing the weak and the helpless, one proves by implication that one belongs to the strong. A rather important by-product of this kind of reasoning is that it takes victory and defeat out of the hands of man and makes any opposition to the verdicts of reality hopeless by definition, since one no longer fights against man but against History or Nature—and thus to the reality of power itself is added a superstitious belief in the eternity of that power.

It was a general atmosphere of "scientificity" of this sort, coupled with efficient modern technique, that the Nazis needed for their death factories—but not science itself. Charlatans who sincerely believed the will of nature to be the will of God and felt themselves allied with superhuman and irresistible forces served Nazi purposes best—not real scholars, no matter how little courage real scholars may have shown and how great the attraction they may have felt towards Hitler.

But neither science, nor even "scientificity," neither scholars nor charlatans, supplied the ideas and techniques that operated the death factories. The ideas came from politicians who took power-politics seriously, and the techniques came from modern mob-men who were not afraid of consistency.

Fake

THE AMERICAN: A MIDDLE WESTERN LEGEND. By HOWARD FAST. NEW York, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1946. 337 pp. \$3.00.

Reviewed by OSCAR HANDLIN

SUPERFICIALLY, the career of John Peter Altgeld follows the traditional American scheme of success. Immigration as an infant, youth on a harsh, marginal farm, and a start in life through desultory, debilitating day-labor are the somber background; ultimate prosperity as a corporation lawyer and real estate operator, public popularity as a politician, and the crowning reward of high office—governorship of the state of Illinois, are the luminous relief.

The significance of the man, however, lies not so much in the extent of his conformity as in three deviations from the expected pattern: an enlightened and progressive study of criminality, a pardon granted in the face of violent disapproval to the Anarchists unjustly convicted of the Haymarket riot, and leadership in the movement that temporarily took control of the Democratic party away from the

conservative leadership of Grover Cleveland. All in all, Altgeld's life is well worthy of examination for the light it sheds on the development of American personality and for its reflections on the general character of politics in the United States at the end of the 19th century.

Mr. Fast's book unfortunately will satisfy few discerning readers in either respect. The work is undistinguished and unenlightening, remarkable chiefly for the opportunities it passes by, and interesting only to the extent that it offers occasion for examination of a technique that has won signal popularity for a long line of best-sellers. For, though it deals with Altgeld's life, this is not a biography. The jacket refers to it as a novel, the sub-title, with unconscious humor, as a legend. More properly, it falls into the vague category of historical novels, a genre at which its author has shown notable facility in recent years.

THE same rigorous canons of evidence that fetter a history manifestly do not bind a work of fiction. The novelist is free to make substantial changes in the order of events. He may omit what does not fit; here, for instance, there is no mention of the court case in which the Haymarket judge earned Altgeld's hostility, or of the macabre foundation for the hysteria after the riot, the bomb sent by the Anarchist Spies to a newspaper editor as a lunatic joke. Similarly the author may alter incidents, as when the suicide of one of the condemned men is turned into a murder by prison guards. Again, there is no reason why the characters should stand in the same relationship to each other as they did in actual life; Altgeld is thus made to despise instead of to court Samuel Gompers.

By labeling his work fiction, Mr. Fast may claim immunity for such liberties, but there is another order of obligations not so readily to be evaded. Even a novel should display a sense of the time and the place in which its incidents occurred. That quality is absent here even in its most rudimentary forms. There is no feeling at all for décor. The characters walk about without clothing in unfurnished rooms and speak a neutral, colorless language. Occasional half-hearted attempts to satisfy that deficiency lead to egregious blunders. In a conversation on literature, Altgeld expresses admiration for Tolstoy and Mark Twain, contempt for Dickens, a preference extremely improbable in a man of his period and position, and one that runs counter to Altgeld's own remarks upon the subject. When it comes to broader issues of society, such as immigration,

industrialization, and urbanization, or of politics, such as populism or the silver question, there is only pathetic and transparent ignorance.

More important, Mr. Fast's characters lack character; their actions are without meaning and without motivation. In the case of the protagonist, there is no insight into the forces that drove a successful lawyer and politician into unconventional and unpopular measures. In the case of the opposition, there is not even a pretense at understanding. Cleveland acts as he does because he sold out "to monopoly." But why he and why not Altgeld? The monopolists themselves, Pullman, Armour, Field, are simple demoniacal powers, shivering between orgies in the Union League Club at the very hint of proposals which, in retrospect at least, seem painfully innocuous. There is no need to account for the motions of lay-figures; their joints move by the simple will of the creator.

Yet precisely here lies the key to Mr. Fast's conception of the historical novel. The novelist who knows his craft finds no need to endow his characters with the names of actual people. The characters themselves are real people, Andrey Bolkonsky as much so as Kutuzov, Conte Mosca as much so as Prince Metternich. But in a work whose every page screams fake, the names of men who once lived are essential, because only the names are real.

A Martyr to Bohemia

OUT OF THIS CENTURY. By PEGGY GUGGENHEIM. New York, Dial Press, 1946. 365 pp. \$3.00.

Reviewed by K. HARDESH

THE book-reviewers, with their customary severity, have scolded Miss Guggenheim for not being a better girl than she is, or at least for not professing the minimum virtues we all owe to print. And some have pointed out to Miss Guggenheim what a spectacle she was making of herself in this book. As if she didn't intend that herself.

The general mistake has been to treat Miss Guggenheim as a subject when, as every one of her simple declarative sentences after page 24 should make clear, she has spent most of her life altogether as an object. And it is the self-contented naiveté with which she confesses her role as an object that makes her autobiography the true historical-social-cultural document it is, a piece of "modern evidence" indispensable to those who may want to investigate the state of mind of international culture and dissipation in the 1920's and 1930's.

Until the age of twenty-one, when she came into an independent fortune, Miss Guggenheim did show enough subjectivity to criticize the milieu into which she had been born, and to draw generalizations from her experience of it. It was after she was freed from her family that she became an object. The new world she then entered proved to be so overwhelming that she is able to record only the barest, most immediate details, boring and otherwise, of what has happened to her since. To these details the reader must apply his own insight and upon them make his own generalizations. Miss Guggenheim is not up to any.

Like the late Gertrude Stein, Miss Guggenheim is an American of German Jewish descent; like Miss Stein, she fled the *lares* and *penates* for Paris; and like Miss Stein, she succumbed uncritically, if on a different level, to international bohemia, becoming one of its most loyal citizens, faithful inhabitants, and assiduous celebrators. But where Miss Stein entered on the wings of literature, Miss Guggenheim flew in on money and a kind of vitality that amounts almost to genius (of which this book gives only the most scattered hints, which the reader has to piece together).

WHAT Miss Guggenheim fled from was moneyed, bourgeois, claustrophobic stuffiness. And it was for fear of being recaptured and returned to it somehow—the unconscious conviction that she would be, simply because Jews are forced to remain bourgeois in spite of themselves—that she threw herself so unreservedly into bohemia and has dwelt in it so unqualifiedly, recklessly, and gullibly. But it is the same fear of bourgeois life, essentially, that accounts for the feverishness with which many non-Latins in general since the beginning of the century have gone in for bohemia. Whereas heretofore only artists had made this internal emigration, in our age, laymen, moved chiefly by a desire for pleasures of a kind or of a quantity not permitted in bourgeois milieu, form a larger and larger proportion of the population of bohemia. But in order to get into bohemia they still have to show "cultural" passports. Perhaps this is the reason why Miss Guggenheim still feels that her citizenship in bohemia is insecure. As a sponsor and as a gallery-director she has done a great deal for modern art—and literature, too—but she is not principally interested in either; she is mainly interested in the freedom and excitement that go with artists' lives—and therefore has, as I seem to detect, an anxious feeling that her presence is possibly illicit.

In any case, Miss Guggenheim is unable to take any distance from the milieu in which

she has chosen to live her adult life. She accepts it on its own terms and claims, questioning and doubting nothing, incredulously grateful to be part of it, and therefore resigned to being victimized by it. Giving the details of this victimization with a helpless literalness, omitting nothing that might be humiliating, drowned in a self-absorption that flows from her total failure to solve either her environment or herself, Miss Guggenheim displays her career, unconsciously, as a martyrology. Her story is sadder than I can express. And that is, in a sense, her revenge on bohemia. . . .

As a Jew I am disturbed in a particular way by this account of the life of another Jew. Is this how naked and helpless we Jews become once we abandon our "system" completely and surrender ourselves to a world so utterly Gentile in its lack of prescriptions and prohibitions as bohemia really is? It is no use objecting that Miss Guggenheim's is a uniquely extreme case, and that personal circumstance has more to do with it than her Jewishness. In the list of the martyrs of bohemia, Jewish names stand out, the names of gifted Jews, too, not merely aberrated ones—beginning with Simeon Solomon in Pre-Raphaelite England and continuing through Modigliani, Pascin, and even Soutine, in Paris. In proportion to the size of the Jewish contingent in bohemia—which is smaller than one would expect—the martyrs are too many, and examples like Miss Guggenheim's too frequent.

What Gentiles Think

GENTILE AND JEW: A SYMPOSIUM.

Edited by CHAIM NEWMAN. London, Alliance Press Limited, no date. 372 pp. 12s. 6d.

Reviewed by GEORGE BECKER

THIS curious little book has a real significance, though logically it should be valueless. It consists of statements by one hundred non-Jews, mostly English, about the "Jewish problem." The problem itself is not defined in advance; there is no recognizable basis upon which the contributors were chosen; their statements range from the trivial to the philosophic; and the order of arrangement is alphabetical rather than analytical. The result is confused and uncritical. Yet for that very reason the book turns out to be a remarkably accurate mirroring of the confusion of the public on this question. It is certainly one step toward solution of a problem to discover that understandings and solutions of that problem are as varied and as numerous as the people involved.

As might be expected, each of the contributors does little more than bring his own prepossessions to bear on the question without thought, and quite without self-criticism. The rather large sprinkling of Christian clergymen urge the application of Christian charity. The Russophiles point happily to the USSR and extol Biro-Bidjan as a better Zion. Government leaders rest on the vague official guarantees of their governments. The devotees of 19th-century nationalism nod enthusiastically in the direction of Zionism. The professional social scientists write sagely of scapegoat theories and cultural dislocations. The professional patriots (the book was compiled in wartime) see the problem in terms of annihilation of the Nazis. Root-and-branch reformers alternately espouse social ostracism of anti-Semites and a self-denying ordinance by the Jews themselves. And at the end we are back just where we started. But just because the opinions are unthoughtful, "horseback opinions," they are illuminating as documentary material, if not as thought.

IT SEEMS clear that Gentile contributors and Jewish editor alike see the Problem (or 101 Problems) through a semantic haze. For the most part they seem to overlook the basic fact: *Jews are people*—as various as people anywhere and with as great a variety of experience and aspirations as any other collection of some millions of human beings. Particularly ridiculous is the querulous demand of one contributor to know what the Jews themselves want, and the reply of the editor that "there must be a Jewish answer; *one* answer, not a discordant medley of strident tones."

Mostly what Jews want is what other people want: to enjoy such integrity of personality as the conditions of life permit and *not* to be pushed around. Some apparently feel that they will be emotionally incomplete without a country of their own; others would find life intolerable anywhere but where they are. Some, no doubt, want to be assimilated, but only on their own terms; and it is likely that none wants to be assimilated exclusively on somebody else's terms.

The point is that in a basic sense the problem cannot even be viewed until it is broken up and examined in terms of multi-faceted human personalities, and one suspects that if enough people could be brought to look at it in this way instead of as a capitalized abstraction, there might cease to be a problem at all. The value of this book is that it demonstrates how little of concerted understanding there is even among presumably competent and educated people.

One wonders, to what extent the obverse of this exists among Jews, to what extent they too, under fearful emotional pressure, are conjuring up other capitalized abstractions. The editor of this volume, not content with letting the Gentile mind convict itself, wrote a preface, an epilogue, and a post-epilogue—"The Voice of the Jew," in which he succeeds in formulating a picture of a persecuted people united in their hunger for Zion, and universally imbued with the conviction that they are God's chosen race. One can't believe that this stereotype has any broad validity, and one wonders if he too should not discover that Jews are people.

Building a Language

PHILOSOPHICAL CLASSICS. Vols. 1-22.

Jerusalem, Hebrew University Press.

\$.75 and \$1.00 per volume.

Reviewed by LEON ROTH

THE publication in Hebrew of the famous first book ("Of the Understanding") of David Hume's *Treatise of Human Nature* sets the seal on an enterprise of considerable educational and philological interest. It is no less than that of making an ancient language grow into modern needs.

How the necessity arose and how it was met is the particular subject of the present review; but it would be ungrateful not to signalize, however briefly, the merits of the translation last published. It is the work of Joseph Ur, M.A. of the Hebrew University, and is marked by a limpidity and simplicity worthy of the original. The student is embarrassed by no distressing neologisms, and only the most necessary notes (and these on points of major philosophical interest) are allowed to obtrude on his attention; and even these are placed modestly at the end. The care with which the work has been done is evidenced by the list of terms added in a short appendix and by the brief illuminating references to parallel doctrines of other thinkers given as footnotes to the text.

This version of Hume appears as Volumes 21 and 22 in a series of *Philosophical Classics* issued by the Hebrew University Press, a series which so far includes some of the works of Aristotle (*Metaphysics*, Books I and XI; *Politics*, I-II), Berkeley (*Principles*), Descartes (*Discourse on Method*; *Meditations*), Fichte (*Vocation of Man*), Hume (*Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*), Kant (*Metaphysic of Ethics*; *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic*), Leibnitz (*New System and Other Writings*), Locke (*Essay Concerning Human Understanding*), Maimonides (*Introduction to*

Logic), Mill (*Utilitarianism*), Plato (*Theaetetus*; *Protagoras*; *Meno*), Rousseau (*Social Contract*).

With one or two exceptions (Maimonides' *Introduction to Logic* and possibly the eleventh book of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*), the books named are those normally used in university teaching. But the labor involved in their production was not undertaken for this purpose only—nor was the problem approached haphazardly. There was a specific difficulty which had to be surmounted, and the series of *Philosophical Classics* is its deliberate solution.

THE difficulty was this. The Hebrew language had passed through certain stages in its evolution and then stopped. In the medieval period it had shown itself adequate to all the needs of the time, and the vast translational activity for which it is justly famous succeeded in taking over from the Arabic, and afterwards from the Latin and the vernaculars, all that was best in the thought of the age. Mathematics, medicine, astronomy, alchemy, physics, psychology, folklore, even the *Romance of Amadis of Gaul* and the *Round Table of King Arthur*, found their expression in Hebrew. In particular, the Provençal school of translators made it their business to make the language a vehicle for philosophy, and a comparatively short time saw in Hebrew standard philosophical treatises both of Jews and of non-Jews from Aristotle to Maimonides, Aquinas, and Averroes.

But at this point, so far as philosophy is concerned, the Hebrew language stuck. In other subjects it progressed naturally, and the poets and the rabbinical writers developed an instrument which, with some further adaptation, was adequate to modern needs. But in philosophy this was not so. When Solomon Maimon, the contemporary and critic of Kant, wrote his Hebrew commentary on Maimonides' *Guide*, he wrote it in the language of the 13th-century translators. When Krochmal (1785-1840), the last Hebrew-writing classic philosopher, wrote his *Guide to the Perplexed of These Times*, it was so much in the medieval style and idiom as to be incomprehensible to anyone unaccustomed to the latter. This book, a series of inquiries into problems of history, metaphysics, and religion, was published in 1851 (eight years after Mill's *Logic*!), at a period when Emerson and Macaulay were already established writers, and Spencer, Sainte-Beuve, Taine, and Renan were beginning, when Grote had published most of his history of Greece, and Cardinal Newman his *Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine*—and yet Krochmal is bound fast in a terminology fixed by medieval scholasticism. His Hebrew is the

Hebrew of the Tibbonidae of the 13th and 14th centuries. There is a gap of five hundred years!

It was thus patent that philosophy had to be taught Hebrew afresh, or rather, that Hebrew had to be taught modern philosophy. And the only way to teach it was the systematic way. Hebrew had to be put through the same stages of philosophical development as had any other modern language. Other languages had been made to abandon the medieval idiom (Latin in their cases), and to adopt modern speech. Hebrew had to be forced to do the same. And the way was obvious, to start with the first modern expressions of philosophical thought, make Hebrew assimilate them, and then pass on to the more recent.

A START was therefore made with Descartes, the great progenitor of the rationalist school who, as is well known, abandoned the language of the learned, Latin, and wrote his *Discourse on Method* in the vulgar tongue, French. When his two essential books had been translated (that is to say, when Hebrew had been induced to digest Descartes), we turned to Locke, the great progenitor of the empiricists. Locke's *Essay* is a huge book; but the Delegates of the Clarendon Press had recently published an abridgement which reduced it to about one half of its original bulk, and they were generous enough to allow us to use the shorter form. Thus we were able to grapple with this remarkable encyclopedia of philosophical thought in the 17th century with comparative ease. (Even so, our version when finally printed covered more than nine hundred pages of our small volumes). After Hebrew had assimilated these giants, it had no difficulty with their successors—Leibnitz, Berkeley, Hume, Rousseau. Hebrew was thus carried to the threshold of the later philosophical development; and at the cost of a special effort, the two streams of Continental rationalism and English empiricism were brought together in Hebrew by versions of two of the smaller although central works of Kant.

An essential part of all this labor was the testing of the medieval vocabulary itself. This was done largely by a novel use of a small treatise of Maimonides, the well-known *Introduction to Logic*. This work offers a clear conspectus not only of Aristotelian logic but of medieval Aristotelianism as a whole, and it has the additional advantages of having been a favorite book for centuries and having been translated from the original Arabic and edited many times. The edition published by our Press, while carefully watched by a competent philologist, has the unique distinction of being devoted to severely practical ends. We asked

ourselves how far each Hebrew word used was adequate to its purpose. If it was adequate, it was left, a translation into Latin or a modern language being given below; if for any reason it was inadequate, a substitute was suggested, while another meaning was offered for the rejected word itself. In this way a systematic attempt was made—within the limits offered by this small treatise—to standardize Hebrew philosophical vocabulary. How far it was successful, others will judge. It is interesting, however, to observe that during many years of lecturing on ordinary logic I have found no reason to depart from the usage laid down.

AND this brings me to the rest of the translations published, those from the Greek. In a teaching university one of the principal problems is the provision of standard textbooks (it is no use lecturing on books that are not easily available); and an essential part of any sound philosophical education is the study of Plato and Aristotle. Apart from any considerations of language, therefore, it was imperative to provide our students with Hebrew versions of some of their more important works. A good deal of Plato has been made available to Hebrew readers in recent times, notably by the efforts of Professor Klausner and the late Professor Diesendruck, and we only had to call in the services of that veteran translator, Mr. Leon Simon, in order to fill in a few of the more obvious gaps. Aristotle was a more difficult problem. The medieval versions are hopelessly inadequate, and such modern ones as exist are no better; and in any case no existing versions seem to have been made directly from the Greek. So a new start had to be made by us. There have appeared in print: the first book of the *Metaphysics*, containing Aristotle's account of his predecessors—and we use it for what it is, the best summary introduction to the history of Greek philosophy; the first two books of the *Politics*, containing the imperishable groundwork of all succeeding inquiries into politics and sociology; and that book of the *Metaphysics* containing Aristotle's doctrine of God which was of such transcendental importance in the framing of the whole of medieval philosophy and within it, of course, Jewish philosophy. The work as a whole is being continued now by a version of some books of the *Ethics*.

It may be of interest to add that we are not and have not been in a hurry to print. Every one of these versions has been tried out, and many of them many times, in classwork. They are mimeographed and distributed, and then read and reread in classes and seminars till we feel they are as adequate as we can make them.

It is true we are now getting more confident, and some of the forthcoming volumes will not be read first in class. But they will be read and reread in manuscript, in typescript, and in successive proofs, by those who have been engaged in the work from the first and know what has been done and what can be done. If I say that the forthcoming volumes include the *Dialogues* of Berkeley and the scientific essays of Pascal, it will be seen that we are keeping within our original plan of teaching the Hebrew language to think with the best.

ONE final word. In case anyone fears we are so wrapped up in the classics that we have no time for anything alive, I may add that a parallel series to the *Philosophical Classics* contains more modern aids to the student. This second series is to comprise a number of translations of modern standard works which have a general as well as a professional value—good instances are the two volumes which have al-

ready appeared, Muirhead's *Elements of Ethics* and Russell's *Problems of Philosophy*. The former is a favorite handbook which has weathered the storms of well-nigh fifty years' use in university class rooms and extension lectures; the latter is an introduction to the problems of philosophy which is as interesting to the layman as it is stimulating to the student. Together with the original works in Hebrew produced by members of the University's philosophy department, which include Professor Bergmann's *Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge* and Professor Roth's *Guide to the Study of Ancient Philosophy* and *Guide to the Study of Modern Philosophy*, these supplementary volumes will soon suffice to give the student at the Hebrew University all the help needed for the rational study of philosophy through the medium of the Hebrew language, and thus the work undertaken in the publication of the *Philosophical Classics* will reach its full consummation.

BOOK REVIEWERS IN THIS ISSUE

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CURRENT BOOKS ON JEWISH SUBJECTS

FROM GENEVA TO SAN FRANCISCO. By NORMAN BENTWICH. London, Gollancz, 1946. 111 pp. 8s. 6d.

A continuation of his autobiography, "Wanderer Between Two Worlds."

ODYSSEY THROUGH HELL. By RAYMOND ARTHUR DAVIS. New York, L. B. Fischer, 1946. 235 pp. \$2.50.

The Jewish situation in Eastern Europe.

HAD GADYA. By EFRAIM M. ROSENZWEIG and TODROS GELLER. Chicago, L. M. Stein, 1946. \$2.00.

A traditional Jewish children's tale.

AN HONORABLE TITAN. By GERALD W. JOHNSON. New York, Harper, 1946. 313 pp. \$3.50.

A biography of Adolph S. Ochs, publisher of the New York Times.

REBELLION IN PALESTINE. By JOHN MARLOWE. London, Cresset Press, 1946. 269 pp. 12s. 6d.

An objective analysis of the British administration in Palestine and the conflict between Jews and Arabs.

THE HISTORY OF THE JEWS OF ITALY. By CECIL ROTH. Philadelphia, Jewish Publication Society of America, 1946. xiv, 575 pp. \$3.00.

HABIBI AND YOW; A LITTLE BOY AND HIS DOG. By MRS. ALTHEA OSHER. New York, Bloch, 1946. 108 pp. \$2.00.

How a little boy grows up, learning the traditions of Judaism.

IN SEARCH OF THE PERMANENT. By ALEXANDER ALAN STEINBACH. Wings Press, 1946. 160 pp. \$2.00.

Essays by a rabbi.

PATHWAYS THROUGH THE BIBLE. By MORTIMER J. COHEN. Illus. by ARTHUR SZYK. Philadelphia, Jewish Publication Society of America, 1946. 540 pp.